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ABSTRACT
This work is a critical study of some of the funda­
mental themes of F.H. Bradley's Appe.an.anc2. and Rcatdty. 
For the most part, the discussion is confined to the 
subjects discussed in the crucial early chapters of the 
first Book.
It is my contention that the conclusions reached in 
the earlier chapters of Bradley's work - in particular, 
Chapters II and III - cannot be sustained by the argu­
ments which Bradley employs in their favour. To the ex­
tent which the conclusions of the later chapters do 
rest upon the soundness of these arguments, they are, I 
suggest, of questionable merit.
But the purpose of this work is not entirely criti­
cal. Where possible, I have argued for certain views 
which, I believe, avoid those aspects of Bradley's crit­
ical argumentation which are sound. Among the positive 
conclusions reached are the following: that reality and 
existence are co-extensive; that a distinction between 
reality and appearance can be effected which does not 
involve the assumption that there are real or existent 
appearances; that an ontological distinction between 
substances, qualities, and relations is defensible; that 
substances, qualities, and relations are real and exist­
ent; and, that substances, qualities, and relations are 
particular, rather than universal entities. This last 
conclusion, in conjunction with the theory of substance 
which I defend, leads to a doctrine of universal
determinism, similar to that held by McTaggart. An app 
lication of Bradley's infinite regress argument, with 
respect to relations, provides the basis for a réfutât 
ion of classical, or Cartesian, materialism.
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Introduction
1. This work is a critical study of what I consider to be 
some of the fundamental themes of F.H. Bradley’s Appe.a/iance. 
and Reality. For the most part I have confined my attention 
to the subjects discussed in the earlier chapters of the . 
first Book. Such a limitation is not entirely without justif­
ication. Bradley himself, at the end of the third chapter of 
the book remarks that if the reader has understood and accept 
ed the arguments in that chapter, he need spend little time 
with those that succeed it - the cogency of the arguments in 
the latter chapters being largely dependent upon the sound­
ness of -those which precede them. A considered assessment of 
the merits of the arguments found in the earlier chapters, 
such as I have attempted here, would seem, then, to be if not 
a sufficient, at least a necessary propaedeutic to those 
found in the later chapters.
It is my contention, however, that the conclusions reached 
in the earlier chapters of Appe.a/iancz and Reality - in partic­
ular, Chapters II and III - cannot be sustained by the argu­
ments which Bradley employs in their favour. To the extent 
which the conclusions of the later chapters do rest upon the 
soundness of these arguments, they are, I suggest, of quest­
ionable merit.
But the purpose of this work is not entirely critical. 
Where possible, I have put forward certain views which, I 
believe, avoid those aspects of Bradley's critical argument­
ation which are sound.
2. I begin with a chapter on the distinction, drawn by 
some philosophers, between reality and existence. The rele­
2)
vance of such a discussion to Bradley’s work might not be 
immediately apparent. But I think it will become evident in 
later discussion that the viability of Bradley’s views on 
the distinction between appearance and reality is largely 
determined by the extent to which, if at all, a distinction 
between reality and existence can be defended. It also pro- ' 
vides an opportunity to discuss a number of issues which are 
not, perhaps, adequately discussed by Bradley himself; and 
yet whose relevance, both to his own metaphysic and to con­
temporary metaphysics, is undeniable.
3. Among the positive conclusions reached in this work are 
the following; that reality and existence are co-extensive; 
that a distinction between reality and appearance can be 
effected which does not involve the assumption that there are 
real or existent appearances; that an ontological distinction 
between substances, qualities, and relations is defensible; 
that substances, qualities, and relations are real and exist­
ent;’ and, that substances, qualities, and relations are part­
icular, rather than universal, entities. This last conclusion) 
in conjunction with the theory of substance which I defend, 
leads to a doctrine of universal determinism, similar to that 
held by McTaggart. An application of Bradley's infinite re­
gress argument, with respect to relations, provides the basis 
of a refutation of classical, or Cartesian, materialism.
Each of the above conclusions is reached largely as the 
result of, and in some cases a reaction against, Bradley’s 
views. The theory of substance, for example, owes much to 
Bradley; although my conviction that his conclusions about 
the nature and status of relations are false, has led to the 
view that pluralism - the theory that there is more than one
3)
existent substance - is a consistent view to take.
4.. Some explanation should be made, at this stage, of some 
technical terms to be found in the discussion.
By entity, I mean any being, regardless of its ontological 
status or kind. Qualities, relations, facts, and substances, 
for example, are all entities. ,
By implication., I mean what is sometimes known as entail- 
ment.. I do not think that this relation can be defined; and 
it is to be distinguished from the contemporary notion of 
material implication.
By dete/iminationt I mean a relation between entities, 
corresponding to the relation of implication which exists 
between some propositions.
Other terms, when used in a technical sense, I have endeav­
oured to explain as they arise in the text.
5. References to Bradley’s works are to the following 
editions, and will be abbreviated in the following way: 
Appea/iance and Reality (AR_) - 2nd Edition, Ninth Impression, 
Oxford University Press, 1930.
Ike. p/iincip le* o-jL Logic (PL) - 2nd Edition, Corrected Impress­
ion, Oxford University Press, 1928.
¿¿¿ay* on 7nutk and Reality (ETR) -1st Edition, Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1 91 4- -
Collected ¿¿¿ay* (C_E) - Oxford University Press, 1935.
References to other works, and explanatory notes, will be 
found at the end of each chapter.
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Chapter 1 - Re.aiLty and Lx.L4te.nae.
6. The purpose of this chapter is to determine to what 
extent reality can be identified with existence. The belief 
that there are existents, namely appearances, which are not 
ultimately real, is central to Bradley's metaphysic. Reality, 
according to Bradley, is not exhausted by the existent. In 
the following chapter I will discuss his theory of appear­
ances, and the related doctrine of degrees of reality. But
we must first attempt to decide the more general question of 
the extent to which, if at all, a distinction between reality 
and existence is justified.
7. I think it is fair to say that, among those who have 
not considered the question, there is a general presumption 
that reality and existence are coextensive - that there is 
nothing existent which is not real, and nothing real which 
is not existent. But this presumption has been challenged by 
a number of philosophers, Bradley included. Various reasons 
have been given for recognizing a distinction between the 
two realms. Perhaps the best known is that put forward, at 
one time, by Bertrand Russell.
The distinction is essential if we are ever to deny 
the existence of anything. For what does not exist must 
be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its
existence; and hence we need the concept of being as
—  • "lthat which belongs even to the non-existent.
Although Russell himself later rejected this view, it is 
still accepted by some philosophers, particularly those
5)
influenced by the theories of Plato and Meinong.
Another reason that has been given for introducing a 
distinction is that it is considered to be necessary for the 
accommodation of some cognitive objects which are not, for 
various reasons, considered to be existent. Among the types 
of entities that have been considered to be real, but not 
existent, are: characteristics (qualities and relations); 
possibilia; propositions; past and future entities; and 
fictional or imaginary entities.
Among those who have advocated the introduction of a 
distinction between reality and existence, most have taken 
the view that, whilst there are realities which do not exist, 
there are no existents which are not real. Few have consist­
ently believed that reality and existence are mutually 
exclusive. And none, to my knowledge, apart from Bradley, 
have believed that there are existents which are real, with­
out being ultimately real. That is to say, the doctrine of 
degrees of reality has been almost unanimously rejected. We 
might say, then, that among those who recognise a distinction, 
the most popular, and probably the most easily defended 
position, is that the existent is a species, or sub-class, of 
the real.
8. But what do we mean by the terms ’reality’ and ’exist­
ence’? And are they co-extensive?
. pFollowing McTaggart , we ought, I think, to conclude that 
these terras are indefinable; and that, in attempting to 
determine their meaning, we should start with their denotation 
rather than their connotation. Attempts have been made to 
define these terms, but for the most part, these ’definitions’ 
amount simply to statements of the conditions of existence.
6)
Or else there is a tendency to confuse what are generally
considered to be essential characteristics of existent
entities, with existence itself. Bradley himself, in a number
of places, identifies reality with experience, and existence
with the series of spatially and temporally given phenomena.
But it is clear that if such statements are true, they are, •/
synthetic truths. Reality does not mean experience, since 
there are philosophers who have claimed that there are 
realities which are neither experiences, nor parts of 
experiences; and such claims, whether they are true or false, 
are not self-contradictory. Likewise, existence does not 
mean the series of spatially and temporally given phenomena, 
since there are those who have argued that no existents can 
have spatial or temporal characteristics. And such claims, 
once again, are not self-contradictory. A similar line of 
argument can, I think, be used against most other attempts to 
define these terms.
But are the terms coextensive? I believe that they are, 
and that the presumption against non-existent realities is 
justified. We cannot, however, ignore those claims to the 
contrary. The rest of this chapter will accordingly be 
devoted to the discussion of some of the reasons that have 
been given for introducing a distinction between reality and 
existence.
9. The first argument to be considered is that put forward 
by Bertrand Russell in Ike P/iinclp tet o-fL PI at hematics, and 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The argument 
might be classified as a ’transcendental’ argument, since it 
begins with the assumption of a proposition which is thought 
to be either self-evidently true, or universally accepted as
7)
true, and then attempts to show that the truth of this prop­
osition is dependent upon the truth of further propositions 
which are not self-evidently true, or universally accepted as 
true. The initial assumption, in Russell’s case, is that 
there are true and meaningful judgements which deny the
existence of certain entities. In order to account for this/
fact, so Russell argues, we must postulate a realm of non­
existent entities which can function as the referents of 
such judgements. A sufficient condition for proving that a 
particular entity ¿a or has being, is, he argues, simply that 
it should be mentioned.
"A .is not” implies that there is a term A whose being 
is denied, and hence that A is. Thus unless "A is not” 
be an empty sound, it must be false - whatever A may be, 
it certainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, 
chimeras and four dimensional spaces all have being, 
for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make 
no propositions about them. Thus being is a general _ 
attribute of everything, and to mention anything is to 
show that it is.^
Existence, on the other hand, is said to be "the prerog­
ative of some only amongst beings!'.
10. There are a number of objections to this view. The 
first is that Russell, himself, undermined the soundness of 
the argument with the introduction of his theory of descript­
ions. Whether or not the theory, or some modified version of 
it, is true, is still a matter of debate. But the important
point is that it does at least raise the question of the
8)
truth of the claim that significant negative existential 
judgements presuppose the being or reality of that which is 
judged to be non-existent. And this is all that is required 
to provide a significant objection to the argument.
11. Secondly, even if Russell's theory of descriptions
should prove to be untenable, we are still not committed to '/
the reality of non-existent objects. Other philosophers, 
including Bradley, have offered alternative analyses of 
negative existential judgements which do not presuppose the 
being or reality of non-existent entities. For the most part, 
these analyses are based upon a distinction between the 
grammatical and the logical forms of judgements. Bradley 
expresses the distinction in the following way.
In existential judgement, as we saw before (Chap. II, 
§4-2), the apparent is not the actual subject. Let us 
take such a denial as "Chimeras are non-existent". 
"Chimeras" is here ostensibly the subject, but is really 
the predicate. It is the quality of harbouring chimeras 
which is denied of the nature of things. And we deny 
this because, if chimeras existed, we should have to 
alter our view of the world. (PL, p.120)
A similar approach to negative existential judgements was 
taken by C.D. Broad, in his book S cie.nti/.ic 1 thought.
Many English peasants, in the Middle Ages, must have 
made the judgements "Puck exists" or "Puck has turned 
the milk". And the latter of these, of course, implies 
the former. I will assume (in spite of Sir Arthur Conan
9)
Doyle) that Puck does not in fact exist. What were these 
men referring to, in our sense of the word? To answer 
this we have simply to ask: What fact made their judge­
ments false? The answer is that it is the negative fact 
that no part of the universe was characterised by the 
set of characteristics by which they described Puck fo 
themselves. Their judgement boils down to the assertion 
that some part of the existent is characterised by this 
set of characteristics, and it is false because it dis­
cords with the negative fact that the set in question 
characterises no part of the universe. Naturally they 
did not know that this was what their judgement referred 
to, ( o? they would not have made it. But, in our sense 
of reference, there is no reason *why a person who makes 
a judgement should know what it refers to.
Now it would obviously be absurd to say that what 
these men were tatklng atout was the negative fact that 
no part of the universe has the characteristics which 
they ascribe to Puck. Hence we see the need of disting­
uishing between what a judgement refers to and what the 
person who makes the judgement is talking about. What 
they were talking about was a certain set of character­
istics, viz., those by which they described Puck to 
themselves. This may be called the logical subject of 
their judgement... Thus, although there is no such being 
as Puck, people who profess to be judging about him are 
not judging about nothing (for they are judging about a 
set of characteristics which is itself real, though it 
does not happen to characterise any particular existent). 
.N.or are they referring to nothing (for they are referring
10)
' - though they do not know it - to an important negative 
fact about the existent).
12. Upon this basis we can, I think, give an explanation
as to why it has been thought to be necessary to postulate
the reality of the subject of significant negative existen.t-
ial judgements. The error has, I think, arisen largely from
a confusion between the need to posit the reality of the
content (or, what Broad has called the "logical subject") of
■  ̂
the judgement, and the reality of the object or referent.
From the true premiss that the parts, or constituents, of
what is real must, themselves, be real or existent; and from
the further premiss that the judgement "Puck is non-existent"
is real, the false conclusion is drawn* that there is a
real entity named Puck who is a constituent of the judgement,
and that, since the parts of such judgements are real, Puck
must be real. But as we have seen, the judgement "Puck is
non-existent" does not have Puck as a constituent, though it
can be said to have a set of characteristics or a dzAc/iiption
as a constituent. A description or set of characteristics is
not, however, a substance; and the reality of a description
does not imply that there is a real or existent substance
which it describes. We can conclude, then, that the reality
of judgements of the form "X is non-existent" does not imply
that X is a constituent of the judgement, or that X is real.
13. A third reason for rejecting the view that there must 
be a realm of non-existent realities if negative existential 
judgements are to be true or meaningful is that it leads to 
the unacceptable conclusion that, whenever the judgement
"X is unreal" is made, it would imply the truth of the con­
tradictory proposition that X is real; unless, of course, a 
realm of entities distinct from either reality or existence 
(analogous, perhaps, to Meinong’s realm of Aa^^c/i^cln) is 
posited. It is clear, however, that the introduction of such 
a realm is suspiciously ad hoc, and serves to generate an 
indefinite regress of distinct realms - each posited to . 
provide truth-conditions for judgements which profess to 
exclude some entity from a particular realm.
14-. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the argument 
in question is circular. When I make the judgement "X does 
not exist", what reason do I have for concluding that 1X 1 is 
the name of a real entity apart from the fact that it per­
forms a sijBjLlar grammatical function to other words which I 
know to be names of real or existent entities? But a word is 
only a name in so far as it does name or denote some entity.
A word which performs a similar grammatical function to a 
name is not a name unless it does denote an entity. Thus, 
when I argue from the existence of the judgement "X does not 
exist", to the conclusion that ,X I names a real entity, I 
can only do so by a^tuming that there is a real entity which 
rX ’ names. But this assumption renders the argument circular.
15. We can conclude, then, on the basis of the above 
objections, that Russell’s argument in favour of non-existent 
realities is inconclusive and, if the last point is correct, 
invalid. So that we have no reason, as yet, to suppose that 
there are non-existent realities. There are, however, some 
other arguments to be considered.
16. It has been suggested that the introduction of a 
distinction between reality and existence is needed to 
accommodate a number of types of cognitive objects which are
12)
not generally considered to be existent. I will firstly 
consider the case for non-existent qualities and relations.
A number of arguments have been put forward in defence of 
non-existent qualities and relations. The first to be con­
sidered is perhaps the most fundamental. It is based upon a 
distinction between qualities and relations pe./i ¿e., such as 
whiteness and difference, and instances of qualities and 
relations, such as the whiteness of this sheet of paper, and 
the relation of difference which exists between my pen and 
this paper. Whilst the latter instance.* of qualities and 
relations are said to be particular and existent, the former 
are said to be unlue./i¿at¿ which, although real, are non­
existent, In support of this position, an appeal is sometimes 
made to the alleged fact that we may be aware of a quality 
pe./i ¿e. or a relation pe./t ¿e. , as distinct from particular 
instances of these qualities and relations. And, so the 
argument goes, since qualities can only exist as the quali­
ties of existent entities, and since relations can only exist 
between existent entities, the fact that we are aware of 
qualities and relations p&ji ¿e., which are not qualities of, •­
or relations between, existent entities, implies that these 
qualities and relations must be real, without being existent.
17. One way of replying to this argument is to simply 
deny that we are ever aware of qualities or relations pe.n. ¿e.. 
What we are in fact aware of, when we seem to be aware of a
quality or a relation pe./i ¿e., is always a particular instance
- 7of that quality or relation.
This reply is difficult to deal with, since it challenges 
the truth of one of the unargued premisses of the argument»- 
a premiss which is assumed to be universally accepted as
13)
true. At this point a stalemate may appear to have been 
reached. But the onus of proof does seem to lie with those 
who deny that we are ever aware of characteristics which are 
not characteristics of existent entities, since there are 
characteristics of which we seem to be aware - for example,
the quality of perfect circularity - which do not directly/
characterise anything existent. I will return to this point 
in Section 19.
18. Another, perhaps more satisfactory, reply is to deny 
that a legitimate distinction can be effected between exist­
ent qualities and relations, and qualities and relations pest
* 8
¿e,. Some philosophers have claimed that all existent qual­
ities and relations are universals; so that, whenever we are 
aware of any existent quality or relation we are, ipAo £acto, 
aware of the quality or relation pz/i This view is some­
times known as Immanent Realism. If this view is correct, it 
would appear that we have no need to postulate non-existent 
qualities and relations to account for the fact that we are 
sometimes aware of qualities and relations p&n. ¿e,.
I think that this reply is adequate to account for those 
qualities and relations which are known to exist. But, as 
with the previous reply, a difficulty emerges when we consid­
er those characteristics, such as perfect circularity or 
dragonhood, which do not seem to characterise any existents. 
How are we to deal with these examples?
19. The correct approach to this problem has, I believe,
obeen suggested by McTaggart . It is true, he admits, that 
the quality of dragonhood, for example, does not directly 
qualify any existent entity. But this does not imply that the 
quality of dragonhood is not a constituent of some more
u )
complex quality which does qualify at least one existent.
And, as a matter of fact, the quality of dragonhood is a 
constituent of the complex negative quality, non-dragonhood, 
which, by an application of the principle of Excluded Middle, 
can be shown to be a quality of all existents. When combined
r*
with the view that the qualities and relations of existent 
entities are universals, we have a solution to our problem; 
since one is aware of the quality of dragonhood in virtue of 
the fact that one is aware of the complex quality, non- 
dragonhood, which is a quality of all existents.
We may use this principle to cover any conceivable quality 
or relation, since, according to the law of Excluded Middle, 
for any quality A, or any relation r, any substance must 
either be the bearer of this quality, 'or its corresponding 
negative quality non-A, of which A is a constituent. Similar­
ly, the substance must either bear the relation r, or the 
relation non-r, to any other substance. In this way we can 
explain the awareness of qualities and relations which, p/ilma 
£acie.t are not qualities of, or relations between, existent 
entities, without the need to postulate the reality of non­
existent qualities and relations.
20. The admission of negative characteristics into an 
ontology has, however, been criticised. And, since the 
existence of negative characteristics is essential to our 
argument, we mast, before continuing, consider some of these 
ob j ections.
In his recent work, Uniue./iAaiA and Sale.ntl-jilc Re,aiiAm,
D.M. Armstrong raises the following objections to negative 
characteristics.
15)
When 1-P1 applies to a number of particulars it is 
implausible to suggest that the predicate applies be­
cause the particulars are identical in some respect. If 
particulars are identical in a respect, then they re­
semble each other. But it is surely implausible to
suggest that not (Le.ing P is a point in which a,£,c..etc.
i oresemble each other.
.. the admission of negative properties leads to a
conclusion., that every particular must have exactly
11the same number of properties.
.. properties should be such that it at least makes
sense to attribute causal powers*to objects in virtue
of these properties. But how could a mere lack or
1 2absence endow anything with causal powers?
I will consider each of these objections in turn.
21. Firstly, it is not at all implausible to suggest that 
all particulars which have a common negative characteristic 
resemble each other. Armstrong, himself, has mentioned one 
example - the property of not accelerating through the speed 
of light - a property which is common to all material part­
iculars, and a respect in which they are identical. Another 
example is the property of being non-spatial - a property 
which is considered by some philosophers to be an essential 
characteristic of mental, as distinct from material, partic­
ulars. And it is unreasonable to suggest tjaat, if we accept 
this view, that mental particulars do not resemble each other 
or that they are not identical, in this respect.
16)
22. The second objection is even less convincing. There 
is nothing inherently absurd in the suggestion that every 
particular has the same number of properties. The suggestion 
may seem surprising, but the fact that it is surprising does 
not imply that it is false. Neither does the fact that it 
conflicts with belief that the number of properties belonging 
to an entity is to be determined by a pô tjz/iio/il methods 
show that it is false; since the belief that the number of 
properties belonging to an entity is to be determined by 
a poAte./iLosiL methods is simply an unargued presumption.
Armstrong then mentions a further argument, which he 
attributes to Alan Musgrove.
.. if everything has the same number of properties.it
will become difficult to understand statements like
’ a resembles & more than a resembles c’ where a, (L and
c are particulars. It will not be possible to analyse
such statements by saying that a and L have more common
1 3properties than L and c have.
Unfortunately, the argument involves a non ¿zquitiui. Why 
can’t statements such as "a resembles b more than a resembles 
c” be analysed in the proposed way? The fact that a, b and c 
have the same number of properties in common does not imply 
that they’have the same number of common properties. But 
unless the latter, erroneous, assumption is made, the argu­
ment is-irrelevant as an objection to the suggestion that 
all particulars have the same number of properties.
Another argument, this time suggested by Edward Khamara, 
is used by Armstrong to support his position. The suggestion
17)
is that McTaggart's argument depends upon the assumption 
that, for each particular, and for each property, the only 
two alternatives are, that the particular has the property, 
or that it has the corresponding negative property. The 
objection to this assumption is that,
/
.. there might be properties such that, if the partic­
ular falls in a certain "category", it neither has nor
lacks that property. (Virtue is neither circular nor 
1 Lnot circular). ^
Once again, the argument in question involves a non 
ae.quitu/1, McTaggart's actual argument is intended to show 
that all pa/iticuia/iA, or substances, m-ust, with respect to 
some quality, either have that quality or its corresponding 
negative quality. But the statement that virtue is neither 
circular nor non-circular is irrelevant as a counter-example, 
since virtue is a quailty and not a particular, and McTagg- 
art's argument is concerned only with particulars.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the example
in question is false. Virtue i/> non-circular, since it is
not a quality with a spatial dimension, and what is not
1 5spatially extended cannot be circular.
23. The third objection which Armstrong raises against 
the admission of negative characteristics is unsatisfactory 
for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is not true 
that negative characteristics do not have 'causal powers', if 
causation is analysed in terms of the necessary and sufficien- 
conditions that are required for the occurrence of a partic­
ular event. To use an example mentioned by Armstrong - it is
18)
a sufficient condition for the death of a man that his body- 
lack water. That is to say, the negative quality of lacking 
water, which we might call ’non-W' is a possible cause of 
the death of a human being.
A similar response can be made to Armstrong’s second 
example - ’’Lack of poison caused him to stay alive”. This , 
statement, according to Armstrong, seems ridiculous. But it 
is, I think, generally admitted that the absence of a lethal 
amount of poison in a man’s body is a necessary condition 
for his continued survival. It is true that a necessary 
condition for a man’s survival sounds unusual when expressed 
in the way expressed’by Armstrong. But the fact that the 
expression .sounds unusual is not an adequate reason for 
judging it to be false, or for denying that the condition it 
expresses is existent. The only justifiable reason for saying 
that it is false would be that it fails to correctly describe 
one of the necessary conditions, i.e. a caâ e., of a man’s 
continued existence. But no-one would reasonably deny that 
the lack of water will cause a man's death, or that the 
absence of poison is a necessary condition for his survival. 
We have no reason, then, to believe that such negative 
qualities do not have 'causal powers'.
Secondly, Armstrong has, at this stage, given no analysis 
of what he means by saying that an entity has causal powers. 
And yet, if the appeal to such a notion is to have any real 
force in his argument, it is of the last importance that 
such an analysis be given.
Thirdly, the appeal to the doctrine that causal power is 
a mark of existence is, at best, somewhat questionable. At • 
worst it is little better than an attempt to re-instate the
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old, but fallacious belief that equates reality with power. 
The ‘notion of a causal power is itself a rather vague, and "" 
perhaps incoherent notion. Many philosophers, including some 
who, like Armstrong, pride themselves on the supposed scien­
tific basis of their theories, have either declared the
notion to be unjustifiably anthropomorphic, or else unnecess-/
ary for adequate and complete scientific explanations. Others 
have concluded that the notion of a causal relation, though 
perhaps coherent, does not apply to any existentsso that 
it is neither self-contradictory, nor absurd, to suggest 
that no existent entities have any qualities which endow 
them with causal powers.
21. On the basis of the above discussion we can, I believe 
reasonably conclude that no serious objections have been 
raised against the admission of negative qualities and re­
lations. And, since the basis for their introduction is 
logically sound, there seems to be no valid reason for re­
jecting them.
25. We have considered one line of argument in favour of 
the reality of non-existent qualities and relations, and 
found that it is inconclusive. From the assumption that we 
are aware of various characteristics which do not seem to be 
characteristics of any existents, we cannot conclude that 
these characteristics are real, although non-existent. On 
the contrary, by recognising the existence of negative 
characteristics, we have shown that, on the assumption that 
we are aware of some characteristic, it follows that this 
characteristic does exist - either as a positive character­
istic of an existent, or as a constituent of a complex 
negative characteristic of an existent.
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26. There is, however, a further argument which professes 
to show that there are non-existent characteristics. The 
argument has also been used to show that there are non­
existent substances. It is based upon the assumption that 
existence should be attributed only to those real entities 
which have temporal characteristics, i.e. which are members
c
of a temporally ordered series. Being or reality, on the 
other hand, is to include only those entities which do not 
have temporal characteristics, and hence are changeless and 
timeless. Among past philosophers, this doctrine has been 
attributed to Plato. In more recent times it has found a 
number of adherents. Bertrand Russell, at one time, adopted 
this view.^.He expressed the basis for the distinction in the 
following way. •
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things 
e,xlAtlng when they are in time, that is to say, when we 
can point to some time at which they exist (not exclud­
ing the possibility of their existing at all times).
Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects 
e.x.lAt, But universals do not exist in this sense; we 
shall say that they Au&AlAt or have. Hzlng, where ‘being1 
is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless. The world 
of universals, therefore, may also be described as the 
world of being.^
27. There are a number of difficulties with this view. 
Firstly, it is based upon the premiss that there La a world 
of universals. In Chapter IV it will be argued that there 
cannot be such a realm, and that everything which is real is
particular. The need to introduce a distinction between 
reality and existence, merely to accommodate timeless, uni­
versal entities, would, in this case, be avoided.
Secondly, such a view would imply that being is a charac­
teristic which is not attributable to existents. Similarly, 
it would imply that no existent can be timeless. Neither o,f 
these objections is sufficient to refute the doctrine. But 
they do, I think, make it appear extremely implausible and 
somewhat ad hoc. For example, some philosophers, such as 
McTaggart, who have recognized a p/iima -/Lacic distinction 
between reality and existence, have also argued that nothing 
existent can have temporal characteristics. All existents, 
according t.o McTaggart, are timeless. Now, if Russell's 
criterion for the distinction between -reality and existence 
is taken to be definitive, then McTaggart's conclusions 
could be dismissed as self-evidently false - which they are ... 
not. There appears to be no sound reason, then, for denying 
existence to atemporal entities.
With this last point we have, I believe, removed the 
basis for one of the most common objections to the view that 
reality and existence are coextensive. Universals, numbers, 
the Homeric gods, are all, if real, existent. The fact that 
they cannot be directly positioned in the series of tempor­
ally ordered entities is not a valid reason to deny that they 
exist. Whether or not they exist must be decided according 
to some other criterion.
28. What other reasons are there for believing that there 
are non-existent realities? And what other types of entities 
have been considered to be real, but not existent?
Arguments have been put forward to suggest that there are
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real, but non-existent poAtUt-iila, The term ’possibilia1 is 
used to refer to various kinds of entities, but it is gen­
erally understood to refer to those entities which are not 
existent, but whose posited existence does not imply the 
truth of contradictory propositions. Possibilia are disting­
uished from importULLtici in so far as the posited existence /
£
of the latter does imply the truth of contradictory propos­
itions l This is the way in which the terms are used in the 
following discussion.
29. Are possibilia real? The question is, I think, some­
what ambiguous. And a good deal of the ambiguity involved, 
and the subsequent confusion about possible worlds, can 
probably be traced to their sources in the diverse and 
sometimes questionable analyses of statements concerning 
possibilities. The question might be more satisfactorily 
put by asking whether we need to assume the reality of 
possibilia in order to account for the truth-conditions of 
judgements concerning possibilities. '
I believe that such an assumption is unnecessary, and 
that the truth of such judgements can be explained with 
reference solely to existent entities. Consider, firstly, 
judgements of the form, nIt is possible that X is the case", 
or "X 'is possible" - where 'X1 stands for a description of ” 
some fact. The truth of such statements does not necessarily 
imply that there is a real possibilia, X, to which we refer 
when making the judgement. The judgement is to be understood, 
rather,' as either a statement about the state of knowledge 
of the person who makes the judgement - in which case it 
should be understood to mean something like, "I do not know 
whether there is anything existent described by ’X ’, but I
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know of no reason why there should not beM. Or else, it is 
to be understood as being a statement about implication 
relations between characteristics - in which case it should 
be understood to mean something like, nThe nature of the 
existent does not imply the absence of any of the character-
r'
istics which are ascribed to X M. According to both interpret­
ations, the initial judgement, which ostensibly refers to a 
real, though perhaps non-existent, possibilium, is shown to 
involve, in actuality, reference only to existent entities. 
According to the first interpretation, it involves reference 
to the actual state of knowledge of the person who makes the 
judgement; according to the second, it involves reference to 
actual implication relations between characteristics.
Judgements of the form, "It is possible that X is a" may,
1 8as McTaggart demonstrates , be analysed in a similar fashion. 
When such judgements are not understood to be implicit 
assertions about the actual state of knowledge of the person 
who makes the judgement, they are to be understood as implic­
itly asserting that the nature of X does not imply the 
absence of a. In which case it is a judgement about implic­
ation relations between certain characteristics; and all 
characteristics, we have seen, are existent if they are real.
30. A different argument has recently been put forward in 
favour of the reality of certain possibilia. In his book, 
Cou.nte,/i£actLLat/>, David Lewis has suggested that the truth- 
conditions for counterfactual conditional judgements can 
best be satisfied by an appeal to the reality of poA^ikte. 
iûo/lîcLa , The notion of a possible world is explained in the 
following way.
I believe that there are possible worlds other than 
the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument be wanted 
it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things 
might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do 
you, that things could have been different in countless 
ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits 
the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have 
been besides the way they actually are. On the face of 
it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It 
says that there exist many entities of a certain des­
cription, to wit, ’ways things could have been1. I 
believe things could have been different in countless 
ways;. I believe permissible paraphrases of what I 
believe; taking the phrase at its face value, I there­
fore believe in the existence of entities that might be
called ’ways things could have been’. I prefer to call
"1 9them ’possible worlds’.
There are a number of difficulties with this argument.
But it should firstly be pointed out that Lewis does not 
argue that his possible worlds are non-existent. If they are 
real, they exist. So the argument, in this form, cannot be 
used to support the view that there are non-existent real­
ities. Furthermore, the intent of the argument is not entire­
ly clear.’Understood strictly, it proves only that Lewis 
believes there are possible worlds other than the one which 
he inhabits. The important question is, however, whether or 
not such possible worlds are real or existent. From the 
initial assumption that some people, perhaps mistakenly, 
believe that things might be other than they are, or might
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have. be,e.n other than they are, we can only legitimately 
conclude - given the acceptability of Lewis’ paraphrase of 
such beliefs - that some people believe that possible worlds
exis.t.„ But we cannot conclude, as was argued in Sections 11 .
and 12, that an entity is real or existent merely on the 
basis of the fact that someone believes or judges it to be 
real or existent.
31. Let us consider, then, the initial assumption of the 
argument - that things might be otherwise than they are.
Since Lewis does not provide an argument in support of this 
premiss, we may infer that he considers it to be either 
self-evidently true,'or else universally accepted as true.
The claim that all of us believe that things could have been 
different in countless ways (¿¿id.) would seem to favour the 
latter interpretation.
Firstly, then, is it true that the proposition that things
might be otherwise than they are is universally accepted as
true? The answer to this question is clearly, no. McTaggart,
20for example, has claimed that the proposition is demon­
strably false. So, the initial premiss of Lewis’ argument 
in favour of the reality of possible worlds cannot be accord­
ed the status of an ontological axiom, or that of a univers­
ally accepted principle. And, since no argument is offered 
in its favour, it remains, at best, controversial.
Granted that the premiss is controversial, are there any 
reasons to believe that it is false? I believe that there 
are, but before considering them, we should clarify exactly 
what it is that is being asserted in the proposition. Taken 
literally, the proposition asserts that things might have a 
different nature, i.e. a different set of characteristics,
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than that which they have. In agreement with C.D. Broad ,
I consider this proposition to be self-evidently false. But 
we should distinguish between what is actually asserted, and 
what is meant to be asserted, by the proposition. And I 
think it is clear from his subsequent discussion, that what 
Lewis meant to assert was that things might have. ¡Leen other­
wise than they are; and that his argument, in fact, rests 
upon this, rather than the former, premiss.
32. The claim that things might have been other than they 
are is, however, evidently based upon the further assumption 
that things are, to some extent, if not completely, independ­
ent of their natures. (The term 'thing* I understand to mean
what' is sometimes called a 'substance' or 'particular'.) I f.
a thing is not, to some extent, independent of its nature, 
then the assumption that a thing might have had a different 
nature to that which it does have (which is what I understand 
to be meant by saying that it might have been otherwise than 
it is) is obviously false. And whether or not this further 
assumption is true cannot be determined independently of a 
discussion of the notion of a thing or substance, and the 
consequent substance/quality distinction. In Chapter III it 
will be argued that the view that a substance is independent 
of its nature is untenable; and from this conclusion it 
follows that the assumption that things might have been 
otherwise than they are, is false. So, our reply to Lewis . 
will ultimately have to be postponed until then. The import­
ant point to be made at this stage, however, is that, in so 
far as Lewis' argument for the reality of possible worlds 
does rest upon this tacit, and unargued, assumption, to that 
extent it is inconclusive.
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33. We have seen that the assumption that things might 
have been other than they are, is, contrary to Lewis’ claim, 
a controversial, and perhaps false, assumption. But even if 
we accept this assumption, is the rest of Lewis’ argument 
strong enough to support the conclusion he wishes to draw
from it? r/
There are a number of reasons for believing that it is 
not. But perhaps the most significant concerns the suggestion 
that the proposition that there are many ways things could 
have been besides the way they are, is equivalent to the 
proposition that there exist many possible worlds. This 
suggestion is, as a number of critics have pointed out , 
at best somewhat tenuous, especially in the light of Lewis’ 
subsequent claim that these possible worlds are of the same 
ontological kind as our own, actual world. The tenuous nature 
of the equation is clearly shown by the fact that there are 
other, more plausible, and less ontologically extravagant, 
interpretations of the initial assumption.
One such interpretation of the proposition that there are 
many ways things might have been besides the way they are, 
which recommends itself as both ontologically economical 
and in accordance with ordinary language, is that it amounts 
to the claim that there are many cka/iacte./ilAticAt i.e. qual­
ities and relations, which things might have had other than 
those which they do have. In this case there is no need to 
postulate the reality of entities other than certain qual­
ities and relations; and all characteristics, we have seen, 
are existent if they are real.
So, even if we accept Lewis’ initial assumption that 
things might have been otherwise than they are, we are still
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not committed to the reality of possible worlds. We may 
conclude, then, that Lewis’ overall argument for the reality 
of possibilia is unsatisfactory, and ought to be dismissed.
34* We have considered, and rejected the view that there 
are real, though non-existent possibilia. I will now consider 
the view that past and/or future entities are non-existent
i
realities.
Existence, according to such theories, is existence noio.
The belief is fairly widespread, perhaps more widespread than
some have been prepared to admit. There are also a number of
variations of the basic theory. There are those, for example,
who believe that the past and the future, though non-existent,
2 3are both real. There are others, like Broad , who have
J
believed that the past and the present are real and existent, 
but that the future is simply nothing at all. And there are 
others, again, who have believed that neither the past nor 
the future is existent or real. All are alike, however, in 
believing that the present exists, and most have believed 
that it is real.
Finally, there are those who believe that neither the 
past, the present, nor the future are existent, or real.
Such qualities, it is suggested, are not objective qualities 
of the events which constitute the temporal series. The 
members of the time series are ordered by the relations,
than, and tate,/i than. But this view is not strictly ... 
relevant to the discussion in this chapter, since it is 
generally accepted by the proponents of such a view that the 
members of the time series, thus ordered, are both real and 
existent. In this chapter we will be concerned only with 
those theories which countenance a p/iima -fLaaiz ordering of
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the temporal series into events with the characteristics 
paAt9 p/ie.4£.ntf -/Lutu/ie., and which then conclude that some of 
these characteristics do not belong to anything existent.
35. Although the various positions regarding the existence 
of the past and the future can be stated quite clearly, the
reasons for denying that they exist are not always so easily/
stated, or so readily understood. And, for the most part, the 
reasons which have been given for regarding the past or the 
future as non-existent, are equally reasons for believing 
that they are not real. It has at times been suggested, for 
example, that we are not, and could not possibly be, directly 
aware of past or future events; and that this is a sufficient 
reason for.; believing that they do not exist. But if it is a 
sufficient reason for believing that they do not exist, it 
is also a sufficient reason for believing that they are not 
real.
36. What are the reasons for believing that past or fut­
ure entities do not exist? There is, firstly, the argument 
just mentioned. The assumption that we are never directly 
aware of past or future entities is said to imply that they 
are non-existent. But the argument is clearly unsatisfactory. 
There would appear to be a great number of entities of which 
we are not directly aware, for example, the contents of 
other minds, but which we nevertheless consider to be both 
real and existent. The fact that we are not directly aware of 
such entities is not, accordingly, considered to be a suff­
icient reason, or even a good reason, for concluding that 
they are non-existent. It is, perhaps, a reason to be 
cautious about the judgements we make concerning these entit­
ies; and it might even be a reason to doubt their existence.
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But it does not constitute a positive disproof of their 
existence. Similarly, the fact (if it is a fact) that we are 
not directly aware of past or future entities does not prove 
that they are non-existent, though it may provide grounds 
for doubting that they exist.
37. There are, however, more challenging arguments. Some 
of these have been recently emphasised by Richard Routley.
In Chapter 2 of his work, £xpto/ilng (fle,Lnong> 2-U-ngte. arid 
Beyond, are to be found a number of arguments in favour of 
the thesis that existence is existence noio. The first of 
these consists basically of an appeal to what is, I believe, 
a rather confused intuitive presumption.
Not all items that have existed or will exist curr­
ently exist: some like Aristotle and Queen Hatshepsut, 
have ceased to exist, others, like the greatest phil­
osopher born in the 21st Century, do not yet exist. The 
fact that most of us really want to claim that purely 
past and purely future items do not exist, that 
Aristotle does not exist, is part of the case for the 
thesis
EO. existence is existence now.
For if an item does not exist now then either it never 
exists or it is purely past or purely future. But if it 
never exists it does not exist, and if it is purely 
past or purely future it does not, by the former points, 
exist. The converse of this, that what exists now does 
exist, is fairly unproblematical. For if any item exists 
now it satisfies whatever criterion of existence is 
adopted, and so exists. Again, if an item does exist
noiv then it is existent (transferring the now into the 
tense) so it exists. The converse, that only what 
exists now exists, can likewise be presented as a 
grammatical transformation; if an item exists then it 
-¿-4 existent, so it exists now. The thesis reflects a 
rationally-based determination to use exists as a /
present-tensed verb, and not in some other way.2^
The fact that some of us resolve to use ’exists1 as a 
present-tensed verb is not, of course, an adequate reason to 
deny the existence of past and future entities. The important 
question is whether such a restricted use of the term is 
justified.
But before considering this question, we should firstly 
determine whether or not the assumption that existence is a 
present-tensed verb is actually incompatible with the belief 
that past and future entities exist. For if the assumption 
is not incompatible with this belief, then the suggested 
restriction of the domain of existence will not support the 
conclusion which Routley wishes to draw from it.
38. Does the assumption that existence is existence now 
imply that past and future entities do not exist? I do not 
believe that it does. Consider, for example, the past event 
of Aristotle’s birth. According to some theories, to say that 
this event is past, is simply to say that it exists at a 
moment of past time. But such theories are based upon the 
premiss~that existence is to be understood as being tense­
less. The claim that existence is a present-tensed verb 
would appear, then, to be incompatible with such a view. But 
the incompatibility is, I believe, only apparent. For, to say
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that an entity exists at a moment of past time does not 
imply that it is not present - it is present at a moment of 
past time. Similarly, the characteristic of being present is 
not incompatible with being past, since every event is both 
present and past - a present event is past at a moment of
future time. Future events are likewise present - at a moment
/
of future time; as well as being future - at a moment of 
present time.
Although this reply might appear to be somewhat sophist­
ical , it seems to me that there are only two ways in which 
it might be refuted. The first, which is open to Routley only 
if he is prepared to beg the question, is to deny that past
and future, entities exist. The second is to insist that the •*’ ;
qualities patt, p/ie.Ae,nt, te. are mutually incompatible.
To insist that these qualities are incompatible leads, how­
ever, as McTaggart has shown , to the conclusion that no­
thing existent can have any of these qualities - since, as 
we have just seen, any entity which has any one of these 
qualities, has at least one of the others; and this, of .. 
course, leads to the conclusion that the entity in question 
is impossible, i.e. its existence would imply the truth of 
contradictory propositions.
The use of ’exists1 as a. present-tensed verb does not, 
then, imply that past and future entities do not exist, 
unless it is assumed that the qualities patt, p/ie.te.nt, £u.t- 
LL/ie. are mutually incompatible; in which case the conclusion 
to be drawn is that nothing can be past, present or future.
39. With this last point we have, I believe, provided an 
answer to our initial question. The restriction of 'exists' 
to cover only present entities is arbitrary, and ultimately
33)
inconsistent. Furthermore, the argument used by Routley to 
show that, if anything exists, it exists now, is unsound. . 
The argument is set out in the following way.
(1) If any item exists now, it satisfies whatever cri- 
tenon of existence is adopted, and so exists.
£
(2) If an item does exist now it is existent, so it 
exists.
(3) Only what exists now exists.
(l) If an item exists, then it ¿a existent, so it exists 
now.
The illegitimate conclusion (1) can be traced to an ■ f' >
ambiguity in (3). From (1) and (2) we.can conclude that only 
what exists, now exists. But this does not give us the con­
clusion that if an item exists, it exists now. The only way 
that this conclusion can be reached is by rephrasing (3) in 
the following way: *
(3*) Only what exists now, exists.
But this proposition cannot be legitimately inferred from 
(1) and (2). So, the argument is unsound. We may emphasise 
the error involved by replacing 'now1 with an equivalent 
expression, 'at this moment’. We then have two possible read­
ings of (3):
(31) Only what exists at this moment, exists.
(3") Only what exists, exists at this moment.
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The first reading, (3*), cannot be derived from (1) and 
(2), although it supports (4-). The second reading, (3M), can 
be derived from the first two premisses (1) and (2), but it 
does not support the conclusion, (4). The thesis, EO., that 
existence is existence now, remains, then, as yet, an unjust­
ified and controversial assumption. ./
40. There is, however, a second, and more important argu­
ment in favour of this thesis. In its basic form it has been 
used by a number of philosophers to prove that the future, 
unlike the present, or the past, cannot exist. Routley 
expresses it thus:
Purely past and purely future items are, like me.sie.iy 
poAAikie. item*, not (now) determinate in all extensional 
respects: hence... they do not exist. Compare the items 
Aristotle and Polonius, and remember Peirce’s question 
as to how long before Polonius died had he had a haircut 
and Russell’s as to the present king of France. Well, 
is Aristotle bald now? If he is, how long has he been 
bald? If not, how long since he had a haircut and how 
long is his hair? Since Aristotle has ceased to exist, 
it is false that Aristotle is now bald and false that 
he is not now bald, even on Russell’s theory of des­
criptions naturally (i.e. temporally) construed. Thus 
Aristotle is indeterminate in respect of the extensional 
property of (present) baldness. Hence he does not exist 
now; hence he does not exist. Likewise the future sea- 
battle is indeterminate in various respects, so even if 
it will exist, it does not exist. Of course there are 
substantial differences between the various sorts of
35)
non-entities alluded to, between Aristotle (a past 
. object) who did exist, but does not now, the future sea 
battle (a future object) which will exist but does not 
exist now, and Polonius (a possibilium) who never 
existed,^
/
The first point that should be made in reply is that 
Routley himself, at a later stage,offers some very plaus­
ible reasons for believing that the principle of determinacy 
is not a satisfactory criterion of existence. There are, he 
suggests, many existent entities which are not fully deter­
minate. '
It is not necessary to go as far -afield as quantum 
indeterminacy of micro-particles to find cases of 
indeterminacy. Natural objects such as clouds and waves 
and gases, forests and mountain ranges and waterfalls, 
are indeterminate in various respects, especially as 
regards their boundaries, lengths, and numbers of 
components.. The indeterminacy features of quanta cer­
tainly appear to fit neatly within the framework of a 
theory - such as a noneism can be - which allows for 
and takes due account of indeterminacy. To see the 
existing world as completely determinate then goes 
against not only the facts of language but the apparent 
facts of physics.^
The last sentence of the above passage, in particular, is 
difficult to reconcile with the statements made in Chapter 2 
of his work, about past and future entities. I am inclined to
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conclude, then, that the fact that past and future entities 
appear to be indeterminate with respect to some qualities is 
not a consistent reason for believing that they do not exist.
41. But is it true, in any case, that past and future 
entities are indeterminate with respect to certain qualities? 
Let us consider Routley’s question about Aristotle: Is Aris­
totle bald now?. The question is, I believe, ambiguous. It 
may mean: Is Aristotle now bald at some moment of past time?, 
in which case the answer is ’Yes’ or ’No1, according to the 
moment of past time stipulated. For example, if we ask: Is 
Aristotle bald in the year 364 B.C.?, then we may presume 
that, unless he is prematurely bald, the correct answer is 
’No1. At any rate, there is a definite answer to this quest­
ion - even though it may be difficult .to verify it.
On the other hand, the question may mean: Is Aristotle 
now bald at a moment of present time?, in which case the 
answer is ’No1, since Aristotle does not exist at a moment 
of present time; although he exists at a moment of past time, 
and is either bald or not bald at that moment.
On either reading we can give a definite answer to the 
initial question, although in the first case it may be diffi­
cult, in a purely practical sense concerning our accessibili­
ty to past entities, to determine the truth or falsity of 
our answer. But since we can, theoretically, give a true or 
false answer to either reading, we may conclude that Aris­
totle is determinate with respect to this, and any other 
characteristic.
42. At this point, an objection might be raised to this 
type of reply. I have assumed that past entities exist, and 
that the qualities patt, p/ie.Ae.nt, and £u.tu/ie. are compatible.
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But if we accept the widely-held presumption that these 
qualities are, in fact, mutually incompatible, is it still 
possible to defend the view that past and future entities 
are both completely determinate and existent?
I believe that it is possible to defend this conclusion.
If we return to the question of Aristotle’s baldness, then,/
we may reply simply that he is not now bald, but that he is 
bald at a number of moments of past time. He is not bald now 
because he does not exist now. But this does not entail that 
he does not exist - he exists through a period of past time. 
To suggest, as Routley seems to do, that, because Aristotle 
is existent at a moment of past time he must therefore exist 
now, i.e. at a.moment of present time, is analogous to the 
false conclusion that, because an entity has a spatial 
position, it is therefore spatially ubiquitous. The question: 
Is Aristotle now bald? is, in this sense, analogous to the 
question: Is the Sydney Harbour Bridge grey here?. Both 
questions contain implicit assumptions, which, when made 
explicit, can be seen to be illegitimate. The first implies 
that Aristotle exists at this moment; the second implies that 
the Sydney Harbour Bridge exists at this place. But in the 
same way that the fact that Sydney Harbour Bridge does not 
exist at this place, i.e. h.e./i2., does not imply either that 
it does not exist, or that it is not determinate with respect 
to the quality of greyness; the fact that Aristotle does not 
exist at this moment, i.e. now, does not imply either that 
he does" not exist, or that he is not determinate with respect 
to the quality of baldness. In other words, in the same way 
that spatial position does not imply ubiquity, temporal 
position does not imply sempiternity.
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4-3. The existence of past entities can be defended, then, 
in either of two ways: by denying that existence is existence 
now; or, by accepting the thesis that existence is existence 
now, but denying that this thesis is incompatible with the 
the existence of past entities. In both cases, we have relied 
upon a p/iio/il arguments in support of our views. But this ,is 
not to say that there is no empirical evidence to support 
our views.
One such piece of empirical evidence is to be found in 
the notion of the ¿pe.clou<6 p/ie,Ae.nt. The adjective ’specious’ 
is used to distinguish the experienced or felt present, from 
the strictly objective present. According to the ’objective’ 
view of the present, it is a characteristic of events which 
are without any temporally divisible dimensions, and which 
are members of a series of entities which is ordered by 
relations which are both transitive and asymmetrical. To be 
present, the entity must be preceded by an entity which is 
past, and succeeded by an entity which is future. Such a 
series is also generally considered to be a series,
according to which any member of the series has both an 
immediate predecessor, and an immediate successor^. The 
immediate predecessor of any present entity is past. The 
immediate successor of any present entity is future.
There is no denying the scientific and practical utility 
of this view of the present, but it is, I believe, a con­
struction from data which are more fundamental. If we turn to 
the e,Kpe.n.le,noe.d or ¿pe.oLou.4 present we find that, unlike the 
objective present, it does not preclude past or future entit­
ies. Nowne.AAt as experienced, does not preclude the direct 
awareness of past events. If it did, it would be impossible
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to be directly aware of change, since the direct awareness 
of change involves the co-existence, before the mind in a 
single state of awareness, of two events - one of which is 
the immediate predecessor to the other, and therefore past.
By appealing to the notion of the specious present we are
able to give empirical support to the claim that the quali- ^
(
ties patt, p/uL̂ e.nt, are not incompatible - an event may be 
the object of a present state of awareness, and thereby 
present, even though it is objectively past. It also lends 
support to the claim that existence does not mean existence 
now, i.e. that existence is tenseless; since events which are 
objectively past are' co-existent, in the specious present, 
with events that are objectively present. It would seem to 
be possible, then, as a matter of fact as well as a matter 
of principle, for a past event to be existent now, Although 
our specious present is limited in the range of past entities 
to which it provides access, I do not think that this is 
anything more than a contingent fact. It would seem to be 
logically possible for some being to be aware of the entire 
objective time series in a single specious present. J-osiah 
Royce, in fact, did ascribe such an awareness to God.^
4-4-. We have argued that past entities are determinate, and 
may accordingly qualify as existent. We have also argued that 
past entities might be said to exist now, But what of future 
entities?'The task is more difficult in the case of future 
entities, since even among those who are prepared to admit 
the existence and determinacy of past entities, there are 
some, such as Broad, who would deny the determinacy of 
future entities. Furthermore, it is not always admitted that 
the specious present includes the direct awareness of future
entities; so that future entities, unlike past entities, 
might not, in this sense, exist now.
4-5. Are future entities determinate with respect to all 
extensional qualities? We may reply to this question in much 
the same way that we replied to the question about the 
determinateness of past entities. Of any future entity we 
can always ask whether or not it is determinate at any of 
the moments of future time at which it exists. And there is 
always a definite answer to such questions,., even though there 
may be practical difficulties in determining what that 
answer is.
With respect to the claim that the specious present does 
not include the awareness of future entities, there seems to
’ •**' Jbe no sound reason, except for that which will be considered 
in the next section, to suppose that this anything but a 
contingent fact.
4.6. There remains one argument, however, which, if sound, 
would show that future entities are hot fully determinate.
The argument is based upon the assumption that the future, 
hence future entities, is nothing at all - it is neither 
existent nor real. Broad explains this view in the following 
way.
It will be observed that such a theory as this 
accepts the reality of the present and the past, but 
holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing 
has.happened to the present by becoming past except that 
fresh slices of existence have been added to the total 
history of the world. The past is thus as real as the 
present. On the other hand, the essence of a present
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event is, not that it precedes future events, but that 
there is quite literally nothing to which it has the 
relation of precedence. The sum total of existence is 
always increasing, and it is this which gives the time- 
series a sense as well as an order. A moment t is later 
than a moment t 1 if the sum total of existence at t
e
includes the sum total of existence at t! together with
31something more.
If true, this theory would undoubtedly show that we 
cannot be directly aware of future entities in a specious 
present. But this is not because the future is indeterminate, 
but because there simply are no future entities to be appre­
hended. As such, it would also show that future entities are 
non-existent. On the other hand, it is equally an objection 
to the view that future entities are, in any sense, real. 
According to Broad, there are no future entities - either 
existent or non-existent. '
This last point brings us to the much wider question of 
the reality of time in general. But we are here only concern­
ed to show that L£ past and future entities are real, then 
they are existent. And we have found no sound reason to doubt 
that this is the case.
4-7. Propositions are another type of entity which, for 
various reasons, have been thought to be non-existent, but 
real. Once again, the reasons for believing that they are 
non-existent, as opposed to the reasons for saying that there 
simply are no propositions, are often unclear. In what foll­
ows I will not attempt to argue that there are no proposit­
ions. I will, instead, argue that there are no sound reasons
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for believing that they are non-existent realities,
48. What are propositions? This has been a notoriously
difficult question to answer satisfactorily, and many who
profess a belief in the reality of propositions have been
prepared to leave the concept of a proposition unanalysed.
This in itself might give good reason to doubt that there,
are any such entities. The additional fact that a number of
theories have been put forward which claim to dispense with
32the need to postulate the reality of propositions gives 
further credence to the view that there are no such entities. 
But there are still those who claim that the reality of 
propositions is indispensable, and these views ought to be 
considered..
19. The introduction of propositions, as distinct from 
true or false beliefs, and from facts, has been thought to 
be necessary to account, firstly, for truths which are 
timelessly true; and, secondly, for those objects of belief 
which are common to a number of beliefs, but which are not 
facts. The reasons for believing that propositions are non­
existent realities are, I think, closely related to the 
reasons for their initial introduction. It is often suggested 
for example, that there are timeless truths; and, that since 
there are no timeless existents, there must be some real 
entities which are timeless and non-existent. These timeless­
ly true ehtities are called ’propositions'.
_ But if it is true that there are timeless truths, and that 
the only timeless entities which can be true are propositions 
does it follow that propositions are non-existent? I don’t 
see that there is any reason for believing that propositions, 
thus characterised, should be thought to be non-existent -
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apart from the presumption that there can be no timeless 
existents. And this presumption, we have seen (Sections 26­
27), is unjustified. But if there may be timeless existents, 
then there may be timeless existent propositions. Further­
more, these timeless existent propositions can be understood
to function as the common, or 'public1 objects of beliefs x/
which are, themselves, in time.
50. On the other hand, the notion of a timeless truth is,
perhaps, somewhat obscure. It may be understood to mean, as
we have so far understood it to mean, that there are timeless
true propositions. Or else, it may be understood to mean that
there are time.te.AAty' t/iue beliefs, i.e..beliefs which are
true wh.e.ne.ve/1 they exist. The belief that Mohammed was born ■>
in the 6th Century A.D., for example, -is timelessly true - 
it is true whenever it exists. But this does not mean that 
such beliefs are timeless or atemporal. It is the failure to 
make this distinction between timeless, true entities, and 
timelessly true entities, which is, I believe, responsible 
for the presumption that there are timeless, true proposit­
ions .
51. Another reason which has been given for believing 
that propositions are non-existent realities is that they 
are claimed to be neither mental, nor material entities; and, 
since, it is assumed, the only existent kinds of entities
are mental or material, propositions cannot be existents. •* 
Similar reasons have been given for believing that such 
'abstract' entities as numbers and classes are non-existent 
realities.
There are at least two replies which might be made to this 
argument. Firstly, it might be pointed out that even though
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propositions are not obviously either mental, or material
entities, this is not to say that they are not /izdiicikte, to
either material or mental entities. John Wisdom, for example,
has given a very plausible demonstration of the way in which
propositions can be reduced to sets of judgements which, in
3 3  * '*turn, are understood to be mental entities. ,
Secondly, it might be pointed out that the material and 
the mental do not necessarily exhaust the entire range of . 
existent entities. There is no sound empirical basis for 
concluding that they do. And there do not seem to be any 
genuine a p/iio/ii reasons - apart from those based upon the 
acceptance of certain metaphysical theories - for believing 
that they do. The most that might be said for the view that 
the material and the mental exhaust the realm of existent 
entities^ , is that it is possibly true. But it is also 
possibly false; and any argument which incorporates a premiss 
that is possibly false cannot be considered to be conclusive.
52. None of the arguments, then, which we have considered 
in favour of the view that propositions are non-existent 
realities can be said to be conclusive. So, there appears to 
be no sound reason why propositions, if they are real, should 
not exist.
53. The final class of entities which we will consider, as 
real but not existent, are fictional or imaginary entities.
To the question whether fictional or imaginary entities 
are real or existent, there is, of course, the obvious reply 
that part of what we normally mean when we say that an entity 
is real or existent, is that it is not fictional or imaginary 
so that such entities ip*o £a d o  cannot be real or existent.
At first glance this reply is quite persuasive. But its
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soundness has been questioned by some philosophers who have 
favoured the view that such fictional or imaginary entities 
are real, though not existent.
$1. When I judge, correctly, that, in Thomas Hardy's 
novel Zude. the. 0&.Acu/ie,t Jude Fawley died in Christminster, 
must 1 assume that, to account for the truth of this judge-’"’ 
ment, there must be a real, though non-existent entity named 
Jude Fawley, and a real, though non-existent town called 
Christminster, in which he died?
There are number of opinions on this topic. Some, such as
3 5William James and Bradley , have suggested that, rather 
than postulate real,” but non-existent entities to explain 
the truth of such judgements, we ought, instead, to expand 
our notion of the limits of the existent world to cover the 
world of fiction, the world of dreams, of imagination, etc. 
Judgements, such as the judgement that Jude Fawley died in 
Christminster, though not true of the world of waking exper­
ience, are nevertheless true of the world of fiction - which, 
incorporates such entities as Jude Fawley and Christminster. 
If I believe, for example, that a Mr Pumblechook lived in 
High Street, London, in the 19th Century, I would, by most 
standards, be said to have judged incorrectly. And if a 
register of the inhabitants of London in the 19th Century 
were consulted, it is quite certain that there would be no 
record of*a Mr Pumblechook of High Street. But, according to 
the theory being considered, although my belief does not 
correspond to any fact in the world which is continuous with 
my body in waking experience, it is true of a world described 
by Dickens' Q/ie.at ¿Kpe.ctation/>. Likewise, the belief that 
Jude Fawley died in Christminster is true of the world
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described by Hardy’s novel.
There does seem to be something implausible about this 
theory. But the arguments against it do not seem to be very 
convincing; unless, of course, it is simply assumed that 
there are no fictional or imaginary entities. It is not true 
for example, that the theory involves the relativisation of 
the concepts of truth and existence. When the belief that 
Mr Pumblechook lived in High Street is said to be true, this 
does not mean that it is true - relative to some particular 
sphere of reference. It means that it is true, ¿imp ¿¿cit&/i. 
In other words, the belief is said to correspond to some 
objective fact in the Universe. And when it is claimed that 
Jude Fawley exists, this does not mean that he exists to a 
lesser degree than other entities, or* relative to some spher<
o ̂of reference^ . It means that he exists ¿imp iicite./i, in the--- 
world described by Hardy’s novel; and, that this world is 
but one among the many existent worlds which make up the 
Universe. '
It should be pointed out that the claim that the notions 
of truth and existence involved in reference to fictional 
and imaginary entities are not relative, does not imply that 
such entities have all or any of the qualities which the 
entities encountered in the world of waking experience have - 
a point which is often ignored by those who claim that such 
entities ‘are neither existent nor fully determinate.
55. It might be suggested that the worlds of fiction and 
imagination are neither spatial nor temporal, and so cannot 
exist. But this criticism is based upon two unjustified 
assumptions. The first, which we have already considered and 
rejected, is that all existents must be spatially and/or
4-7)
temporally positioned.
The second is that the worlds of fiction and imagination 
do not have spatial or temporal dimensions. But it is true, 
for example, that in Hardy's Wessex, Christminster is north 
of Stonehenge, and that Jude was born before he died. And so 
such worlds can, and do, have spatial and temporal dimen-, 
sions. What is not true is that these spatial and temporal 
dimensions are directly continuous with those of waking 
experience. But, as Bradley and others have argued , the 
possibility of there being numerous distinct and discontin­
uous spatial and temporal dimensions cannot be arbitrarily 
ruled out. Just as the spatial and temporal dimensions of
the worlds described by Dickens' and Hardy's fiction are■ ■" >
discontinuous with each other, and with our own, so there 
may be an indefinite number of other worlds, discontinuous 
with our own, and with each other. It is clear that such a 
possibility cannot be ruled out on an a pô te./iio/il basis, 
and I know of no reason of an a p/ilo/il nature - unless it be 
an argument which professes to show that there cannot be any 
existent spatial or temporal dimensions - which precludes 
this possibility.
There is, furthermore, an argument to show that the 
various worlds of dreaming, fiction, and imagination have at 
least a p/ilma -/Lacie. claim to existence. It is possible, as 
Descartes * and others have suggested, that what I take to be 
a dream world, or a world of imagination, may, in fact, be 
real, and the world which I presently judge to be real or 
actual, may be a dream world. It may turn out that there are 
overwhelming reasons for believing that this is not the case. 
But these reasons are, in general, based upon considerations
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of continuity and coherence, rather than any intrinsic 
qualities of either the experiences or their objects.
56. What other reasons are there for believing that such 
entities are non-existent realities? I think that we can 
conclude, at this stage, that any further arguments that 
might be produced to show that fictional or imaginary entit­
ies are non-existent, will equally show that they are not 
real. Such, for example, is the claim that judgements which 
profess to refer to certain fictional or imaginary entities 
are essentially hypothetical, and do not, in fact, involve 
reference to any entities, real or existent.
Similarly, the charge that fictional and imaginary entit­
ies are not fully determinate, and hence non-existent, would 
also, if sound, show that they are not real. At any rate, 
this charge does not seem to be justified. It is true of 
Jude Fawley, for example, that he is a stone-mason, and that 
he is less than eight feet high, and so on with respect to 
all the qualities which are either explicitly ascribed to 
him by the author, or which might be logically inferred from 
such qualities. To the question whether he is determinate 
with the respect to the quality of being ten-toed, we can 
reply that, since this quality is not explicitly ascribed to 
him by Hardy, and since it cannot be logically inferred from 
those qualities which he is explicitly ascribed, he has the 
quality oi being non-ten-toed. This does not, of course, 
imply that he is, in any sense, a freak; since this epithet 
applies only to entities which profess to be human beings 
existent in the world co-extensive with our bodies in waking 
experience. Jude Fawley, being a fictional existent, cannot 
be judged by such criteria.
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57. We have so far discovered no sound reasons for be­
lieving that there are non-existent realities. The initial 
presumption that reality and existence are co-extensive 
would appear, then, to be justified.
There remains, however, one class of entities to be con- ~ 
sidered. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, .it 
is Bradley’s view that there are some existents, namely 
appea/iance*, which are not ultimately real. Other philoso­
phers have claimed that appearances are real, but not exist­
ent. In the next chapter we will discuss the question of the 
ontological status of appearances, with particular attention 
to Bradley's view that they are unreal existents.
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Chapter 2 - Reailty and Appe.an.ance,
58, In the previous chapter we reached the conclusion 
that the presumption against non-existent realities is 
apparently justified. We will now consider one view which, if 
true, would oblige us to abandon this presumption. The view 
in question is that put forward by Bradley, that there are 
existent appearances which are not real, or which are only 
real to a certain degree. In this chapter I propose to do 
two things: firstly, to give a critical assessment of Brad­
ley’s theory of appearances; and, secondly, to provide an 
analysis of the distinction between appearance and reality 
which avoids the difficulties involved in Bradley1s theory,' j
and which upholds the validity of the•distinction without 
positing the reality or existence of appe.a/ianceA. '
$9. It has been suggested that, rather than providing a 
positive theory of appearances, Bradley instead has simply 
provided a theory of reality - appearance being that which 
fails to satisfy the criterion of reality . I believe this 
objection to be substantially correct, although the extent 
to which it should be admitted as a point of valid criticism 
needs to be determined. It seems to be quite plausible, for 
example, to suggest that the notion of an appearance can only 
be understood in a negative way - as that which is either 
not real, 'or not ultimately real. To ascribe a positive and 
definite nature to appearances might even be thought to beg 
the question as to whether or not they have any sort of 
nature or reality at all. In this case, the above objection 
could not be accepted as a valid criticism of Bradley's 
views - although it may indicate a need for them to be
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further clarified, and possibly restated.
Bearing this point in mind, it is, I think, nevertheless 
possible to isolate a number of positive features of Bradley1s 
views on the distinction between reality and appearance which, 
when taken in conjunction, might be said to constitute a the.o/iy 
of appearances. ,
60. Firstly, an appearance is said to be anything which 
fails to satisfy the criterion of ultimate reality. Throughout 
the first Book of Appe.asian.ee. and Re.aiity, this criterion is 
identified with that of coherence, or lack of contradiction.
Any entity whose nature, upon analysis, proves to be internally 
inconsistent, or to have contradictory characteristics, or 
whose existence would imply the truth of contradictory propos­
itions, is said to be an appe.a/iance., It* should be pointed out 
that the term ’appearance1, when used in this way, is to be 
understood to be a contrary term to ’reality’ or ’real’. That
is to say, the propositions "X is real", and "X is an appear-
2 ’«ance”, cannot both be true.
Secondly, appearances are said to be existent, without 
being real, or ultimately real. In so far as they are taken 
to be appearances of the Absolute, they are accorded degrees 
of reality. To the extent that this position involves the 
introduction of the doctrine of degrees of reality, it is 
probably one of the more controversial features of Bradley’s 
theory.
Thirdly, all appearances are said to involve a disjunction 
of, or a'discrepancy between the that and the what. In a 
number of places, Bradley speaks of this as being the most 
fundamental, or definitive feature of appearances. But the 
precise meaning of these two terms remains somewhat obscure.
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An analogy might be found in the more traditional distinction 
between form and matter.
Fourthly, it is not necessary, according to Bradley, that 
appearances appe.a/i to a mind. It is quite possible, on his 
theory, that space and time, for example, be classified as 
appearances solely on the basis of their having an inconsist-t
ent or self-contradictory nature. They may, in principle, 
exist as appearances, independently of any mind.
I will now consider each of these features of Bradley’s 
theory in turn. It will soon become evident, however, that 
each feature is, to some extent, dependent upon one or more 
of the others for its plausibility.
61. Let us begin with the claim that anything which fails
■ <■* j
to satisfy the criterion of reality is, Ipto -jiacto, an 
appearance.
This claim might be interpreted in either of two ways. It 
might be understood to mean that anything which does, in 
fact, fail to satisfy the criterion of reality is an appear­
ance. Or, it might be understood to mean that anything which 
is correctly judged to fail the criterion is an appearance. 
Although distinct, the two interpretations are not entirely 
independent. For it would seem that we have no sound reason •­
to suppose that anything does, in fact, fail the criterion, 
apart from the fact that it is judged to do so. This does 
not, of course, show that there is nothing, or could be 
nothing which fails to satisfy the criterion; and we will 
need to~consider independent arguments to determine whether 
there are appearances in this sense. Firstly, however, we 
will attempt to determine whether there are appearances in 
the second sense.
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62. When I make the judgement that something is not real, 
does this imply, assuming that the judgement is correct, that 
whatever I have judged to be unreal is an appearance? Accord- 
m g  to Bradley , it does. This conclusion cannot, however, 
claim the status of an evident truth, and it needs to be 
supported by arguments. It seems to me that there are two 
ways in which the conclusion might be supported. An appeal 
might be made to conventions established by ordinary dis­
course; or else, independent philosophical reasons might be 
adduced in its favour. Let us consider, firstly, the appeal 
to ordinary discourse.
63. When I make the judgement that round-squares are not
real, or the judgement that griffins are not real, I am not' r’;
generally understood, according to established conventions, 
to be thereby committed to the view that such entities are 
nonetheless existent or real in some phenomenal sense, or in 
some realm of mere appearances. I am understood to mean that 
there is nothing and, in the case of round-squares, could be 
nothing which satisfies either the complex description of 
being both round and square in the same respect, or the 
complex description of having the head and wings of an eagle, 
and the body of a lion, respectively. And that, as such, 
neither round-squares, nor griffins are real or existent in 
any sense, in any degree, or in any realm whatsoever. Nor am 
I understood to be thereby committed to the view that such 
non-entities are to be classified along with, say, mirages 
as sensory illusions; or with, say, the blueness of the sky 
as illusory or mere appearances of anything real or existent. 
And yet the latter are, I think, the only relevant contexts 
in which the notion of an appearance arises in ordinary
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language.
The appeal to conventions established by ordinary discourse 
does not, then, appear to support Bradley’s conclusion. But 
it is possible that ordinary language is either inconsistent 
or inadequate in this respect; and, if used as a criterion for 
determining the soundness or otherwise of philosophical , 
theories about the status of appearances it might, therefore, 
be misleading. The alternative for Bradley is to base his 
conclusion upon distinct philosophical grounds.
64-, What arguments does Bradley offer in support of his 
conclusion? There is, first of all, the type of argument we 
considered in the first chapter. In order that we may talk 
of entities^such as round-squares, or griffins; or, that we 
may make significant and possibly true negative existential 
judgements about them, it was assumed that such entities must, 
in some sense, be real. Bradley’s argument for this view is 
slightly different from Russell’s, but it is, I think, simil­
arly inconclusive. Consider, for example, the following quot­
ation from CAAayA on 7/iutk and Reality.
The self-contradictory, I suppose most of us would agree, 
is unreal. And yet, since we discuss it, it is clear that
5the self-contradictory in some sense exists.
There is also the following passage from Ap pe.a/ianae, and 
Re.ailty,
Everything so far, we have seen, has turned out to be 
appearance. It is that which, taken as it stands, proves 
inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be
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true of the real. But to deny its existence or to 
divorce it from reality is out of the question. For it 
has a positive character which is indubitable fact, and 
however much this fact may be pronounced appearance, it 
can have no place to live except reality. (AR p.114-)
The argument in the first passage professes to show that 
self-contradictory entities exist. The argument in the 
second, that whatever is judged to be self-contradictory, or 
to be inconsistent with itself, is an appearance. The con­
clusion drawn is that self-contradictory entities exist - as 
appearances.
6f>. There are, however, a number of difficulties with this 
argument. The first concerns the claim that self-contradict­
ory entities exist. The argument which Bradley uses to 
establish this conclusion is essentially that used by Russell 
to show that there are non-existent beings. And this argument, 
as we have already seen, (Sections 10-12), is unsatisfactory. 
Unless we make the erroneous assumption that the object of 
a belief or judgement is a constituent of that belief or 
judgement, then the fact that something is believed to be 
self-contradictory, or even judged correctly to be self­
contradictory, does not entail that there is any such entity 
- real or existent. But apart from this assumption, Bradley’s 
argument, like Russell’s, lacks any plausibility.
A second difficulty concerns the claim that, whatever is 
judged to be self-contradictory is, Ipto £ac.to, an appearance. 
We have seen that this conclusion is not supported by an 
appeal to the conventions of ordinary language. But apart 
from the tacit assumption that an entity which is judged to
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be self-contradictory must "appear", in some sense, to the 
mind which makes the judgement, in virtue of its making that 
judgement, there do not appear to be any satisfactory philo­
sophical reasons for accepting this conclusion. The viability 
of Bradley’s position rests, then, upon the truth or falsity 
of this assumption. Unfortunately, there are convincing , 
reasons for believing that it is false. When, for example, I 
make the judgement that round-squares are unreal, I am admitt 
edly aware of the meaning of the terms "round" and "square". 
And, if we accept a purely extensional theory of meaning, 
according to which the meaning of a term is determined ex­
clusively by its denotation^, then it follows that I am 
thereby aware of the qualities siound and ¿qua/ie.. So that we 
might say that these qualities "appear-" to the mind when 
making the judgement. What does not follow from my making 
this judgement is that I am thereby aware of these qualities 
as the qualities of a single real or existent entity. There 
is not, in other words, a single entity bearing these incom­
patible qualities which "appears" before the mind in the act 
of judgement. The fact that I judge round-squares, or any 
other entity, to be unreal does not, then, entail either that 
such entities exist, or that they appear before the mind, i.e 
that they are appe.a/iance.A.
66. We have seen that the fact that we discuss, or rather 
pass judgement upon self-contradictory entities does not imp­
ly that such entities "appear" to the person who makes the 
judgement; or, that such entities are real, or existent. In 
this respect, our argument has been mainly negative. But we 
can also show that, not only is there no need to posit the 
reality or existence of such entities, but that it is, in
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fact, impossible for such entities either to exist, or to 
appear to the mind. As Bradley himself suggests, in the first 
of the quoted passages, that which is self-contradictory is 
unreal. But it is also, by his own definition, therefore 
LrnpoAA ikte.*
A thing is impossible absolutely when it contradicts the 
known nature of reality. (AR p. 4.4.6 )
But if an entity is judged to be impossible, because self­
contradictory, then it is impossible for it to be real or 
existent as an appearance. That which is correctly judged to 
be unreal cannot, then, be an appearance.
It is possible, of course, that, if our judgement is erron­
eous, an entity which is judged to be unreal may exist as an 
appearance. But this is not what Bradley has argued. His argu­
ment is, that whatever does, in fact, have a self-contradictory 
nature, or whatever does, in fact, involve a contradiction, 
is therefore an appearance. And such a conclusion, it is clear, 
is unjustified.
67. The fact that an entity is judged to be self-contradict­
ory, and to thereby fail to satisfy the criterion of reality, 
does not, then, determine that it is an appearance. On the 
contrary, the fact that something is judged to be self-contra­
dictory is a sufficient condition for believing that it is
* not an appearance. The first feature of Bradley’s theory of 
appearances is therefore unacceptable.
68. Thus far the notion of an appe.a/iancz has been accepted 
as unproblematic. A number of points arising from the above 
discussion will oblige us, however, to consider the nature
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and status of appearances in more detail. In what sense, for 
example, if at all, can appearances be said to exist? And in 
what way do illusory or m.e.n.e. appearances differ from veridical 
or actuat appearances? Both questions are directly related to 
the second feature of Bradley's theory of appearances - the 
belief that appearances exist. We will begin by considering 
the distinction between mere, and actual, appearances.
69» The failure to distinguish between mere appearances, 
and actual appearances has, I believe, led to a serious equi­
vocation in Bradley's argument concerning the existence of 
appearances. The basis for the distinction between actual and 
mere appearances can be traced to the distinction between two
significantly different uses of the verb "to appear". There
7is, on the one hand, what H.H. Price has termed the clLao tute. 
sense of the verb. When I say, for example, that my dog appe.cui- 
e.d at the door, I am using the verb "to appear" in the absolute 
sense. In this case, as Price points out, there is no distinct­
ion to be made between what appears at the door, and what 
actually exists. If the dog did, in fact, appear at the door, 
the possibility that the dog did not exist, at that time, is 
tacitly precluded. The propositions, "The dog appeared at the 
door at time t", and "The dog did not exist at time t", are 
thus said to involve a contradiction.
Now, if the dog did, in fact, appear at the door, then this 
event might legitimately be called the appe-a/iance. of the dog 
at the door. And it is evident that if the dog exists at the 
time of its appearance, then the appearance (i.e. the event 
of its appearing at the door) exists. So, from the premiss 
that something appears in this sense, we can, by considering 
the event to be an appearance, legitimately conclude that
62)
appearances exist. But to talk of appearances in this sense 
is not to talk of something distinct from, or independent of, 
the entity which appears. It is simply a part of the history 
or temporal dimension of that entity. And, if we consider the 
parts of the temporal dimension of an entity to be parts of 
that entity, then appearances are parts of the entities which 
appear. An appearance, thus understood, I shall call an actual 
appearance.
70. On the other hand, we have what Price calls the p/ie.dl- 
catiue., and the q.uaA i-existent ¿a l senses of the verb "to 
appear". The statement, "The cat at the door appca/i* to be 
black", is an example of the predicative sense. The statement, 
"There appe.a/iA to be a cat at the door", is an example of the 
quasi-existential sense. Both the predicative, and the quasi­
existential senses, unlike the absolute sense, are understood 
to imply the possibility of there being a distinction between 
what appears, and what actually exists. The fact that the cat 
at the door appears to be black, does not, according to common- 
sense opinion, entail that the cat, or any other existent, is
gactually black . Similarly, the fact that there appears to be 
a cat at the door, does not, according to common-sense opinion, 
entail that there ¿a a cat at the door, or anywhere else. In 
other words, the use of either the predicative or the quasi­
existential senses of the verb "to appear", implies the possi­
bility of error.
But the transition from the use of the verb "to appear" in 
either its predicative or its quasi-existential sense, to the 
introduction of a substantive appca/iancc is not as straight­
forward, or as easily justified as it is in the case of its 
use in the absolute sense. Is the appearance to be identified,
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for example, in the first case, with an entity cat-aA-kiack, 
which is distinct from the actual cat; or, with either a 
quality of apparent blackness, or an apparent quality of 
blackness, neither of which, again, is an intrinsic quality 
of the actual cat? Apart from the difficulty of understanding 
the relationship between such ’appearances’ and the actual 
cat, there is the intrinsic obscurity involved in the notion 
of a merely apparent quality. How, for example, can a merely 
apparent quality of blackness, or an actual quality of apparen 
blackness, be identified with an actual quality of blackness 
or a quality of actual blackness in case the cat is, in fact, 
black?
Similar problems arise in the case of the quasi-existential 
sense of app&a/i, If I say that there appears to be a cat at 
the door, does this imply that there is an appearance - an 
apparent cat - at the door? If so, we are again faced with the 
problem of understanding the relationship between the mere 
appearance and, if there really is a cat at the door, the 
actual cat. How, for example, if there is a cat at the door, 
can an apparent cat be identical with an actual cat? And what 
is meant by a merely appa/ie.nt cat, as distinct from an actual 
cat ?
71. There seems to me to be only two obvious ways in which 
these problems might be overcome. Both, however, are incompat­
ible with Bradley’s views. We might deny that such appear
ances as the apparent quality of blackness, and the apparent 
cat at the door, are existent. Or, we might deny that the 
terms /ie.at and appa/ie.nt are contrary.
If we deny that the terms n.e.ai and appa/i£.nt are contrary, 
then we will have avoided the problem of explaining how a
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merely apparent entity can also be an actual entity. But this 
decision is incompatible with Bradley's view that, only upon 
the assumption that there terms are genuine contraries (Cf. 
Section 60), are we entitled to introduce any distinction in 
the ontological statuses of appearance and reality. And it is 
clear that, since such a distinction is unavoidable in meta­
physics, the contrariety of these terms must be preserved.
If, on the other hand, we deny that mere appearances exist, 
then we may give a tentative definition of an appearance, 
based upon the predicative and the quasi-existential senses 
of the verb "to appear". An appearance is an entity which is 
perceived as existent. It is a mc/ic appearance if it is per­
ceived as existent, although it is not, in fact, existent - 
i.e. if it is m.ls!>pe,/ic£,lDe.d as existent.. It is a vc/iidical
appearance if it is perceived as existent, and if it is, in 
. 9 .fact, existent . The quality of blackness, for example, when 
misperceived as existent - i.e. as the quality of the cat - 
is a mere appearance. It is a veridical appearance, hence 
existent, when it is correctly perceived as the quality of 
the cat. Similarly, the cat at the door is a mere appearance 
if it is misperceived as existent; and it is a veridical 
appearance if it actually exists.
72. We may summarise our results concerning the nature and 
status of appearances as follows. Among appearances, we may 
distinguish the following classes: actual appearances, which 
are events, and existent as parts of the temporal dimensions 
of existent entities; vc/iidical appearances, which are exist­
ent as characteristics of existent entities, or entities in 
their own right; and mc/ic. appearances, which are not existent, 
either in their own right, or as characteristics or parts of
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anything existent.
Now it is evident from this classification that the only 
class of appearances whose members might conceivably be said 
to differ in their ontological status from those entities 
which are ultimately real is the class of mere appearances. 
Both actual and veridical appearances are as real as the 
entities of which they are the appearances. So, when Bradley 
claims that appearances differ in their ontological status 
from real entities, and, that the terms /ieatit.y and appea/i- 
aacie. are genuinely contrary, he can only be referring to the 
class of mere appearances. But mere appearances, we have seen, 
are not existent. To be consistent, then, Bradley must either 
abandon the claim that those appearances which differ in their 
ontological status from real entities are existent; or, aban­
don the claim that those appearances which are existent differ 
in their ontological status from real entities. The abandon­
ment of either claim leads, however, to a fundamental incon­
sistency in his overall theory. *
73. At this stage it might be pointed out that we have 
ignored an important qualification in Bradley's theory. It 
is true that the terms /ieat and apparent are understood, by 
Bradley, to be contraries. But they are contraries only if 
by 'real' we mean 'ultimately real’. If, on the other hand, 
we introduce the notion of degrees of reality, then it would 
seem to be possible to consistently hold the view that mere 
appearances exist, and that they differ in their ontological 
status from real, i.e. ultimately real, entities. They differ 
in so far as they have a lesser deg/iee of reality than ultim­
ately real entities.
71. There are, however, two serious difficulties with this .
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reply. The first concerns the claim that mere appearances 
exist. The second concerns the question of the intelligibility 
of the motion of degrees of reality. •­
When discussing the basis for the distinction between 
actual and mere appearances, we noted that the use of either 
the predicative or the quasi-existential senses of the verb 
nto appear” is not generally considered to involve a commit­
ment to the existence of what appears.to exist. In other words, 
there is an implicit allowance, in such uses, for the possi­
bility of perceptual error. But if we are to take the view 
that mere appearances exist, then it will need to be shown 
that these presumptions are unjustified. What arguments does 
Bradley offer to show that these presumptions are unjustified,' ft' i
and that mere appearances exist? The main argument in favour 
of this thesis is found towards the end of Chapter XII of 
Appe.a/iance. and Re.atity.
We shall hereafter have to inquire into the nature of 
appearances; but for the present we may keep a fast hold 
upon this, that appearances exist. That is absolutely 
certain, and to deny it is nonsense. And whatever exists 
must belong to reality. That is also quite certain, and 
its denial once more is self-contradictory.. What appears, 
for that sole reason, most indubitably and there is
no possibility of conjuring its being away from it.. And 
the whole result of this Book may be summed up in a few 
words. Everything so far, which we have seen, has turned 
out to be appearance. It is that which, taken as it 
stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this 
reason cannot be true of the real. But to deny its
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existence or to divorce it from reality is out of the 
question. For it has a positive character which is 
indubitable fact, and, however much this fact may be 
pronounced appearance, it can have no place to live 
except reality. (AR p.1U)
75* There is, however, a clear equivocation in this argu­
ment. It is true, we have seen, that if something is an actual 
or a veridical appearance, then it exists. And Bradley's claim 
that whatever appears, hence its appearance, is both real and 
existent, is justified if, by an appearance, we mean either 
an actual or a veridical appearance. But if something is an 
actual or a.veridical appearance, it is impossible that it 
should be delusive or self-contradictory.
This is not to say that I might not be wrong in what I 
believe to be an actual or a veridical appearance. My belief 
that my dog appeared (in the absolute sense) at the door five 
minutes ago might be mistaken. And the reason that I come to 
doubt the truth of the belief might be that it contradicts 
some further belief which I subsequently know to be true. 
Similarly, my belief that the cat which walked past the 
window two minutes ago is black might be shown to be mis­
taken by the fact that, when it now returns, it is clearly 
grey. But in both cases, the correct conclusion to be drawn 
is not that the supposed appearance of the dog at the door, 
or the supposed blackness of the cat, are unreal (i.e. not 
ultimately real) existents, but, in the first case, that the 
dog did not appear at the door at all; and, in the second 
case, that neither the cat, nor anything else existent, is 
black. The fact that, in the first example, the belief that
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the dog did appear at the door five minutes ago, and, in the 
second example, the belief that the cat is black, would 
contradict further beliefs which are known to be true is, in 
other words, a sufficient condition for denying that there is 
either an actual appearance of the dog at the door, or a 
veridical appearance of blackness belonging to the cat. ,
It is evident, then, that Bradley cannot be talking of 
actual or veridical appearances when he says that an appear­
ance is that which proves inconsistent with itself; since an 
appearance, if it is either an actual or a veridical appear­
ance, cannot be internally inconsistent or self-contradictory. 
But if he is not talking of actual or veridical appearances, 
then it is difficult to justify his claim that appearances 
exist. The only appearances which might be said to involve 
error or inconsistency are mere appearances. But mere appear­
ances, we have suggested, do not exist. And Bradley's argu­
ment certainly does not give us any reason to suppose that
they do. It is difficult, for this reason, not to agree with
1 0at least one of Bradley’s critics when it is suggested that 
Bradley’s whole position with respect to the distinction 
between appearance and reality rests upon an equvocation in 
the use of the term appe.a/ianc.e. between actual or veridical 
appearances, on the one hand, and mere appearances on the 
other.
76. We have seen that Bradley's argument is unsatisfactory, 
but there is another argument which might be thought to 
support"the claim that mere appearances exist. If the argument 
is sound, it would oblige us to either reject or revise our 
original definition of mere appearances, or to classify all 
appearances as either actual or veridical appearances.
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The argument, in effect, amounts to a denial of the 
assumption that misperception is possible - all cognitive 
error is attributed to false beliefs or unsound inferences. 
Such a view was taken by Bertrand Russell in his book, Oil/i 
Kn.0ut2.dge. 0/£ th.2 Cxte/inat Uo/itd,
The first thing to realise is that there are no such
things as "illusions of sense". Objects of sense, even
when they occur in dreams, are the most indubitably
real objects known to us.. Objects of sense are called
"real" when they have the kind of connection with other
objects of sense which experience has led us to regard
as normal; when they fail in this, they are called
"illusions". But what is illusory is only the inferences
11to which they give rise.
The principle being asserted here might be called the
principle of the self-evident correctness of perception or,
more simply, the principle of the evidence of perception; and
it might be stated in the following way; 7fiat which l pe/i-
C2 iv2 La cla l pejiccivc it to &2 , at th.2 mom.2n.t oJL tim.2 at
12 .which 1 p2/ic2 iv2 it . By pc/iccption is meant that species of 
awareness which is the direct awareness of a substance or 
particular, as distinct from that species of awareness which 
is ostensibly an awareness of characteristics pe/i ¿2 , i.e. of 
characteristic-types, rather than characteristic-tokens. Per­
ception, thus understood, should be distinguished from per­
ceptual belief - by which I mean either a belief acquired as 
the result of perception, or a belief about what is perceived 
This last distinction is important, since the principle of
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the evidence of perception is not, as is sometimes believed, 
a claim about the correctness of perceptual beliefs,
77, The relevance of the principle of the evidence of 
perception to the argument that mere appearances exist is 
easily seen. If I perceive a substance as having certain 
characteristics, then, according to this principle, we must 
admit that whatever I did perceive existed, and had those 
characteristics which I perceived it as having at the time at 
which I perceived it. In which case it follows that, if a 
substance is perceived as having characteristics which are 
subsequently determined to be incompatible or contradictory, 
then that substance must be both existent and self-contradict­
ory, And this is what Bradley means by an appearance. Now 
since, as we have seen, the only appearances which can be said 
to involve error or inconsistency are mere appearances, it 
would seem to follow from this argument that mere appearances 
exist.
78, Perhaps the most obvious reply to this argument is to 
deny the soundness of the principle upon which it is based.
At most, we might suggest, perception guarantees the existence 
of that which is perceived. If I perceive a substance X as 
having the characteristic b, at a moment of time t, I might 
legitimately conclude that X exists at that moment of time.
But perception does not necessarily guarantee that what I 
perceive has, at the moment of time at which I perceive it, 
those characteristics which I perceive it as having. Nor does 
it guarantee that the entity which I believe that I perceive 
is the entity which I do, in fact, perceive. So that I might 
believe that I am perceiving a silver coin on the ground when, 
in fact, I am actually perceiving a piece of aluminium foil.
And, if any support is wanted for this reply, we can appeal 
to the fact, mentioned earlier, that the use of either the 
predicative, or the quasi-existential senses of the verb Mto 
appear” in ordinary discourse, is based upon the tacit 
assumption that perception might be erroneous - that things 
might, in fact, be other than they are perceived as being,
I think that this reply is adequate. But the adherent to 
the principle in question might fail to be satisfied. He 
might point out that what has been construed to be a case of 
misperception can just as plausibly be analysed in terms of 
a veridical perception accompanied by a false belief or an 
unsound inference. For example, if what I take to be a mis­
perception of a substance X as having the quality c - which 
it does not, in fact, have - is understood, instead, to be 
a veridical perception of another substance Y which does have 
the quality c, accompanied by the false belief that it is X 
which is perceived, then the principle of the evidence of 
perception is saved.
Historically, a similar approach was, I believe, taken by 
those philosophers who wished to introduce the notion of a 
¿e.nAe.-datuni into the analysis of perceptual situations. If, 
for example, I believe that the shining elliptical object 
which I perceive before me on the table is a twenty-cent 
coin, and if I subsequently conclude that there could not 
have been an elliptical twenty-cent coin in my perceptual 
field at that moment, the conclusion which has been drawn 
by some sense-datum theorists - upholding the principle of 
the evidence of perception - is not that I misperceived a 
circular coin as elliptical, but that I did not perceive a 
coin at all. What I in fact perceived, it is alleged, had, at
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that moment, those characteristics which I perceived it as 
having* i.e. shining and elliptical. But it was not a coin, 
rather it is a substance called a sense-datura. The belief 
that I perceived a coin is false, but the evidence of per­
ception is upheld, since the substance which I did, in fact, 
perceive, had those characteristics which I perceived it as 
having. If there is any error, or ’'illusion" involved in 
perception* the error, as Russell suggests, lies exclusively“ 
in my perceptual beliefs, and not in any erroneous perception 
as such,
79* At this stage, the decision as to whether we should 
admit the possibility of misperception, or, on the other 
hand, attribute all error associated with perception to 
mistaken perceptual beliefs is, perhap-s, somewhat arbitrary. 
Any supposed instance of misperception might equally well 
be construed, so it would seem, as an instance of veridical 
perception accompanied by erroneous perceptual belief, J
There are, however, a number of considerations which, I 
believe, favour the acceptance of the possibility of misper­
ception.
Firstly, there is the ambiguity involved in Russell’s 
statement of the principle. The claim that the objects of 
sense are the most indubitably real objects known to us is 
not equivalent to, nor does it imply, the proposition that 
the objects of sense have precisely those characteristics 
which they are perceived as having. And it does not imply 
that all error involved in perception can be attributed to 
false beliefs or unsound inferences. So, we might be prepared 
to agree with Russell that the only substances which we 
directly perceive are sense-data, without thereby being
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committed to the view that our awareness of these sense-data 
is invariably veridical. But this ambiguity is, I think, 
attributable more to Russell*s somewhat loose characterisation 
of the principle, than to some intrinsic obscurity in the 
principle itself.
Secondly, and more importantly, it is doubtful whether any 
adherents to the principle of the evidence of perception 
would be willing to admit that it is possible to be aware of 
any entity which proves to be inconsistent or self-contradict­
ory. If confronted with the fact that some entities are 
perceived as having characteristics which subsequently prove 
to be incompatible, I am sure that most would rather abandon 
the principle than be committed to the existence of impossible 
entities. So, even though many would be prepared to accept *“ 
the principle under normal circumstances, I think that none, 
apart from Bradley, would be prepared to accept it if it could 
be shown to lead to a commitment to the existence of impossi- 
bilia.
Thirdly, and most importantly, there is one limitation 
which must be imposed upon the principle of the evidence of 
perception. According to the principle, if a substance X is 
perceived as b, at a moment of time t, then X is b at t. But 
the fact that X is perceived as b at t does not imply that 
X is b at t1. The proposition MX is perceived as b" does not, 
then, imply the proposition nX is bM ii.nie.AA there is a real 
time-series, of which t is a member, and at which both X and 
the perception of X exist. But we cannot be certain that there 
is such a time-series except by appealing to the principle in 
question; and this, of course, involves a vicious circle. The 
reality of the time-series is, in other words, a condition
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for the truth of the principle of the evidence of perception. 
Now this condition might not prove to be a worry for those 
who accept the reality of the time-series. But it is a problem 
for Bradley who, in Chapter IV, argues against the reality of 
such a series. He cannot, then, appeal to this principle in 
support of his contention that mere appearances exist.
80. It is clear, then, that the principle of the evidence 
of perception is not, itself, a self-evident truth. It is 
valid only upon the assumption that there is a real time- 
series. And this assumption is neither self-evidently true, 
nor capable of being established by the principle in question. 
Bradley1s rejection of this assumption consequently undermines 
the most plausible basis for his belief that mere appearances
exist. *
81. We have, I believe, established that the second feature 
of Bradley's theory of appearances - the claim that mere 
appearances exist - is not supported by any sound argument.
We have also, I believe, put forward convincing reasons for 
believing that it is both false, and incompatible with other 
aspects of Bradley's raetaphysic. ..
In Section 60 I mentioned that the belief that mere appear­
ances exist is closely related to the further belief that they 
have varying degrees of reality. Does the conclusion that mere 
appearances do not exist preclude the possibility that they 
have some degree of reality? I think that it does. But in 
order to answer this question we must first determine whether 
or not the doctrine of the degrees of reality is intelligible; 
and, whether or not appearances can be real without existing. 
The latter question, although important, is not strictly 
relevant to the assessment of Bradley's theory, since he
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believed that appearances do exist. I wil^return to this 
question in the next chapter. For the moment we will confine 
our attention to the question of degrees of reality.
82. The doctrine of degrees of reality is, perhaps justi­
fiably, one of the more controversial aspects of Bradley's 
philosophy. Some criticics have simply dismissed it as being 
self-evidently false. But many of those who have done so have 
I think, confused reality with existence. The fact that the 
terms "reality" and "existence" are so often used as equival­
ents might seem to lend support to the view that, since it 
seems meaningless to speak of something having degrees of 
existence, it is therefore meaningless or false to speak of 
reality as having degrees. The fact that these two terms are 
often used interchangeably does not, however, imply that they 
are equivalent. And even though, as I have argued, they may 
be co-extensive, this does not imply that they have the same 
connotation. Thus, even if we cannot meaningfully speak of 
entities as having degrees of existence, this does not pre­
clude us from saying that they can have degrees of reality.
Furthermore, if the doctrine of degrees of reality is 
false, as I believe it is, it cannot be shown to be false by 
an appeal to ordinary discourse. It is neither grammatically 
incorrect, nor even awkward, to speak of an entity as being 
more or less real than another. And although we may be mis­
taken in believing that such statements correspond to some 
.fact about these entities, they are not self-evidently false 
or meaningless.
83* But what does Bradley mean when he says that reality 
has degrees? To be more or less real, he suggests,
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• • is to be separated by an interval, smaller or greater, 
from all-inclusiveness or self-consistency. Of two given 
appearances the one more wide, or more harmonious, is 
more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all contain­
ing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in other
words, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The
<■
truth and the fact, which, to be converted into the 
Absolute, would require less re-arrangement and addition, 
is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by 
degrees of reality and truth. To possess more the char­
acter of reality, and to contain within oneself a greater 
amount of the real, are two expressions for the same 
thing V;(AR pp.322-323)
Although this principle is referred to, and utilised, in 
a number of other arguments in his works, I don't think that 
Bradley has given any clearer statement either of the prin­
ciple itself, or of the philosophical basis for its intro­
duction. Unfortunately, even this passage is not without 
ambiguity. And, on the whole, as an argument for the accept­
ance of the doctrine of degrees of reality, it is, I think, 
unconvincing.
84. There is, firstly, a failure to distinguish between 
what might be called the doctrine of degrees of £.Kte,ru> ive. 
magnitude of reality, and the doctrine of degrees of lnte.n>!>lDe- 
magnitude of reality. To say that entities may have varying 
degrees of extensive magnitude of reality means that they may 
have or contain a greater or lesser amount of that which is 
real. To say that they may have varying degrees of intensive 
magnitude of reality means that they may have the quality of
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reality or being real to a greater or lesser degree of intens­
ity. Now, the doctrine of degrees of extensive magnitude of 
reality is not, I suggest, a controversial doctrine. It is 
quite acceptable, for example, to suggest that Australia is 
more real than New Zealand if it is meant that Australia has 
or contains more of that which is real - such as land mass or- 
people. But this does not imply, and is not equivalent to, the 
claim that Australia has a greater degree of intensive magni­
tude of reality, i.e. that it has the quality of being real 
to a greater degree of intensity, than New Zealand. And it is 
also, I suggest, uncontroversially true that the Universe, or 
the Absolute, is more real than its finite parts or "appear­
ances", in the sense that it contains more of that which is 
real than does any finite part or "appearance". What is con­
troversial is the claim that the Universe has a greater degree 
of intensive magnitude of reality than its finite parts or 
"appearances". But this conclusion does not follow from the 
the fact that the Universe has a greater degree of extensive 
magnitude than its parts; and yet it seems clear in the pass­
age quoted above, that Bradley either considered the propos­
itions to be equivalent, or believed that the former implies 
the latter.
85. Having clarified the distinction between the doctrine 
of the degrees of extensive magnitude of reality, and that of 
the degrees’ of intensive magnitude of reality; and, having 
noted that the former is uncontroversially true, we may con­
clude that when Bradley claims that appearances have greater 
or lesser degrees of reality, he means that they have greater 
or lesser degrees of intensive magnitude of reality. But is 
this an intelligible doctrine? There are, I think, a number
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of reasons for believing that it is not.
According to Bradley, there is only one entity which is 
ultimately real - the Absolute. But if the doctrine of degrees 
of reality is to have any valid application, there must be a 
plurality of entities which admit of comparison in this res­
pect. Given the truth of Bradley’s monism, there are, I be­
lieve, only two options: that the entities which admit of 
degrees of reality are pa/it* of the one real entity; or, that 
the entities which admit of degrees of reality are appe.a/iance.A 
of the one real entity. I will consider each of these options 
in turn.
86. Can the parts of a real entity be more or less real 
than each other, or less real than the entity itself? The 
answer to this question depends upon whether we are talking of- 
degrees of intensive magnitude, or of degrees of extensive 
magnitude, of reality. If the latter, then the answer, as we 
saw in Section 84, is clearly that they can. If the former, 
then the answer is, I believe, that they cannot.
It is true, as Bradley suggests in the quoted passage, that 
one part of a whole might resemble the whole of which it is a 
part more than another part of that whole resembles the whole. 
And, again, one part, we have seen, might contain more of the 
content of the whole than another part. But neither of these 
facts determines that the part in question is more real, in 
an intensive sense, than any other part, or that it is less 
real than the whole. The principle that a part of a real entity 
is as real as any other part, or as real as the entity itself, 
is not, I believe, susceptible to proof. It is rather, a self­
evident axiom. And it is a principle which is embodied in the 
logic of ordinary discourse, where we do not speak of a part
79)
of a real entity as being less real than any other part, or 
less real than the entity itself. When I say, for example, 
that the leg of my table is a part of the table, I do not 
thereby mean that it is any less real than the table itself. 
Nor do I mean that the lower half of the leg is less real than 
the top of the table, except in an extensive sense, simply 
because it does not contain as much of the content of the 
table as the top does, or because it resembles the table less 
than the top does. To claim that the parts of a real entity 
may have degrees of reality would mean, then, that either one 
had confused the doctrine of degrees of extensive magnitude of 
reality with that of degrees of intensive magnitude of reality; 
or, that one,did not clearly understand the meanings of the 
terms '’real", "part” and "whole”. •
87. At any rate, appearances of the Absolute are not con­
sidered by Bradley (at least not explicitly) to be parts of 
the Absolute. And it is appearances, he maintains, that are 
the only entities which admit of degrees of reality. Is it 
possible, then, for an appearance of a real entity to be less 
real than the entity itself? And can one appearance be more or 
less real than another?
It is difficult to answer these questions without firstly 
determining the sense in which the term "appearance is used.
If we are talking about actual or veridical appearances, then 
g_ppQa.rances cannot be more or less real than each other, or 
less real than the entity which appears; since actual and 
veridical appearances, we have seen, are either parts of the 
temporal dimension of the entity which appears, or character­
istics of the entity which appears, respectively. And neither 
the parts, nor the characteristics of a real entity admit of
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88. If, on the other hand, we are talking about mere appear 
ances, then we are faced with the difficulty of determining 
the basis for according these appearances a greater or lesser 
degree of reality.
A possible suggestion is that, since mere appearances, 
unlike veridical appearances, involve the reality of error, , 
the degree of reality to be accorded to the appearance might 
be equated with the degree of error which it involves. But 
this suggestion must be rejected for the following reason. The 
error associated with a mere appearance is not an intrinsic 
quality of the appearance itself. It consists, rather, in the 
perception of a substance as having characteristics which it 
does not have, and hence is determined by a relation - which 
we might call a relation of misperception - between a mind, a 
substance, and a characteristic, or set of characteristics. A 
perception is more or less erroneous according as it perceives 
a substance as having more or less of those characteristics 
which it does not have. And, if error is to be a quality of 
any entity, it should be attributed to the mind which misper- 
ceives the substance in question, rather than to the charac­
teristics which are subsequently classified as mere appear­
ances. If there is to be any correlation between the degree of 
error involved in misperception and degrees of intensive 
magnitude of reality, then it ought to be between the degree 
of error, and the degree of reality to be attributed to the 
state of mind in misperception. There can, then, I suggest, be 
no sound basis for a positive correlation between the degree 
reality which is accorded to a mere appearance, and the degree 
or error involved in a state of misperception.
89. Another possible suggestion is that the degree of
reality to be attributed to mere appearances is determined by 
the degree to which they resemble the entities of which they 
are appearances; or, by the degree to which they contain the 
content of the entities. But this suggestion, although perhaps 
in accordance with Bradley’s views, is unsatisfactory. Firstly, 
a mere appearance cannot resemble the entity of which it is 
said to be an appearance, since a mere appearance, by defin­
ition, is a characteristic, or set of characteristics, which 
the entity does not have. And if the appearance, and the entity 
in question, have no common characteristics, it is difficult 
to understand in what respect they may resemble each other.
Secondly, to talk of mere appearances as being appearances 
0/ an entity, is somewhat misleading. A mere appearance is not 
a part of the entity in question. And the characteristics 
which are said to comprise the appearance are, by definition, 
not actual characteristics of the entity. It is therefore 
impossible for a mere appearance to contain any of the content 
of the entity of which it is said to be an appearance. Mere 
appearances cannot, then, be accorded degrees of reality on 
this basis.
90. There is a further reason for rejecting the possibility 
that mere appearances have degrees of reality. We have so far 
spoken of mere appearances as if they are in some sense real, 
if not existent. But if they are neither real, nor existent, 
it would be impossible for them to have any d&g/uze. of reality. 
And secondly, even if mere appearances are real, then this 
fact would be incompatible, I believe, with Bradley's monism.
Let us first briefly consider the question of the reality 
of mere appearances.^ If I perceive a substance X as having 
the quality b at a moment of time t, and if X does have the
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quality b at t, then my perception is veridical. That is to 
say, there is no distinction between the way X is perceived as 
being, i.e. its appe.a/iance.y and the way it really is. But to 
talk of an appearance in this sense is not to introduce a 
distinct entity into the situation described as my perception 
of X as b, over and above the substance X, and my perception 
of it. It is simply a way of expressing the fact that X b, 
and is correctly perceived as such by me.
If, on the other hand, I perceive X as b at t, and if X is 
not b at t, then we ought to conclude that I misperceived X. 
But there are two ways in which this situation might be inter­
preted. We might acknowledge the analysis of the sense-datum 
theorist and. conclude that I did not, in fact, misperceive X. 
Rather, it might be suggested, I correctly perceived another 
substance Y which was, in fact, b at t. The error involved in 
the perceptual situation is, accordingly, attributed to an 
erroneous perceptual belief. Now, if we follow this interpret­
ation through, and apply it to all cases of ostensible misper­
ception, it is clear that, since it removes the possibility 
of any strictly sensory, as distinct from noetic, error, it 
undermines the basis for the belief that there are any mere 
appearances. And if there are no mere appearances, then they 
cannot be accorded any degree of reality.
Or else, we might accept the possibility of misperception; 
in which case the mere appearance is ostensibly that quality,
■ĵ  ̂ q misperceive X as having. But if the mere appearance
is identified with the quality b, which neither,X nor any 
other existent substance has, then this characteristic, hence 
the mere appearance, cannot exist or be real; since, as was 
argued in the previous chapter, all real characteristics are
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existent, and the only way a characteristic can exist is as 
a characteristic of an existent substance. The contention that 
mere appearances are characteristics which, although real, do 
not characterise any existent substances must, therefore, be 
false. And yet, if mere appearances are to be real, this, by 
definition, is what they must be. We must conclude, then, that 
mere appearances are neither existent nor real.
This conclusion will seem unduly paradoxical if we ignore 
the possibility.of misperception. In the next chapter I will 
argue that the notion of misperception must be taken as ulti­
mate; that is to say, it cannot be analysed in terms of, or 
reduced to, the veridical perception of a surrogate entity - 
a mere appearance. It will be argued, on a different basis to 
that used above, that there are no mere appearances, real or 
existent, although there are perceptual situations which imply 
the reality of error. It will also be argued that the sense­
datum theorist's analysis of such perceptual situations is 
unsatisfactory, and that misperception is possible. A mere 
appearance, it will be seen, is not an entity - real or exist­
ent. It is, rather, the erroneous perception of an existent 
substance. A mere appearance, as Samuel Alexander put it, is
1 5"the real world seen awry or squintingly" .
91. But even if we were to ignore the above conclusions, 
and insist that mere appearances are, in some sense, and in 
some degree, real, it would, I believe, be impossible to 
reconcile this fact with Bradley's monism.
In order that a mere appearance should be real, it is nec­
essary for certain conditions to be satisfied. The first is 
that both the mind which misperceives the one ultimately real 
entity, the Absolute, as having characteristics which it does
not have, and the erroneous perception as such, must be irre- 
ducibly real. The second is that the reality of error as in- 
eliminable be acknowledged. Neither of these conditions is 
accepted by Bradley; and both are incompatible with his 
monistic Absolute in which all error is transmuted, and where 
all finite minds and their states, or finite centres of exper-^ 
ience, are themselves said to be mere appearances. In other 
words, the reality of mere appearances would imply the reality 
of finite minds and error; and neither of these conditions can 
be reconciled with Bradley’s ultimate metaphysical conclusions. 
Mere appearances cannot, then, even upon Bradley's own assump­
tions, have any reality or existence.
92. So, we have found no entities which might truly be said
to have degrees of reality. The class of entities to which 
Bradley applied this doctrine, the class of appearances, must 
be either actual or veridical appearances - in which case they 
are either parts of, or characteristics of a real entity, and 
hence as the entity itself; or else they must be mere appear­
ances - in which case they cannot be real, and therefore do 
not admit of degrees of reality.
The second feature of Bradley’s theory - that appearances 
exist, and have degrees of reality - is therefore untenable.
93. The third feature of Bradley's theory of appearances is 
what he, at times, considers to be the most fundamental feature 
of appearances. So far in our discussion we have more or less 
assumed that the notion of an 'appearance' or, more accurately, 
that the"distinction between reality and appearance, arises 
only in a perceptual context. But this sense of the term 
'appearance' is, according to Bradley, secondary. What is fun­
damental, he suggests, is the sense in which an appearance
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involves the disjunction of the wkat from the that - of content 
from existence.
The reader next should recall the twofold meaning of the 
word ’appearance1. That sense of the term in which some­
thing appears to someone., is secondary. What is funda-(
mental ..is the presence in everything finite of that 
which takes it beyond itself. (ETR p.272)
The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of 
existence and content, and, on the other side, appearance 
consists in the discrepancy between these two aspects.
And reality in the end belongs to nothing but the single 
Real. For take anything, no matter what it is, which is 
less than the Absolute, and the inner discrepancy at once 
proclaims that what you have taken is appearance. The 
alleged reality divides itself and falls apart into two 
jarring factors. The ’what’ and the 'that’ are plainly 
two sides which turn out not to be the same, and this 
difference inherent in every finite fact entails its 
disruption. As long as the content stands for something 
other than its own intent and meaning, as long as the 
existence actually is less or more than what it essential­
ly must imply, so long we are concerned with mere appear­
ance, and not with genuine reality. And we have found in 
in every region that this discrepancy oi aspects prevails. 
The internal being of everything finite depends on that 
which is beyond it. Hence everywhere, insisting on a so- 
called fact, we have found ourselves led by its inner
character into something outside itself. And this self- .
t and ideality of all thingscontradiction, this unres
86)
existing is a clear proof that, although such things are, 
their being is appearance. (AR pp. 103-4-04)
When discussing this feature of Bradley's theory of appear­
ances, there are two questions to be considered: To what ex­
tent is this feature of his theory internally consistent?; and; 
To what extent, if at all, is this feature of his theory con­
sistent with the other features? The answers to both of these 
questions will, unfortunately, turn out to be somewhat nega­
tive .
94-. The first thing that should be pointed out is that 
Bradley is not justified in his claim that this new sense of 
the term 'appearance' is more fundamental. As he himself sugg­
ests, its use in this way is derivative, and ultimately in­
volves a licence.
We have found that no one aspect of experience, as 
such, is real. None is primary, or can serve to explain 
the others or the whole. They are all alike appearances, 
all one-sided, and passing away beyond themselves. But I 
may be asked why, admitting this, we should call them 
appearances. For such a term belongs solely of right to 
the perceptional side of things, and the perceptional 
side, we agreed, was but one aspect among others. To 
appear, we may be told, is not possible except to a 
percipient, and an appearance also implies both judgement 
and rejection. I might certainly, on the other side, 
inquire whether all implied metaphors are to be pressed,
and if so, how many phrases and terms would be left us.
I admit at once that theBut in the case of appearance
87)
objection has force. I think the term implies without 
doubt an aspect of perceiving and judging, and such an 
aspect, I quite agree, does not everywhere exist. For, 
even if we conclude that all phenomena pass through 
psychical centres, yet in those centres all is not per­
ception. And to assume that somehow in the Whole all , 
phenomena are judged of would again be indefensible. We 
must, in short, admit that some appearances really do not 
appear, and that a licence is involved in our use of the 
term. (AR pp.129-4-30)
The extension of the meaning of certain terms so as to go 
beyond what ris implied by their normal usage is, I think, jus­
tifiable in philosphy, particularly where the normal usage is 
either unduly restrictive, or inconsistent. But it is not jus­
tifiable if the extended meaning bears little, if any, relation 
to the meaning normally accorded the term. And it is indefens­
ible if the disparity between the normal and the extended uses 
is exploited so as to give the impression that the implications 
arising from one use of the term are carried over, more or less 
intact, to the other. And the latter is, I believe, the case 
with Bradley1s extension of the meaning of the term 'appear­
ance 1 .
The notion of an appearance which we have so far considered 
is essentially derived from the context of perception. Explicit 
reference to the notion of misperception is, in fact, included 
in our definition of a mere appearance. In this respect, our 
use of the term »appearance1 has been in accordance with norm­
al usage. The omission of any explicit reference to a percept­
ual context when extending the meaning of the term 'appearance'
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would accordingly deprive the term of any meaning which it has 
been accorded by ordinary language. And yet, this is precisely 
what is involved in Bradley’s extension of the meaning of the 
term. The proposed definition of an appearance as an entity 
which involves a discrepancy between content and existence 
makes no reference, implicit or explicit, to perception. For 
this reason, it is not a legitimate extension of the normal 
meaning of the term. It is, rather, a redefinition. Thus re­
defined, however, the term ’appearance1 loses any of the im­
plications associated with its normal usage; and any conclus­
ions which might follow from the meaning normally accorded the 
term must, as a consequence, be put aside. Having made this 
point, we can now turn to a consideration of the philosophical 
difficulties with this notion of an appearance.
95. There is first of all the question of the internal 
consistency of this feature of Bradley’s theory. We need not, 
at this stage, question his criterion of reality as the union 
and agreement of content and existence. In a general sense we 
might understand, and accept, that wherever we find these two 
aspects of reality to be discrepant or disjoined, we do not 
have reality as such. But what are we to understand by the 
proposition that appearances consist in the discrepancy of 
these two aspects? In our earlier discussion we defined a mere 
appearance as being a characteristic which is misperceived as . 
the characteristic of an existent substance. An appearance, 
thus defined, clearly involves a discrepancy between content 
and existence; it is, in fact some element of content disjoined 
from existence. As such, it would appear to be in keeping with 
Bradley's proposed redefinition. But it is evident that such 
appearances cannot exist. And we have also argued that it
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is impossible for such appearances to be real. It is clear, 
then, that this cannot be what Bradley means by an appearance.
The discrepancy alluded to might, on the other hand, be 
understood to mean that some substance has content which is 
not its own; which, in effect, belongs to some other substance. 
This view is, however, clearly absurd. It is equivalent to the 
statement that some substance has content which it does not 
have. .
Nor is our difficulty solved by adopting the position that 
an appearance consists in the disjunction of content and 
existence. An appearance might be said to presuppose such a 
disjunction, but it cannot tc such a disjunction, since a 
disjunction fi,s not a kind of entity. If an appearance is to be 
anything at all in this sense, it must be one of the disjoined 
aspects. But if the appearance is identified with the aspect 
of content alone, it cannot be existent. And if the appearance 
is identified with the ’that’, or unmediated being or exist­
, ence, then it will be devoid of content and, as such, incapable 
of being described or having any content.
An appearance, then, must somehow be the unity of content 
and existence which is either discrepant or disjoined. An 
appearance, then, must be a self-contradictory, hence imposs­
ible entity. Bradley might be prepared to agree with us to an 
extent in this conclusion if, by a ’self-contradictory1 entity, 
we mean an entity which combines or unites incompatible or 
contradictory characteristics. But this is not the sense in 
which it*is self-contradictory. It is contradictory in the 
sense that it would oblige us to assent to the proposition 
that such an entity does, and does not, exist. And this, rather 
than being a significant and enlightening statement about the
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nature of appearances, is simply meaningless.
96. If we turn from this interpretation of Bradley's pos­
ition, and emphasise, instead, the statement that an appearance 
is an entity whose nature implies its inclusion within a more 
extensive whole, we are no further ahead. By definition, a 
part of any whole, in so far as it is understood to be a part 
of that whole, must imply the existence, and to a lesser extent 
determine the nature, of that whole of which it is a part. And, 
if we perceive the part cu> a part of a particular whole, then, 
to that extent, we might be justified in saying that the whole 
is thereby immanent in the part. But this fact neither entails 
that the part in question, i.e. the appearance, is self-contra^ 
dictory, nor.̂  implies that the part involves a discrepancy 
between content and existence. •
This might not be exactly what Bradley means by his state­
ment that the internal being of everything finite depends on 
that which is beyond it. He might mean that every finite entity 
is not self-existent; that its nature is conditioned by its 
inclusion within a greater whole, and that it depends upon this 
whole for its existence. But this fact, once again, does not 
imply that there is any discrepancy between content and exist­
ence in the part, or that it is, in any sense, self-contradict­
ory.
Furthermore, neither of these interpretations of the sig­
nificance of the part to the whole implies that the part is 
in any way delusive, i.e. a mere appearance. If it is a real 
part of the entity, that is to say, if it is either an actual 
or veridical appearance, then there is no possibility of error 
being involved.
97. But there is a more interesting, and probably more
controversial interpretation of Bradley’s position. In a 
chapter entitled "On Appearance, Error and Contradiction", 
from ¿¿¿ay* on 7/iutfi and Re.ati.ty, Bradley gives the following 
characterisation of appearances.
Now in every finite centre (on our view) the Whole, 
immanent there, fails to be included in that centre. The 
content of the centre therefore is beyond itself, and the 
thing therefore is appearance and is so far what may be 
termed 'ideal’. (ETR pp.250-251)
This suggests a much more literal interpretation of the
statement that the whole is immanent in its parts than eitherr‘ ;
of the above interpretations. According*to this interpretation 
Bradley’s position is much more like that of Leibniz, accordin 
to whom the fundamental constituents of the Universe - the 
monads - "mirror" or represent the whole universe, from a 
particular point of view, within themselves; or, like that of 
McTaggart's description of the Universe as a ”self-reflecting" 
unity, according to which each member of a set of parts of the 
Universe corresponds with, and in a sense is a man L£e. station 
o/, the Universe as a whole. Both of these theories suggest 
that a much closer unity prevails between the parts of the 
Universe, and the Universe as a whole, than that which is 
sometimes known as an "organic" unity. According to the notion 
of an organic unity, the whole is manifest in its parts, but 
only in all of the parts taken together. But according to 
jvjc'Paggart’s theory, and I think the same can be said of Leib— 
niz' theory, the whole is "manifest" or "immanent" in each of 
its parts taken separately. In this respect both theories
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closely resemble the more literal interpretation of Bradley's 
position. The important point of difference is that both 
McTaggart and Leibniz have been able to set out, in an appar­
ently consistent fashion, an insight which Bradley could only 
express as a contradiction.
But if such a position can be expressed in a consistent , 
theory, then there is no real contradiction involved in the 
proposition that each part of a real entity "includes" the 
content of the whole. In this way we can agree with Bradley's 
contention that the content of any finite part of the Universe 
transcends its existence, that its what transcends its that, 
without being committed to his conclusion that this proposition 
involves a contradiction. There would, accordingly, be no valid 
reason to condemn such finite parts or •"appearances" as mere 
appearances.
98. We have, I believe, established that the third feature 
of Bradley’s theory of appearances is not internally consist­
ent. But is it also incompatible with the other features of 
his theory? I believe that it is.
It is incompatible with the first feature - the claim that 
all appearances are either self-contradictory or imply the 
truth of a contradiction. None of the interpretations which 
we have given of Bradley's definition implies that such "app­
earances" are self-contradictory, except the claim that an 
appearance*is a disjunction of content and existence. But this
claim, we saw, is unintelligible.
And it is incompatible with the claim that appearances exist 
and have degrees of reality, which is the second feature of 
his theory. It may be true that there are finite entities 
which imply their being included in, and being existentially
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dependent upon, a more extensive whole. And these entities 
might, as we have seen, be said, in a significant sense, to 
have content which transcends their existence. Furthermore, 
since there is no apparent contradiction involved in the notion 
of such entities, it is possible that they might exist. But 
these entities, if existent as appearances, must be either , 
actual or veridical appearances of real and existent entities. 
And both actual and veridical appearances - being either parts 
or constituents, respectively, of real and existent entities - 
can be neither delusive, nor susceptible to being accorded 
varying degrees of reality.
99. We may now turn our attention to the fourth and final 
feature of Bradley’s theory of appearances - the claim that 
appearances need not appza/i to a mind. •
It is clear that this claim is unacceptable if an appearance 
is understood to be a characteristic or set of characteristics 
which a substance is perceived as having, i.e. if it is under­
stood to be either a veridical or mere appearance. The elimin­
ation of any reference, implicit or explicit, to perception 
when discussing veridical or mere appearances is bound to 
render such talk meaningless.
If, on the other hand, he is talking of what we have termed 
’actual’ appearances, then it is true that such appearances 
need not appear to any mind. But, as we have argued, actual 
appearances cannot, in any sense, be said to be either delus­
ive or of a diminished degree of reality - both essential 
features'of Bradley's notion of an appearance.
It might be suggested that the claim that appearances need 
not appear to a mind is compatible with Bradley's definition 
of an appearance as an entity wherein content is discrepant
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with, or disjoined from, existence. But Bradley has not, as 
I have argued, shown that this notion of an appearance is at 
all intelligible. But even if it could be expressed in an 
intelligible form, any conclusions which might be reached 
about such "appearances" would not necesarily apply to the 
more fundamental, perceptually-based, notion of an appearance. 
And yet it is this this latter notion of an appearance, involv­
ing the possibility of error, which is implicitly, and at times 
explicitly, utilized in the first Book of Appea/iance and 
Re.aii.ty, ̂ ̂
100. On the basis of the preceding discussion we must, I 
think, conclude that none of the essential features of Brad­
ley's theory of appearances is acceptable; and, that the theory 
as a whole is internally inconsistent. .
At this stage we might be thought to have reached a dilemma. 
It is undeniable that a distinction between reality and appear­
ance is often justifiably made. But we have seen that Bradley's 
analysis of the distinction and its basis is unsatisfactory.
If the validity of an ontological distinction between appear­
ance and reality is to be upheld, it will be necessary, then, 
to provide an analysis of the distinction, and of statements 
such as "X is an appearance", which avoid the difficulties 
associated with Bradley's own analyses.
In the following chapter I will attempt to state the basic 
conditions for upholding the validity of the distinction be­
tween appearance and reality. In doing so I will provide an 
interpretation of statements about appearances which will 
hopefully avoid the sort of problems discussed in this chapter. 
Where I will depart from Bradley is in the contention that 
appearances are neither real nor existent. The distinction
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between appearance and reality will be understood in terms of
veridical and erroneous perception; and not between different
types of existent entities with varying degrees of reality.
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13. In Chapter 3 it will be argued that there are conclusive 
reasons for rejecting the sense-datum analysis.
14. The question of the reality, as distinct from that of the 
existence, of mere appearances, will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.
13. S. Alexander, Space,, Time and. deity, Vol.2, p.216. '
16. This is particularly true of the initial argument in
Chapter XII, "Things in Themselves", to show that appear­
ances exist. On pages 113 and 114» for example, Bradley 
explicitly identifies appearances with phenomena, and then 
goes on to conclude that such appearances exist.
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Chapter 3 - Reaiity and Appe.an.ance. (Cont.)
101. In the previous chapter, a mere appearance was tenta­
tively defined as being a characteristic, or set of character­
istics, which a substance is erroneously perceived, or m.i¿- 
pen.cei.ued as having. Misperception, accordingly, was understood 
to involve a multiple relation - at least triadic - between a 
mind, a substance, and a characteristic or set of character­
istics.
In Chapter 1, I put forward an argument, derived from 
McTaggart, to show that all real characteristics are existent. 
In accordance with the conclusion of this argument it was 
pointed out that mere appearances, being characteristics which
f’ i
do not belong to any existent substance, cannot, as such, be 
either real or existent. The further conclusion was then drawn 
that, although there are illusory perceptions or mispercept­
ions, there are no illusory or mere appearances.
It is clear, however, from this las’t point that the above 
analysis of misperception must be revised. If we analyse mis­
perception in terms of a relation between a mind, a substance, 
and a characteristic or set of characteristics which do not 
exist, then we are placed in the somewhat awkward position of 
assuming the existence of relations between substances and
non-existent characteristics. That is to say, we seem to be
. 2committed t*o the view that there may be multiple relations
have only two existent terms. Such a view is, I think, 
unacceptable, and perhaps ultimately meaningless. If the notion 
misperception is to be preserved, an alternative analysis must
be found.
This chapter will, therefore, be devoted to the analysis
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and defence of the notion of misperception. I will also be 
concerned to show that the distinction between reality and 
appearance is valid, although it is not, as it has often been 
believed to be, a distinction between two different kinds of 
entities.
102. By miApe/iception, I mean the perception of a substance 
as having a characteristic, or set of characteristics, which 
it does not have. In the previous chapter (Section 90) I 
suggested that misperception is an ultimate concept, and that 
it cannot be analysed in terms of the veridical perception of 
a mere appearance. I will, in this chapter, defend this view. 
My defence will, however, be somewhat circuitous, in the sense 
that, rather than provide positive arguments in its favour, I
3
will, instead, attempt to show that there is no other plausible 
explanation for some types of perceptual error. In doing so I 
hope to anticipate some possible objections that might be 
raised against the notion of misperception.
103. But before beginning the discussion 
portant to clarify the notion of perception 
previous chapter perception was defined as 
awareness of a substance. It is thus analog 
relation of acquaintance., and more or less 
Broad's notion of p/ietienA ion^. In perceptio:
Alexander suggests, is com.p/ic/>cnt with its object.
It seems' to me that it is impossible to be aware of a sub­
stance without being aware of its nature. A substance, it will 
be argued in Chapters 1 and 3, is manifest in, and exhausted 
by, its nature. To perceive a substance is thus to perceive it 
as having certain of those characteristics which comprise its 
nature. Perception might, accordingly, be said to be the
on proper it is im
being used. In
being the direct
ous to Russell's
identi cal with
ion, the mind, as
 5•
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awareness of a substance under some description.
Perception may be veridical or erroneous. If a substance is 
perceived as having characteristics which it does have, and 
only characteristics which it does have, then the perception 
is veridical. If, on the other hand, it is perceived as having 
characteristics which it does not have, then the perception is 
erroneous, i.e. it is a misperception. A misperception may, 
however, be partially veridical. If a substance is perceived 
as having some characteristics which it does not have, and 
some which it does have, then it is what might be termed a 
mix.e.d perception. But a mixed perception is still a misper­
ception, since it is the perception of a substance as having 
some characteristics which it does not have.
All perceptions, being states of awareness, are essentially 
conscious. They are to be distinguished, in this respect, from 
perceptual beliefs which, according to some philosophers, are 
not essentially conscious.^
104-. The concept of misperception lias been introduced to 
explain the occurrence of some forms of perceptual error. Can 
all perceptual error be explained without recourse to the 
notion of misperception? I do not think that this is possible. 
If we admit that error is sometimes involved in perception, 
then, it seems to me that there are only two possible explan­
ations for the occurrence of such error. The first is to 
attribute all error to misperception alone, or to a combin­
ation of misperception and erroneous perceptual belief. The 
second is to attribute all error to erroneous perceptual 
belief. If we adopt the first explanation, then our thesis 
will have been established. Or, if we can show that there are 
conclusive reasons for rejecting the second explanation, then
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our thesis will also be established, since these two explan­
ations would appear to exhaust the field of possible explan­
ations for perceptual error. Any reason for rejecting one 
explanation will, accordingly, be a reason for accepting the 
other.
The argument in favour of the existence of misperception is 
of course, based upon the assumption that error is sometimes 
involved in perception, i.e. that we are sometimes mistaken 
about the nature of the substances which we perceive. This 
assumption would, I believe, be universally accepted. Disagree 
ment, if and when it arises, is usually over the nature of 
the conclusion to be drawn from this premiss. Does it imply, 
for example,, that we misperceive these substances? Or, does 
it simply imply that we have mistaken beliefs about the nature 
of these substances?
We will now consider two distinct kinds of argument which 
profess to show that the latter conclusion is the correct one. 
Both are, I think, representative of the kinds of arguments 
which have been used in the past, and which sometimes recur 
in contemporary discussions.
105. The first kind of argument is that put forward by 
William James and, at one time, by Bertrand Russell. We have 
briefly considered Russell's views in the previous chapter. 
James' position is expressed in the following passage from 
Ike. P/iinci'pie* o£ Psycho ioyy .
Note that in every illusion what is false is what is 
inferred, not what is immediately given. The 'this' if 
it were felt by itself alone, would be all right, it 
only becomes misleading by what it suggests. If it is a
sensation of sight, it may suggest a tactile object, for 
example, which later tactile experiences prove to be not 
there, 7 he ¿o-catted '/attacy 0/ the ¿enAeA* 0/ which the 
ancient ¿cepticA made ¿0 much account, i/> not Jiaiiacy 0-/L
the ¿enAeA p/iope/i, i.ut /lathee 0-/L the intettect, which 
inte/ip/ietA w/iongiy what the ¿enAe* give, ,
According to Russell, there are no sensory illusions as 
such. Any error involved in perception lies exclusively with 
false perceptual beliefs based upon inferences from sensory 
data simply given in perception. Both James and Russell are 
therefore in agreement as to the origin and nature of percept­
ual error. It remains to be seen whether all perceptual error 
can be explained in this manner. •
106. Concerning, firstly, Russell’s position, it should be 
pointed out that his claims about the supposed infallibility 
of the senses are not as strong as they might initially appear 
to be. As I remarked in Section 79, his claim that the objects 
of sense - by which expression I understand him to mean those 
entities with which we have direct acquaintance in perception - 
are indubitably real is, in one sense, uncontentious. That 
which we perceive is real, and existent. But we are sometimes 
mistaken both about the precise substance which we do perceive, 
and about its characteristics. I might believe, for example, 
that the brown expanse with which I am now acquainted is a 
part of my table - a material substance. But my belief might 
be mistaken. The brown expanse with which I am acquainted may, 
in fact, be a sense-datum - which is not, by most theorists, 
considered to be a material substance. Or, in case my percept­
ion itself is erroneous, the substance with which I am
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acquainted may not, in fact, be brown, although it appears to 
be brown. In other words, as we noted in the previous chapter, 
perception guarantees that what I perceive exists, and is real 
But it does not guarantee that what I perceive has those 
characteristics which I perceive it as having.
Russell’s position would be considerably strengthened, and 
his claims made more significant, if he were proposing that 
perception is always veridical; that is, if he were advocating 
the principle of the evidence of perception. At times this is,
I am sure, what he meant to assert. But the claim that the 
objects of sense are indubitably real is not equivalent to the 
claim that the senses' are infallible. And it is not a suffic­
ient reason to believe that all perceptual error ought to be 
attributed to false perceptual beliefs -based upon unsound 
inferences from what is merely given in perception.
Russell’s claim that all perceptual error can be attributed 
to false perceptual beliefs is, then, an hypothesis. It is not 
a valid conclusion from the premiss that the objects of sense 
are real and existent. In this respect, his position is on a 
par with James’ view. Neither philosopher gives conclusive 
reasons for believing that their view must be the correct one. 
The only reasons that we might have for believing that it is 
the correct one are that perception is idz-ntty correct
or veridical; or, that the hypothesis can explain all types of 
perceptual’error. Now, we have already seen (Section 79) that 
the principle of the evidence of perception is not self-evident 
ly true.““And, as I now hope to show, there are some types of 
perceptual error which cannot be accounted for in this way.
107. In the following two diagrams, we have examples of 
figures., which almost invariably give rise to perceptual errors.
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Figure 1
Figure 2
The circle in figure 1, although regular, almost invariably 
appe.a/i<5 to be irregular. And the two central horizontal lines 
in figure 2, although parallel, appea/i to be curved. Now, 
according to the type of explanation offered by Russell and 
James, any 'illusion1 which arises as the result of the per­
ception of these two diagrams is to be attributed solely to 
false perceptual beliefs. The suggestion is, that in any such 
cases of perceptual error or illusion, the figures in the 
diagram are perceived as they really are - as a regular circle, 
and as parallel lines, respectively - although they are mis­
takenly judged or believed to be other than they are.
This explanation is, however, clearly unsatisfactory. If 
I mistakenly believe that the moon is larger than the sun, 
then, so long as I hold this belief, error exists. But if I 
subsequently come to the conclusion that the moon is not larger 
than the sun, then the error no longer exists. That is to say, 
any error which can be attributed to the fact that someone has 
a false belief, can be removed by that'person ceasing to hold 
the belief. In the case of sensory illusion, if all error is 
to be attributed to false beliefs, then it would seem to follow 
that any error involved will be removed if the false beliefs 
cease to be held. In the case of our two examples, it follows, 
according to this type of explanation, that once I cease to 
believe that the circle in figure 1 is irregular; and, that 
the lines in figure 2 are curved, then the illusions will 
cease. The figures will no longer be perceived as being other 
than they are. But it is obvious that this does not, in fact, 
happen. The fact that I cease to be de.iude.cL LLy, i.e. hold 
false beliefs about, the figures does not mean that I thereby 
cease to undergo the illusion. I may no longer perceive that
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the circle is irregular, or ttiat the lines are curved, but I 
do not cease to perceive the circle <2-4 irregular, or the lines 
cla curved. And to perceive the figures in this way - as having 
characteristics which they do not have - is to misperceive 
them. The error ought, then, to be attributed to misperception,
108, The only way in which the belief in the infallibility* 
of perception might be maintained in the light of these exam­
ples is by claiming that whenever, as in Figure 1, I claim to 
misperceive the circle as irregular, I am, in fact, correctly 
perceiving an irregular circle. This irregular circle is not, 
however, numerically identical with the circle on the page.
Any supposed instance'of misperception is, in fact, an error 
of reference, arising from the mistaken belief that the circle 
which I perceive is numerically identical with the circle on 
the page.
There are a number of reasons for rejecting this explanat­
ion. The first is that it would imply that I can never per­
ceive the circle on the page; since any supposed perception of 
the circle on the page will perceive it as irregular. And if 
perception is infallible, then any perception of a circle as 
irregular is ip/>o -l.ac.to a perception of an irregular circle.
But the circle on the page is not irregular, therefore I can 
never perceive it. This criticism does not refute the proposed 
explanation, but it does, I think, make it seem highly implaus­
ible. ■
The second reason is, I believe, probably conclusive. If I 
look at Figure 2, the two central horizontal lines appear to 
be curved. That is, the two lines are perceived as being cur­
ved. Now, according to the proposed explanation, whenever I 
perceive a line as curved, I am ipto £acto aware of a curved
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line. It follows, then, that since I perceive the two central 
lines in Figure 2 as curved, they are, in fact, curved. And 
yet, if, whilst perceiving the lines, I place a transparent 
rule - which I independently know to be straight, and which 
allows me, in virtue of its transparency, to perceive the 
entire figure while the lines are being checked - against ’ 
either of the lines in question, then one and the same line 
which is perceived as straight according to the rule, is per­
ceived as curved, and therefore Ia curved, according to the 
proposed explanation. If I adhere to the view that perception 
is infallible, I am therefore committed to the self-contradict­
ory position of maintaining that, in the case of the above 
example, I perceive a straight, curved line.
A similar conclusion can be drawn in respect of the circle 
in Figure 1. The circle which I perceive is, according to the 
proposed explanation, a regular, irregular circle; since the 
circle which I perceive as irregular is, lp/>o JLacto, an irreg­
ular circle which, if checked with a pair of dividers, for 
example, whilst being perceived, is proven to be regular.
In both cases, and this is the important point, the figure 
which is perceived is one and the same as, i.e. numerically 
identical with, the figure on the page. The only plausible 
conclusion, then, is that the figures on the page are misper-
•  ̂ 8 ceived.
We have', then, in these examples, at least two instances of 
perceptual error which, I suggest, cannot be attributed to 
veridical perception accompanied by false perceptual beliefs.
The claim that all fallacies of the senses, or perceptual .
errors, are, in fact, fallacies of the intellect "which inter­
prets wrongly what the senses give", is therefore unacceptable.
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109* We have considered one attempt to eliminate misper­
ception, and found that it is unsatisfactory. All perceptual 
error cannot be explained simply in terms of false beliefs 
about, or mistaken inferences based upon, what is simply given 
in perception. There is, however, a further theory of percept­
ion which attempts to eliminate misperception in favour of 
false perceptual beliefs. In his book, Pc/iccptLon and i.h.c 
Ph.yALc.at Uo/itd9 D.M. Armstrong gives the following explanation 
of perceptual error.
In sensory illusion there is no ’perception' of a quasi­
object, but simply a false belief that there is ordinary
veridical perception of an ordinary physical object or
9state of affairs. •
To suffer sensory illusion is to acquire a false belief
or inclination to a false belief in particular propos-
1 0itions about the physical world, by means of the senses.
In so far as the error involved in perception is equated 
with false perceptual belief, Armstrong’s theory is, I believe, 
susceptible to the same criticisms that we raised against the 
theories of James and Russell. When, for example, I look at 
the circle in Figure 1, it is possible for me to hold the true 
belief that the circle is regular, whilst undergoing the 
illusion that it is irregular. The circle is still perceived 
as being irregular, in spite of my belief that it is not irreg­
ular .
110. Armstrong was, I think, aware of this type of object­
ion. He is therefore careful to distinguish between a belief - 
which is said to be a state, or disposition; and the
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acquisition of a belief - which is an event. Veridical per­
ception is accordingly defined as the acquisition, by means of 
the senses, of a true belief about the world. A non-veridical 
or illusory perception, on the other hand, is defined as the 
acquisition of a false belief, or inclination to a false 
belief, about the world.
According to this revised definition, to undergo a sensory 
illusion it is not necessary that I should acquire an actual 
false belief about the world. It is sufficient that I should 
acquire only the inclination to a false belief. Thus, in our 
example of the circle in Figure 1, I need not acquire the 
belief that the circle is irregular, I need only acquire the 
tendency to a belief that it is irregular, in order that I 
should undergo the illusion. •
Although this revision is an improvement, in so far as it 
is an attempt to account for those cases of illusion where 
there is no ostensible false belief about the perceived object, 
the theory in general still suffers from a number of funda­
mental and, I believe, insuperable difficulties.
111. The first of these difficulties is to be found in the 
ambiguous use of the term 'belief*, and the subsequent analysis 
of perception.
By a Lctict- we may understand either of two distinct things: 
(i) the mental act or 'disposition' of believing; or (ii) the 
content or'proposition which is believed. You and I might be 
said, for example, to share the same belief that the earth is 
round - where by 'belief' is meant the content or proposition 
believed; although we do not, thereby share one and the same 
mental act or disposition. Henceforward I will use the term 
'belief' to refer only to the mental act or disposition of
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believing, and the term ’proposition* to refer to the content 
of the belief.
With this distinction in mind, we should now be able to see 
the difficulty in determining exactly what is involved in 
Armstrong’s analysis of perception as the acquisition of a 
belief, or the inclination to a belief, about the world. A , 
perception might be understood to be either (a) The event of 
acquiring a belief, or the inclination to a belief, in a prop­
osition about the world; or (b) The event of acquiring a prop­
osition about the world - according as a belief is understood 
to be either a mental act or disposition, or the content of 
such an act or disposition. Unfortunately, there is a tendency 
by Armstrong-, to conflate, or perhaps confuse, these two analy---- 
ses. But the importance of upholding the distinction between 
the two different senses of the term ’belief’ is obvious when 
we reconsider the examples of sensory illusions mentioned 
previously.
When, for example, I am said to erroneously perceive the 
circle in Figure 1 as irregular, this might be understood to 
mean either that I acquire a false belief or inclination to a 
false belief that the circle is irregular; or, that I simply 
acquire the false proposition that the circle is irregular, 
depending upon whether we accept interpretation (a) or (b) as 
the correct one.
Now, the acquisition of a false proposition that the circle 
in Figure 1 is irregular is not sufficient to guarantee that 
I am undergoing any illusion, or that any error is involved.
I may, for example, after checking the circle with a pair of 
dividers, acquire the proposition that the circle is regular.
I may then entertain, or suppose both the proposition that the
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circle is irregular, and the proposition that the circle is 
regular, without a££i/iming either. And the possibility of 
error does not arise until I affirm one or the other of these 
two acquired propositions. In other words, we ought to dis­
tinguish between what Meinong called a^AumptionA or Mippo¿ait, 
which are not, strictly, capable of being either true or false, 
and hence not capable of sustaining error; and beliefs proper, 
which may be true or false, and hence erroneous. Beliefs differ 
from assumptions, then, in so far as they involve not merely 
the acquisition of a proposition, but a further act of affirm­
ing, or dissenting from, the acquired proposition. And it is 
not until we have this further act of affirmation or dissension 
that the possibility of error arises.
So, the only plausible explanation of perceptual error, or 
illusion, available to Armstrong is to equate it with the 
acquisition of a belief proper, or the acquisition of an in­
clination to a belief proper, in a false proposition about the 
world. However, the only interpretation that I can offer of 
what he means by a belief in a proposition about the world, is 
what I have termed the a££i/uriaLion of a proposition about the 
world. We should understand his analysis of perception, then, 
to be the acquisition of an act of affirming, or the acquisit- 
” ion of an inclination to affirm, a proposition about the world. 
But it is clear that, unless I actually do affirm, and not 
merely incline to affirm, a proposition about the world, then 
I cannot be in a state of error or illusion. Any perceptual 
error or illusion must, accordingly, involve the actual affirm­
ation of a proposition. Thus, when I perceive the circle in 
Figure 1 as irregular, I am, according to Armstrong, acquiring 
the act of affirming, or simply affirming, the proposition that
the circle is irregular.
But this is clearly not what happens when I undergo the 
illusion that the circle is irregular. If, having previously 
checked the circle with a pair of dividers and determined that 
it is regular, I then look at the figure again, I still per­
ceive it as irregular; and this is in spite of the fact that,' 
as a result of my previous check, I simultaneously believe in, 
or a-jL-jLLjun the proposition that it is regular. According to 
Armstrong1s analysis of sensory illusion, for this situation 
to occur, I must simultaneously affirm both the proposition 
that the circle is regular, and the proposition that it is 
irregular - in other words, I must simultaneously affirm two 
contradictory propositions. Now, although, as I suggested pre­
viously, it is possible to simultaneously aAAume or ¿uppoAe 
two contradictory propositions, it is, I would suggest, psycho­
logically impossible to simultaneously affirm or believe in, 
two contradictory propositions. For this reason, we must, I 
think, reject Armstrong's analysis of misperception or sensory 
illusion.
112. I have argued that Armstrong's analysis of perceptual 
error is unsatisfactory; and that the weakness in his analysis 
can be traced to the failure to clearly distinguish between a 
belief proper, and a proposition. But there are further prob­
lems with his theory of perception, in particular, and his 
account of mental acts in general, which can be traced to a 
failure to clearly distinguish between the act and the content 
of an act. In his discussion of mental images in A Plate.*. La t ¿a t 
7 keo/iy 0-7 the. PllncL, for example, he begins his discussion with 
a comparison between mental images and perceptions.
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It seems clear {pace. Ryle) that there is the closest 
resemblance between perceptions (or perhaps we should say
1 isense-impressions) and mental images.
The 'analogy between mental images and perceptions is often'* 
drawn by philosophers and psychologists. And it seems to be a 
plausible analogy if, by a pe/iceptiony we mean a sense-impress 
ion or sense-datum. But it is highly implausible if, by a 
perception, we mean the acquisition of a belief. It is reason­
able, for example, to ask of my visual sense-impression or 
sense-datum of the table, what colour or shape it is. But it 
seems meaningless to ask the same questions about my act of 
acquiring the belief that the table is brown and rectangular. 
The problem is accentuated when we consider Armstrong's defin­
ition of a mental image. A mental image, he says, is an idle 
perception.
(Mental images are)., events that resemble the acquiring 
of beliefs about the environment as the result of the 
action of that environment on the perceiver, although no 
belief or ’potential belief’, nor any action of the en­
vironment is involved. Our introspective awareness of
mental images is an awareness of mental occurrences of 
1 2this sort.
Again, it seems reasonable to ask about the colour or the 
shape of my mental image of the table; and, in this respect, 
the analogy between mental images and perceptions (sense­
impressions or sense-data) is plausible and enlightening. But 
it is meaningless to ask, "What colour or shape is your "idle
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perception” of the table?”. In other words, Armstrong has given 
a plausible account of mental imaging, but an implausible, and 
perhaps incoherent, account of a mental image,. Once again we 
have here, as before, a failure to clearly distinguish between 
a mental act and its content. The only way in which Armstrong 
might possibly avoid these difficulties would be for him to 
deny that there are any mental images as such. But then the 
analogy between mental images and sense-impressions or percept­
ions breaks down.
113. A similar problem arises in Armstrong’s discussion of 
sense-impressions, and the relationship between sense-impress­
ions and beliefs. It is an important part of his strategy to 
show that the introduction of sense-impressions or sense-data 
is unwarranted in the correct analysis of perception. Percept­
ion, according to Armstrong, is to be understood exclusively 
in terms of beliefs, and the acquisition of beliefs, about the 
world. I have already put forward one reason for believing that 
such an analysis is inadequate; namely, that it cannot give a 
satisfactory account of sensory illusions. But there are other 
reasons.
I have suggested that Armstrong has, at times, tended to 
conflate the act or event of perceiving, with the content of 
the perception. And, in doing so, he has also attempted to 
undermine the distinction between knowledge by ac.guaintanc.et 
and knowledge by de.Ac/iipt ion, One of the reasons he gives for 
taking this approach is that we cannot, allegedly, in percept­
ion, distinguish sense-impressions from beliefs or inclinations 
to believe. As such, there is, according to Armstrong, no 
datum involved in perception - apart from the belief - with 
which we can be said to be acquainted. There is only the belief
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which, if true, is an instance of knowledge by description.
On the other hand, the belief that, in perception, we are 
directly acquainted with a datum - whether it be a sense-impre­
ssion, or some other entity - is, as Armstrong himself admits, 
a commonplace. As such, in any discussion of the nature of per­
ception, the onus of proof lies with those who, like Armstrong, 
would deny the truth of this presumption. Armstrong takes up 
this challenge, and offers a number of arguments against the 
view that perception involves the awareness of a datum.
111. The first argument that Armstrong puts forward is, that 
in perception, sense-data cannot be distinguished from what I 
have termed perceptual beliefs. In his discussion of the view 
that we may, on the contrary, have instances of ostensible 
perception which involve no beliefs whatsoever, Armstrong 
considers the following argument in its favour.
Even so, it will still be argued, there is a distinction
between sense-impressions, on the one hand, and belief or
inclination to believe that we are immediately perceiving
something on the other. The two may in fact always be
found together, but it is logically possible, at least,
1 1to have the first without the second.
He then gives the following argument to show that there 
cannot be such a distinction.
Now, if this view were taken, what would be the relat­
ionship between the sense-impression and the belief or 
inclination to believe we are immediately perceiving some 
physical state of affairs? Does having a certain sense-
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impression e.ntaii having a certain belief or inclination 
to believe? If it does, then ’having a sense-impression’ 
already involves having a certain belief or inclination 
to believe, and so the sense-impression is not distinct 
from the belief or inclination to believe, which is con­
trary to the hypothesis.^ •
The argument is, however, clearly unsound. I might be pre­
pared to grant Armstrong the assumption that every awareness 
of a datum is accompanied by a perceptual belief, and even 
insist that having a sense-impression, or being aware of a 
datum, entails having a particular belief or inclination to 
believe, without thereby being committed to the conclusion 
that the datum or sense-impression is not distinct from the 
belief or inclination to believe. Furthermore, as I suggested 
earlier when discussing Armstrong’s analysis of sensory illu­
sion, there are very good reasons for believing that they must 
be distinct. Armstrong has not, therefore, with this line of 
argument, shown that the distinction between sense-impressions 
and beliefs, and the correlative distinction between knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description is unjustified.
11$. The second line of argument he uses is, I believe, 
equally unsatisfactory. Throughout his book, Armstrong seems 
to work upon the assumption that the only plausible alterna­
tives to his own theory are either phenomenalist, or represent­
ative theories of perception. And both of these types of 
theory, he maintains, are untenable. So that his reply to 
someone who consistently advocates a clear distinction between 
sense-impressions or sense-data, and perceptual beliefs, is to 
point out that such a distinction inevitably leads to either a
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representative or a phenomenalist theory of perception - both 
of which are said to be philosophically unacceptable.^
We need not consider Armstrong's critique of representative 
and phenomenalist theories to see that his conclusion in fa­
vour of his own theory as the only plausible alternative is 
without justification. This conclusion would only be justified 
if his own theory, together with representative and phenomen­
alist theories, exhausted the field of possible theories of 
perception. But this is not the case. The analysis of percept­
ion which I have proposed - as being the direct awareness of
a substance as having certain characteristics - is not consid-
1 7ered by Armstrong . Nor does he consider the possibility of 
what I have termed m.l̂ pe./ic.e.ptiont as distinct from the question 
of the fallibility of perceptual beliefs.
Now, in accordance with the analysis which I have proposed, 
a distinction can, and should, be drawn between perception as 
such, and perceptual beliefs. But this does not commit us to 
either a representative or a phenomenalist theory of percept­
ion. We therefore avoid Armstrong's criticisms of these theor­
ies. Furthermore, we are able to give an explanation of the 
relationship between perception, and perceptual belief, without 
conflating the two. The fact that I perceive a perceive a 
substance as having certain characteristics can be said to be 
e,vi.de.nc£. JLoji the belief that the substance has those character­
istics, without £.ntaiiing the belief, or inclination to be­
lieve, that the substance has those characteristics. Thus, we 
may explain the fact - which Armstrong has difficulty in ex­
plaining - that we often undergo sensory illusions, even though
we have no false belief, or inclination to a false belief,
18about the nature of that which is perceived.
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116. Those substances with which I am acquainted in per­
ception may, of course, include sense-impressions or sense- 
data. But according to the view which I have advocated, per­
ception does not necessarily (i.e. as a consequence of the 
definition) involve acquaintance merely with sense-data; so,
we are not antecedently burdened with the problem of the 'veil
{
of perception - that of being acquainted only with one's own 
sense-impressions - a criticism that is often, though perhaps 
unjustifiably, made against representative and phenomenalist 
theories.
17. So far in our evaluation of Armstrong's theory I have
concerned that he has given no conclusive reasons for
eving that misperception is impo ssible. But if we can show
that there is a fundamental weakness in his overall theory of 
perception, then our position will be considerably strengthen­
ed. Is there, then, such a weakness?
I believe that there is. Perception, according to Armstrong 
is to be understood entirely in terms of beliefs, and the 
acquisition of beliefs or inclinations to believe. But he also 
claims that it is possible for any type of mental event, per­
ceptions included, to be unconscious. That is to say, the 
relationship between any belief, or inclination to believe, 
and consciousness, is contingent.
The view that there are unconscious mental events is not 
without precedent, and no serious problems arise (that is, 
apart from the intrinsic difficulty of understanding how any 
mental event can be unconscious 7) until we attempt to under­
stand how it is possible, according to Armstrong's analysis, 
to acquire any evidence for the belief that any mental events 
exist•
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118. The answer, it might be suggested, is obvious. We are 
simply conscious or aware of the occurrence of such events 
when introspecting. Such a reply would be adequate, I believe, 
on any view, such as the one which I have proposed, which 
understands consciousness to be an instance of simple acquaint­
ance. But what does it mean, according to Armstrong's analysis, 
to say that someone is conscious of his own mental states or 
events?
Consciousness, or experience, then (as opposed to com­
pletely unselfconscious mental activity which is perfectly 
possible, and which occurs in the case of 'automatic driv­
ing') is simply awareness of our own state of mind. The
technical term for such awareness*of our own mental state
20is 'introspection' or 'introspective awareness'.
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aware of an event without, at the same time, being conscious 
of it *
Armstrong may not, however, be concerned about this point.
He might, in reply, suggest that the term 'awareness1 simply 
denotes the process of acquiring beliefs about our own states 
of mind, i.e. introspection; and, that there are some such 
introspective acts which are conscious, and some which are not.
120. But this brings us to the second of our difficulties 
with his view. If it is possible for some introspective acts , 
to be unconscious, then the relationship between introspection 
and consciousness is contingent. Two conclusions follow from 
this. The first is that the mere fact that I am, in Armstrong's 
sense, 'introspectively aware' of a mental state or event does 
not imply that I am conscious of that state or event. And yet, . 
unless I am conscious of that state or event, or some other 
state or event from which the former can be inferred, then I 
can have no evidence for the existence of the former state or 
event. In other words, it is consciousness, and not intro­
spection, that provides evidence for the existence of mental ■ 
states or events; and, indirectly, for the existence of a ,
'physical world'.
The second conclusion that follows from the fact that the 
relationship between consciousness and introspection is contin­
gent is that consciousness cannot be identical with intro- .
spection. Presumably Armstrong wishes to retain the notion of 
consciousness in his theory of the mind, otherwise, as I 
suggested above, there could be no evidence for the existence 
either of any mental states or events, or of the physical 
world. But if consciousness is not equivalent to introspection, 
then it is difficult to understand what it can be on Armstrong's
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theory. It cannot, for example, be identical with belief, the 
acquisition of belief, or the inclination to believe; and yet, 
perception, to which consciousness is said to be analogous, is 
understood exclusively in terms of these mental states. It 
would seem, then, that there are only two conclusions available 
to Armstrong. The first is that consciousness is not a species , 
of, or analogous to, perception. The second is that the pro­
posed analysis of perception exclusively in terms of beliefs, 
is inadequate. Either conclusion is clearly inimical to Arm­
strong’s overall theory.
Given that Armstrong would wish to retain the notion of 
consciousness, along with his analysis of perception, it seems 
to me that he has only one option - to admit consciousness as 
a distinct, and irreducible mental state. Now it is clear that 
such a conclusion is an insurmountable barrier to any programme 
of reductive materialism. But it also gives rise to a further 
dilemma. Since we need a name for the mental act which is the 
consciousness of particulars, we are entitled, on the basis of 
a consideration of ordinary language, to use the term ’per­
ception’ as a name for this act - since the direct conscious 
awareness of particulars or substances is, as philosophers of 
such diverse theories as Russell, Alexander and McTaggart have 
acknowledged, what is generally meant by this term. What Arm­
strong has attempted to do, and failed to do, is to show that 
there is no perception in this sense. But his arguments, we 
have seen, are unsatisfactory; and his theory, as I have arg­
ued, cannot adequately account for what is arguably the 
most fundamental element of perception in particular, and 
mental states in general, namely, consciousness. His proposed 
analysis is not so much an analysis of perception proper, as
an analysis of perceptual belief. But, as I have argued, the 
two can, and ought, to be distinguished.
121. I think that we can conclude, then, on the basis of 
the above criticisms, that Armstrong has no provides a satis­
factory alternative theory of perception; and that, as such, 
he has not shown that misperception, as we have described it, 
is either impossible or implausible.
122. The attempt to reduce all perceptual error to either 
false beliefs about, or mistaken inferences based upon, what 
is simply ‘given1 in perception is, as we saw in the case of 
the James/Russell theory, unsatisfactory. We have reached the 
same conclusion with respect to Armstrong1s attempt to analyse 
all perception, including misperception or sensory illusion,
in terms of beliefs, and the acquisition of beliefs and inclin­
ations to believe. And, as I have previously indicated (Sectior 
104.), the rejection of these two theories of perceptual error 
is indirect proof of the theory which we have suggested.
It is, of course, possible that these three theories do not 
collectively exhaust all possible theories of perceptual error, 
But I am unable to conceive of any other possibilities. And if 
as seems likely, discursive and intuitive knowledge - or know­
ledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance - together 
cover all forms of knowledge, then, by rejecting the possibil­
ity that all perceptual error can be attributed to discursive 
or descriptive forms of knowledge, we have as adequate a basis 
as is possible for concluding that some perceptual error must 
be attributed to misperception.
Having thus shown that misperception is possible, and that 
it is perhaps the only possible explanation for some types of 
perceptual error, we can now consider the question of the
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relation between misperception and the ontological distinction 
between appearance and reality.
123. In a paper entitled, "Is There A Problem About Appear- 
21 .ances?", Quentin Gibson has argued that the assumption that 
an adequate and complete account of the world can be given in 
terms of the traditional categorial schema of substance, qual- , 
ity and relation, must be questioned once we admit the validity 
of a distinction between appearance and reality; that is, be­
tween the way things appear to be, and the way they really are.! 
Appearances, he suggests, cannot be readily subsumed under any 
of the above categories; for this reason they present a genuine 
problem for any attempt to give a systematic and complete 
account of the world in terms of the traditional categories 
alone. ■ ■
Gibson considers a number of possible ways of dealing with 
appearances. The first is to give an analysis of appe.a/iing, 
and consequently of appearances, in terms of a triadic, or 
three-term relation between a substance, a mind, and a charac­
teristic. The expression "T appears b to P", or "T is perceived 
as b by P" , is to be understood as asserting that a triadic 
relation of appearing exists between T - the substance perceiv­
ed; b - the characteristic which T appears to have, or is per­
ceived as having; and P — the mind which perceives the sub­
stance T. The appearance, in so far as it is a nia/ie. appearance, 
is identified with the "free-floating" characteristic b, which 
does not belong, as an intrinsic characteristic, to T.
The .second approach is that which I suggested has been taken- 
by some sense-datum theorists - to identify the appearance with 
an existent substance, a sense-datum.
A third approach is to reject the substance, quality, and
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relation schema as inadequate; and to admit a further category 
of things-as-they-appear•
The fourth approach is to recognise the fact that a dis­
tinction is often justifiably made between appearance and 
reality, but to deny that a place needs to be found for appear­
ances in a complete account of the world. This is the approach 
which I believe is the correct one, and the one which I will 
defend. But before doing so, I will consider some reasons for 
rejecting the other three theories.
124-. The main objection to the first approach is that it 
involves the introduction of "free-floating" characteristics; 
that is, characteristics which do not belong to any existent 
substance. Such an approach, Gibson suggests, is clearly at
r* j
odds with the intuitive conviction that all characteristics, 
if they exist, are characteristics of existent substances.
We automatically rule out free-floating properties which 
are not the properties of any entities at all. We there­
fore rule out the property which is set down as the third 
term of our triadic relation. The bentness which the 
stick (in water) appears to have but in fact does not 
have persists as a metaphysical oddity of which we desire
o. x, 23to be rid.
This objection is similar to that which we raised, at the 
beginning of this chapter, against the attempt to analyse 
misperception in terms of a tri-adic relation between a mind, 
a substance, and a characteristic or set of characteristics. 
Both approaches involve a commitment to "free-floating" char­
acteristics - a commitment which, as Gibson remarks, ought to
be avoided if possible. For the moment, our objection to such 
free-floating characteristics must remain on this ’aesthetic1 
level. But in the next chapter, when dealing with the notion 
of a substance, further metaphysical arguments will be raised 
against free-floating characteristics. Furthermore, the need tc 
posit the reality of such properties can, I believe, be avoid­
ed by the view of misperception such as I will propose at a 
later stage in this chapter. And this is probably the most 
satisfactory way of dealing with the notion of free-floating 
characteristics - by showing that we do not need to posit their 
reality in order to explain the facts which their introduction 
is intended to explain.
125. The.second approach to the ’problem1 of appearances is, 
to attempt to fit them into the traditional categorial schema 
as entities or substances in their own right. This, as was 
mentioned previously, is the approach which has been taken by 
most sense-datum theorists.
There are some advantages in such an approach. It allows us 
to deal, for example, with hallucinations and dreams, where 
there is no ostensible entity other than the ’appearance’ whicft 
appears, or is perceived. It also allows us to dispense with 
the awkward analysis of appearing in terms of a triadic re­
lation between a substance, a characteristic, and a mind. 
Appearing becomes simply a dyadic relation between a mind and 
an ’appearance’ or sense-datum. This approach has been taken 
by a number of philosophers since Descartes. Rusell, in Ou/i
Unou)¿edge oJL the tx.ten.nat Uo/iicL, and C.D. Broad, in Scientific
2 /
thought and The Hind and its> P ¿ace in N atu/ie , have taken the 
view that appearances or sense-data, are substances in their 
right. According to this theory, the analysis of statements of
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the form nT appears b to P", is to be understood as expressing 
the fact that P is acquainted with a b-like appe-a/iance. of the 
substance T . Thus, whenever it is suggested that something 
appears to be other than it is, we are, according to this 
approach, to understand not that misperception is taking place, 
but that the observer or perceiver is not acquainted exclusive­
ly, if at all, with the substance which he believes himself 
to be acquainted with. He is, instead, acquainted with an 
appearance of the substance in question - the appearance having 
those characteristics, or that characteristic, which are mis­
takenly attributed to the substance itself.
Several objections might be raised against this approach.
The first ig that which I mentioned when discussing Bradley1s— ' 
attempt to prove that mere appearances•exist in the last chapt­
er; namely, that it seems to presuppose the validity of the 
principle of the evidence of perception. Thus, when, for ex­
ample, a coin on a table, viewed from a particular angle, 
appears to be elliptical, it is thought to be self-evidently 
true that the observer is acquainted with an elliptically- 
shaped entity - an appearance or sense-datum. The obvious repl̂ i 
to this approach is to deny that the conclusion follows from 
the premisses. The fact that an entity appears to have a par­
ticular characteristic does not, as we have seen, entail that 
the entity in question, or any other entity - an mere appear- , 
ance, for example - has that characteristic. If we return to 
Figures 1 and 2, for example, the fact that the circle in 
Figure 1 appears to be irregular does not entail that there is 
any irregular circle, real or existent; and the fact that the 
two central lines in Figure 2, appear to be curved does not 
entail that I am thereby aware of any curved lines when looking
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the figure. In other words, the principle of the evidence of 
perception, which is presupposed by those who wish to estab­
lish the reality of appearances, is not a self-evident truth 
and; if my previous arguments are sound, it is, in fact, dem­
onstrably false.
Furthermore, the acceptance of this principle, and the 
associated theory of appearances, would lead to some unaccept­
able conclusions. If a substance is perceived as having char­
acteristics which are subsequently judged to be contradictory, 
then it follows, according to the above approach, that there 
is an appearance which has these contradictory characteristics, 
And this would imply that such appearances are impo¿a iH¿¿¿a.
At this stage we might be thought to have reached a dilemma. 
If we adopt the approach in question, then it is conceivable 
that we might, in some circumstances, be committed to the 
reality of self-contradictory, hence impossible, entities. On 
the other hand, if we deny the soundness of the above approach 
to the problem of appearances, and the principle of the evi­
dence of perception upon which it is based, then we are comm­
itted to nothing more extravagant than the admission that 
perception is fallible. The latter position is, I think, the 
only philosophically acceptable position to take.
126. Appearances cannot, then, be readily accommodated into 
the traditional categorial schema as either 'free-floating' 
characteristics, or as substances or entities in their own 
right. But perhaps the schema is to restrictive, and ought to 
incorporate t.h.i.ngA-a.4-the.y-appe-afit as well as substances, qual­
ities and relations. This is the third approach to the problem 
considered by Gibson, and one which he believes that J.L. Aus­
tin, in virtue of his rejection of the sense-datum theory, is
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committed.
Austin is concerned to reject commitment to sense-data, 
and since he pays no attention to alternative realistic 
views, he is presumably committing himself to the view 
that the world contains things-as-they-appear to people.
His readiness to do this and thereby to challenge the 
restrictive assumption is no doubt due to a general dis­
like of reductive analysis, a general disinclination, 
that is to say, to minimize differences or say of anything 
that it is after all a case of something else. That things 
appear other than they are, it is felt, is a fact we must
accept and if■*' J it does not fit into a scheme which includes
only entities, properties and relations, so much the
worse for that , 26 scheme.
The acceptance of a revision in a traditionally accepted 
catégorial schema is dependent upon a number of considerations. 
Firstly, the suggested revision must be necessary to account 
for facts which cannot possibly be accomodated by the tradition 
al schema. Secondly, it should not create more difficulties 
than are involved in the acceptance of the traditional schema. 
Thirdly, it should not simply "cover up" genuine problems. And 
fourthly, the revised schema should not be used to create en­
tities.
127. We will leave the first of these considerations till 
the next section, where I hope to show that the traditional 
schema is adequate to accommodate a distinction between appear­
ance and reality; that is, to accommodate a distinction between 
the way things appear to be, and the way they really are.
128)
The remaining considerations are closely related. The intro­
duction of a category of things-as-they-appear is not, as 
Gibson points out, a return to a satisfying naivety. The tking- 
at-it-appe.a/iA, he suggests, is metaphysically unacceptable to 
the ordinary man. As such, any revision of the categorial 
schema so as to include things-as-they-appear cannot be supp­
orted by an appeal to common sense. Nor can it be supported by 
an appeal to ordinary language. It is true that ordinary lan­
guage embodies expressions about the way things appear to be, 
as distinct from the way they really are, and this, in turn, 
would seem to imply a tacit acceptance of the notion of a 
thing-as-it-appears. But language serves many functions, and 
one of these, as Gibson remarks, is to enable us to get by 
without raising too many awkward questions.
And I have already suggested that the terminology of 
appearances (or things-as-they-appear)* fulfils this 
function admirably. Using phrases like ’the stick looks 
bent1 involves us in recognizing a difference between how 
things look and how things are. But it simply evades the 
question what it is that we are describing when we des­
cribe how things look. And it certainly does not commit 
us to the view that in describing how things look we are 
describing some unique feature of the world which is 
different from any kind of entity or property or relation
of entities. 27
For this reason, the appeal to ordinary language is incon­
clusive. It is clear, then, that if the introduction of a cat- 
gory of things-as-they-appear is to be justified, it must be
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justified on other grounds than an appeal to common-sense or 
ordinary language. Just what these grounds might be, it is 
difficult to discover. Perhaps the most plausible would be the 
contention that it is the only way in which we may consistently 
distinguish between appearance and reality. But this contention 
is plainly unwarranted. Both the sense-datum theory, and the 
view which I shall propose in the next section, are capable, 
it would seem, of accommodating such a distinction; and both 
are based upon the traditional categorial schema. It is true 
that the sense-datum theory has internal difficulties. But, on 
the other hand, it is not clear that the notion of a thing-as- 
it-appears is free from difficulties.
For one jthing, there does not seem to be any obvious way of 
deciding whether, and in what way, the'thing-as-it-appears 
differs from the thing "in itself"; that is, with the thing as 
it actually is. And yet such a distinction must be drawn if 
the cat-egory of a thing-as-it-appears is to have any valid 
application. In one sense the thing-as-it-appears must be 
identical with the thing-in-itself; since it is the thing-in- 
itself, and not the thing-as-it-appears, which appears. But, 
in another sense, the thing-as-it-appears must differ from the 
thing-in-itself, since the thing-as-it-appears can, and often 
does, have characteristics which the thing-in-itself does not 
have. This difficulty is, I believe, both fundamental and 
irresolvable; and it points to an inherent contradiction in 
the notion of a distinct category or class of things-as-they-
appear.
This last point brings us to the third and the fourth con­
siderations. The introduction of a category of things-as-they- 
appear does not solve the question, raised by Gibson, as to
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what it is that we are describing when we talk of how things 
look or appear. Are we describing the thing-in-itself, or are 
we describing the thing-as-it-appears? If it is the thing-in- 
itself, then there seems to be no need to introduce a further 
category of things-as-they-appear. If it is the thing-as-it- 
appears, then we must explain how the thing-as-it-appears can 
at once be identical with the thing-in-itself, and yet have 
different qualities or characteristics.
Furthermore, the introduction of such a category would tend 
to 1 create1 entities unnecessarily. It is clear that, if the 
thing-as-it-appears has different characteristics to the thing- 
in-itself, then it must be judged to be a distinct entity in 
its won right. But such an unprincipled spawning of entities 
would seem to indicate the folly, rather than the wisdom, of 
the proposed categorial revision. Any analysis of the dis­
tinction between appearance and reality which can avoid the 
introduction of a category of things-as-they-appear will, in 
this respect, have a decided advantage.
128. It is clear, then, that there are genuine difficulties 
with each of the three approaches to the distinction between 
reality and appearance so far considered. There remains only 
the fourth approach to consider. This approach is described by 
Gibson in the following way.
The assumption, as I have stated it, is that a complete 
account of the world can be given in terms of entities, 
•t,h.0iF properties and their relations. If we can find no 
place for appearances in this account, there are two 
things we can do about it. The first is to say the assum­
ption is unduly restrictive.. But there is a second
131)
possibility. This is to accept the assumption as it stands 
and deny that we need find a place for appearances in a 
complete account of the world. For we must distinguish, 
it may be said, between appearance and reality. In des­
cribing the world we only describe what is, and not how 
it appears to any particular person. Hence things-as-they-
appear, though they may be mentioned, cannot be said to
. . 28 exist.
In the previous chapter, when discussing Bradley’s theory 
of appearances, we considered and rejected the main arguments 
he uses to show that mere appearances exist. The distinction 
between appearance and reality, I suggested, should be based 
upon the more fundamental distinction between veridical per­
ception and misperception. And misperception, we have seen, 
cannot always be reduced to false perceptual beliefs, or the 
acquisition of false beliefs. Any error involved in mispercept­
ion, as distinct from false perceptual beliefs, is to be attri­
buted to the way in which a mind perceives an existent sub­
stance, rather than to the introduction of an illusory entity - 
a mere appearance. Mere appearances, on this view, are not 
existent or real entities. They are, as Dawes Hicks - following 
Alexander - has suggested, "ways in which the reality itself 
is apprehended, — as partial, imperfect, incomplete ways in 
which the reality is known."
In this way, the validity of a distinction between appear­
ance and reality can be upheld without the need to posit mere 
appearances as a class of real or existent entities. The dis­
tinction between appearance and reality is ultimately a dis­
tinction between the world seen "awry", and the world seen
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correctly. We have, in this explanation, an answer to Gibson's 
question about the status of appearances. Appearances do not 
figure among the entities in the world; the entities which we 
are describing when we describe the way things look are the 
things themselves, and not their 'appearances'. To talk of the 
way a thing appears to be, or of its 'appearances' is, simply, 
an elliptical way of expressing the fact that the thing or 
substance in question is perceived as having certain character 
istics. To talk of illusory or mere appearances, is, according 
ly, to express the fact that a substance is misperceived.
129. The question of the status of hallucinatory entities 
can be readily resolved within the context of our theory. 
Hallucinations are to be understood, according to our theory, 
as misperceptions, hence perceptions, o*f the existent. The 
apparent paradox in this suggestion can be easily explained.
It is often assumed that an hallucination is the awareness of 
an hallucinatory entity, or mere appearance; such entities 
being considered to be, in some sense, unreal. Thus, when 
Macbeth claims to perceive a dagger before him, it is often 
suggested that he is, in fact, aware of an hallucinatory 
dagger - which is neither existent nor real. But according to 
the analysis which I have proposed, the introduction of a 
class of such hallucinatory entities is unnecessary. Provided 
that Macbeth is undergoing a genuine hallucination, and not 
simply erroneously believing that he is perceiving a dagger, 
then the hallucination consists in the perception of some 
existent substance, e.g. the spatial field before him, as 
having certain characteristics, viz. those which are normally 
attributed to a dagger, which it does not have. This type of 
analysis can, I believe, be extended to cover all cases of
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ostensible hallucination. The object of an hallucinatory per­
ception, like that of a veridical perception, is a real and 
existent substance. An hallucination, being an instance of 
misperception, is simply the real world, or some part fo the 
real world, perceived erroneously, i.e. as having character­
istics which it does not have. ’
130. The distinction between reality and appearance has 
often been understood as being akin to an object surrounded 
by a veil - the so-called "veil of appearances" - which comes 
between and hides the real world from the mind. But such an 
analogy can be misleading. If the "veil of appearances" is 
considered to be such that it completely obscures the real 
world from the mind, then the analogy is misleading. If the 
analogy is to be retained, then the "ve-il" should be under­
stood as being translucent, rather than opaque; distorting, 
rather than eliminating, our awareness of the real world. The 
analogy should not, however, be pressed. In one important 
respect it breaks down. To talk of a "veil" of appearances 
would seem to imply that appearances are, in some sense, ent­
ities in their own right; and this view, we have seen, is 
false. .For this reason, it is perhaps better to retain only •­
the literal interpretation of our analysis of the distinction 
between reality and appearance, as being ultimately a dis­
tinction between the world misperceived, and the world per­
ceived as it really is.
131. At this stage we may give an unequivocal answer to the 
question "whether appearances exist - a question which, Gibson 
contends , demands an unambiguous reply. Our reply to this 
question is that appearances, by which I mean mere appearances 
are neither existent nor real. This is not to say that we are
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we are denying that the distinction between the way a thing 
appears to be, and the way it really is, i.e. the distinction 
appearance and reality is valid. The distinction, as I sugg- . 
ested in the revious sections, is valid. But it does not rest 
upon a distinction between two orders of being. It is simply 
a distinction between correct and incorrect perception.
The basic conditions for the validity of the distinction 
can also be stated at this stage. It is clear that if the 
distinction rests upon the way in which the world is perceived, 
then it can only arise, and have any valid application, where 
there are existent minds which perceive existent substances. 
Thus, the distinction between reality and appearance presupp­
oses the reality both of existent substances which are per­
ceived, and of existent minds which either misperceive, or 
correctly perceive, these substances. It also presupposes 
the reality of misperceptions; since the contrast between the 
way a thing really is, and the way it appears to be, can only 
arise where there is misperception.
On the basis of these conditions, it follows that any view, 
such as Bradley's, which presupposes the validity of a dis­
tinction between appearance and reality, and yet denies the 
validity of the categorial schema of substances, qualities, 
and relations, and which denies the ultimate reality of selves, 
of which perceptions, including misperceptions, are parts or 
states, is involved in a fundamental inconsistency. We have, 
then, by accepting the validity of a distinction between 
appearance and reality, implicitly endorsed the traditional 
categorial schema. In the next four chapters I will attempt to 
defend this schema against Bradley’s critical arguments. And 
if, as I will argue, he has not provided any conclusive
135)
reasons to believe that this schema is philosophically un­
acceptable, then our analysis of the distinction between 
appearance and reality, being based upon the validity of this 
schema, will receive further support.
132. Having indicated the basic conditions for the validity 
of the ditinction between appearance and reality, and having 
shown that it rests ultimately upon a more fundamental dis­
tinction between veridical perception, and misperception, we 
can now consider the question of the analysis of mispercept­
ion .
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that misper­
ception should not be understood as being, or involving, a 
triadic relation between a substance, a mind, and a "free­
floating” characteristic. It should now, I think, be clear as 
to why such an analysis is unsatisfactory. The misperception 
of a substance as having a particular characteristic does not, 
we have seen, imply that the substance in question, or any 
other substance for that matter, has the characteristic in 
question. It does not, in other words, imply that the mind, 
in misperceiving a substance, is aware of the characteristic 
which the substance is misperceived as having. It follows, 
from this fact, that misperception does not involve, or is 
not equivalent to, a triadic relation between a mind, a sub­
stance, and a characteristic. It is, I suggest, a unique and 
irreducible state, involving a two-term relation between a 
mind and a substance. It cannot be understood to be the ver­
idical perception of an illusory entity - a mere appearance. 
Nor is it to be analysed in terms of the acquisition of a 
false belief, or a tendency to a false belief. Our initial 
definition must, I think, be taken as final - misperception
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cannot be further analysed. We may say of misperception what 
Cook Wilson has said of judgement - that it is unique, Mit 
cannot be reduced to any other denomination. We must simply 
recognize it in its universal character through instances in 
which we excercise it.n^
r's~133* In the previous chapter we discussed and criticised ' 
Bradley*s theory of appearances and his views on the basis 
for a distinction between appearance and reality. In this 
chapter, I have attempted to show that, although Bradley* s 
own interpretation of the distinction is unsatisfactory, a 
satisfactory analysis of the distinction can be given. This 
analysis is based upon the notion of misperception which, I 
have suggested, must be taken as a unique and irreducible kind 
of cognitive act. The analysis is also'based upon the accept­
ance of the categorial schema of substance, quality, and 
relation. In the following chapters we will be concerned with 
defending this schema against Bradley’s criticisms.
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Chapter J+ - Su&4d.ance
134-. According to Lotze , if we summarize the most univers­
al factors of the ordinary view of the world, the summary will 
be found to include the following suppositions: That there are 
things in indefinite number; that every thing has certain _ ' 
p/io pe/itle.̂  or qaailtie^>\ and can, in so far as it has a prior 
existence, enter into all manner of neiationA with other 
things; and, that these relations are the reason for which 
change,*j take place in these things.
In accordance with the suppositions we might say, then, 
that the ordinary view of the world assumes that there are 
three distinct and irreducible types of entity: things or 
substances, qualities, and relations. •
135. That these suppositions are fundamental to the ordin­
ary view of the world is, I think, uncontroversial. What is 
controversial is the question of the ultimate consistency and 
intelligibility of this view.
In Appea/iance. and Re.aiity Bradley raises some serious ob­
jections to the ordinary or common-sense view of the world.
In this chapter I wish to discuss and evaluate, in particular, 
Bradley's criticism of the fundamental notion of a substance 
or a thing, and the consequent distinction between a substance 
ancj. its qualities. In doing so I will put forward, and defend, 
a view of substances which, I believe, avoids Bradley's criti­
cisms; and yet which also has much in common with his own 
views on the nature of ultimate reality.
My discussion of Bradley's views will be based upon Chapt­
ers II and VIII of Appca/iance and Re,aiity, entitled respect­
ively, "Substantive and Adjective", and "Things".
no)
1 3 6 , Perhaps the first point which should be raised in a 
discussion of the notion of a substance is the importance of 
the distinction between a substance and a substantive, Al­
though the title of Chapter II of AR_ would suggest that it is 
a critique of the more general notion of a substantive, the 
discussion is, for the most part, limited to criticism of the 
narrower notion of substance or thinghood.
The distinction between a substance and a substantive is
important for a number of reasons. In the first place, some
philosophers have claimed that there are various kinds of
entities which can be described as substantives (i.e. bearers
of qualities), although they are not traditionally considered
to be substances. The list of such entities includes facts,
processes or events, classes (as distinct from groups), and,
in general, the class of entities which are called occu/i/icnts,
as distinct from continuants - which are alone considered to
2be genuine substances . It would also seem to be possible for 
qualities and relations to be substantives (as the bearers of 
further qualities), although, in accordance with most defin­
itions, it is impossible for a quality or a relation to be a 
substance.
Secondly, the distinction between substantive and adjective 
is basically, although no exclusively, a grammatical dis­
tinction, relative to the syntax of a given statement; whereas 
the distinction between substance and quality is ontological 
and absolute. It is possible, for example, that a term should 
function both as a substantive and an adjective, although it 
is impossible for a term to be at once a substance and a 
quality.
Thirdly, although any criticism of the distinction between
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substantive and adjective is applicable to the distinction 
between substance and quality - a substance being an instance 
of a substantive - an objection to the notion of substance is 
not Lp̂ bo £acto an objection to the more general notion of a 
substantive; since, as I suggested above, the class of sub­
stantives is not co-extensive with the class of substances..
Having recognised the significance of this distinction, it 
will, I think, become obvious that Bradley is primarily con­
cerned with criticising the notion of a substance, rather than 
that of a substantive.
137. Bradley begins the discussion in Chapter II by pre­
senting, and subsequently criticising, two traditional ways of 
construing the relationship between a substance and its qual­
ities. According to the first of these-views, a substance is 
not identical with its qualities; it is, in some sense, dis­
tinct from, and possibly independent of, its qualities. Acc­
ording to the second view, a substance is not something dis­
tinct from its qualities; it is simply various qualities which 
are related to each other in a particular way. The latter view 
is what has been called the '’bundle” theory of a thing. I will 
now consider each of these views in turn.
138. Bradley’s criticisms of the notion of substance are 
based upon what he considers to be a fundamental and insuper­
able difficulty faced by any attempt to formulate a consistent 
theory of ’things' - that of reconciling the diversity of the 
qualities attributed to the thing, with its supposed unity. 
This difficulty is set out in the following passage.
We may take the familiar instance of a lump of sugar.
This is a thing, and it has properties, adjectives which
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qualify it. It is, for example, white, and hard, and 
sweet. The sugar, we say, all that; but what the ¿a 
can really mean seems doubtful. A thing is not any one 
of its qualities, if you take that quality by itself; if 
’sweet’ were the same as ’simply sweet’, the thing would 
clearly be not sweet. And, again, in so far as sugar ist'
sweet it is not white or hard; for these properties are 
all distinct. Nor, again, can the thing be all its prop­
erties, if you take them each severally. Sugar is obvious­
ly not mere whiteness, mere hardness, and mere sweetness; 
for its reality lies somehow in its unity. But if, on the 
other hand, we inquire what there can be in the thing 
beside its several qualities, we are baffled once more.
We can discover no real unity existing outside these 
qualities, or, again, existing within them. (AR_ p.1 6 )
One’s response to this point will differ according as a 
substance is considered to be either distinct from and inde­
pendent of, its qualities; or distinct from, but not independ­
ent of, its qualities.
1 3 9 * Let us consider, firstly, the view that a substance is 
both distinct from, and independent of, its qualities. How 
does this view fare against Bradley’s criticism? The relevance 
of his criticism to such a view is, at first look, somewhat 
difficult to determine. He seems to be suggesting that such a 
view cannot provide an intelligible account of the nature of 
the relation between a substance and its qualities. This is 
not, however, a decisive objection. The fact that the relation 
between two terms is unintelligible does not necessarily mean 
that the relation is non-existent or unreal. The relation
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might be unintelligible in the sense that it is indefinable.
Or else, the relation might be unique, and unlike any other 
kind of relation - in which case it might be unintelligible 
in the sense that it is not analogous to, or definable in 
terms of, some other, more familiar relation. But if the 
relation between a substance and its qualities is unintell­
igible in either of the above senses, then Bradley’s criticism 
is somewhat innocuous. The acceptance of indefinable relations 
- such as the relations of identity and difference - is, I 
think, a commonplace. And the view that the relation in quest­
ion should be analogous to, or definable in terms of, some 
more familiar relation is quite unreasonable. Besides, what
relation would seem to be more familiar than the relation of• ;
inherence which exists between a substa'nce and its qualities?
But perhaps his objection is based upon the tacit accept­
ance of the conclusions of the anti-relational arguments of 
Chapter III; in which case any relational analysis of a 
thing would prove to be unacceptable. It is my contention, 
however, that the arguments in Chapter III pn.e.6appose, the 
truth of the conclusions argued for in Chapter II, Bradley 
cannot, accordingly, introduce these conclusions as premisses 
j_n his 'argument against the notion of a substance without the 
argument becoming circular.
14.0, So far, it would seem that Bradley's criticism is more 
or less irrelevant to the view that a substance is both dis­
tinct from, and independent of, its qualities. This conviction 
would seem to be strengthened even more when we consider his 
more general objection - that the unity of a substance is 
incompatible with the diversity of its qualities.
The correct reply to this more general objection would
appear to be obvious. It will be pointed out that a substance, 
being independent from its qualities, is simple (i.e, without 
parts), thereby retaining its unity in spite of the diversity 
of its qualities. The qualities ’belong1 to the substance in 
virtue of the fact that they stand to it in a unique and per­
haps unanalysable relation of inherence. A substance, it will 
be suggested, kaa its qualities without being any of them. It 
can be identified by its qualities without, thereby, being 
ide.ntic.at with. them. There is, it will be suggested, no genu­
ine problem to be resolved; the unity of a substance is com­
patible with the diversity of its qualities simply because it 
-¿-4 independent of them.
Although.perhaps obvious, this reply is ultimately unsatis­
factory. And the explanation as to why-it is unsatisfactory 
will, I think, bring out the true nature of Bradley’s object­
ion to this view of substance.
14.1. Bradley’s fundamental objection to the view that a 
substance is both distinct from, and independent of, its qual­
ities, is, I suggest, that it obliges us to introduce an 
absolute distinction between a substance and its nature. And 
this, I will now argue, leads to some untenable conclusions.
In the first place, an absolute distinction between a 
substance and its nature would entail that judgements such as 
"Sugar is white", can never be interpreted literally. That is 
to say, if the subject term is understood to denote a sub­
stance, then that substance cannot be white. An absolute dis­
tinction between a substance and its nature would, in fact, 
imply the truth of the contrary judgement "Sugar is not white" 
(although it would not imply the truth of the judgement "Sugar 
is not-white").
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The charge that this criticism is based upon the failure 
to distinguish between the Ia of identity, and the ¿a of 
predication would, I think, be unwarranted. For the question 
at issue here is that of the actual significance of the cop­
ula in a predicative judgement. And I believe that at least
r "part of what we mean (whatever difficulties this may appear 
to generate) when we say, for example, that sugar is white, 
is that sugar is, in one respect, and in some sense, literally 
identical with the quality of whiteness. For this reason, I 
don’t believe that we are justified in considering the appar­
ent distinction between the two senses of the copula to be 
ultimate.
14-2. The difficulties involved with any attempt to effect 
an absolute distinction between a substance and its nature 
will perhaps become more obvious if we consider the nature of 
change.
As Lotze has suggested, it is a supposition inherent in 
the ordinary view of the world that there are things or sub­
stances which, by entering into certain relations with other 
substances, undergo changes. Let us assume, then, in accord­
ance with the ordinary view of the world, that substantial 
change is possible. Now, if we also assume that a substance 
is both distinct from, and independent of, its nature, we will 
I believe, be led to the contrary conclusion that substantial 
change is not possible. The argument which leads us to this 
conclusion is as follows.
If a "substance is said to change, we would normally under­
stand this to mean that, at some moment of time t, the sub­
stance has some quality, or set of qualities, which it does 
not have at some other moment of time t’. And if we define
the natu/ie. of a substance as being either the class of qual­
ities which are true of a substance; or, in accordance with 
McTaggart , as a compound quality which has, as its parts, 
all th’ose qualities which are true of a substance, then we may 
understand a change in a substance to be a change in its nat­
ure, But if the nature of a substance is distinct from, and 
independent of, the substance itself, then any change in the 
nature of a substance will not necessarily be, or determine, 
a change in the substance itself. In fact, since any substant­
ial change can only be understood in terms of the qualities 
of the substance, i.e. as a change in its nature, an absolute 
distinction between a substance and its nature will preclude 
the possibility of substantial change. Thus, on the assumption 
that a substance is independent of its- nature, we must con­
clude that substances cannot change - which is contrary to 
our initial assumption that they do change.
We have seen that, upon the assumption that a substance is 
independent of its nature, it is impossible for the substance 
itself, as distinct from its nature, to change. But I think 
that we can also show that, upon this assumption, if the 
nature of a substance changes, then the substance itself must 
change.
If a substance has different qualities at different moments 
of time, then, as I have argued, it can be said to change its 
nature. For example, if, at a moment of time t, the nature of 
a substance is comprised of the qualities A,B,C and D; and, at 
another moment of time t , it is comprised of the qualities A, 
B,C, and E, then the nature of the substance will be said to 
change from A,B,C,D to A,B,C,E, But, in addition to this 
change in the nature of the substance, we must also consider
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the relation between the substance and its nature. Now if, at 
time t, the nature of the substance is comprised of the qual­
ities A,B,C and D, then the substance will, at that time, have 
the further quality, M, of having A,B,C and D as comprising 
its nature. Similarly if, at time t ’, the nature of the sub­
stance is comprised of the qualities A,B,C and E, then the , '
substance will, at that time, have the quality N, of having A, 
B ,C and E as comprising its nature. But the two qualities M 
and N, which are generated by the relationship between the 
substance and its nature at different moments of time, cannot 
themselves be parts of the nature of the substance, since 
their existence presupposes that the nature of the substance 
at t and t 1,. respectively, is independently determined. That 
is to say, M and N are logically subsequent to the determin­
ation bf the nature of the substance at times t and t1. But 
they are nonetheless qualities of the substance; and, since 
they do not form part of its nature, they must be ascribed 
to the substance itself. And, in so far as the substance does 
not possess these qualities simultaneously, it must possess 
them at different moments of time - which is to say that the 
substance itself must change.
The assumption that a substance is independent of its nat­
ure leads us, then, to the self-contradictory conclusion that, 
if the nature of the substance changes, then the substance 
itself cannot, and yet must, change. The assumption that a 
substance is independent of its nature must, therefore, be 
rejected.-
113. At this point it might be suggested that we have only 
shown that a substance cannot be independent of its nature if 
in accordance with the ordinary view of the world,we assume,
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that substances can, and do, change. There may, however, be 
changeless substances - in which case no such contradiction 
would seem to arise.
There are a number of possible replies to this objection. 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that, according to this 
view, not only must all substances be changeless, they must 
also be atemporal - since any continuant (i.e. a substance 
which endures through a period of time, or has a temporal 
dimension) must undergo a change in its temporal qualities of 
being past, present, and future. This is not, of course, a 
conclusive reply, but it does undermine one of the most comm­
only cited reasons for assuming that a substance is independ­
ent of its nature; namely, to account for the possibility that 
a substance can retain its identity through a period of time 
and, consequently, change.
The second reply is that put forward by David Armstrong^.
In his criticism of the so-called "Lockean" account of sub­
stance, Armstrong suggests that, if a substance is held to be 
independent of its nature, then we are faced with an infinite 
regress of relations when we attempt to explain the way in 
which the two are united. It is interesting to note that Arm­
strong claims to derive this argument from Bradley, although 
there is no evidence to suggest that Bradley did, in fact, use 
this type of argument against the view we are presently dis­
cussing.
Finally, if we assume that a substance is independent of 
its nature, this implies that it is independent of all of its 
qualities - both formal and material. And this, in turn, leads 
to the absurd conclusion that the substance must be independ­
ent of the quality of being a substance, and of the quality of
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being identical with itself. And if it is suggested that the 
notion of independence is somewhat obscure, we can state our 
objection in a slightly different way. If an entity is said 
to be Mindependent of" another entity, then we must at least 
mean that the relation between the two terms is contingent; so 
that, if we say that a substance is independent of its quali­
ties, then we must at least mean that the relation between the 
substance and its qualities is contingent. But if the relation 
between a substance and its qualities is contingent, then the 
relation between a substance and the quality of being a sub­
stance, and the quality of being identical with itself, must 
be contingent. And such a conclusion is clearly absurd.
144-. We have, I believe, established that a substance can <■*;
not be independent of its nature. Bradley’s own reasons for 
rejecting this view proved to be somewhat obscure. But our 
discussion has led to a number of independent reasons for 
rejecting this view. We will now consider the view that a 
substance is distinct from, but not independent of, its nat­
ure.
115. As with the previous view, it is difficult to be sure 
that one has understood the exact point of Bradley’s criticism. 
The relevant passage is that which I quoted previously (Sect­
ion 1 3 8 ) in relation to his criticism of the view that a sub­
stance is independent of its qualities. The point he wishes 
to make seems to be that, because a substance is not identical 
with any one of its qualities, taken individually; or, that it 
is not something which exists independently of its nature, 
that it"is therefore nothing at all. But this conclusion would 
only follow if these two analyses of a substance together 
exhausted all possible analyses. They are not, however,
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exhaustive. The fact that a substance is not an entity which 
exists independently of its nature, and the further fact that 
it cannot be identified with any of its qualities taken sever­
ally, does not preclude the possibility that a substance is 
real only when taken in conjunction with its nature. That is 
to say, it might be argued that, when attempting to understand 
the notion of a substance we ought to take a ¿u.!LAt.arice,-idLt-ti- 
¿t-A-quaiit.¿e./> as both conceptually and ontologically funda­
mental. This is, in fact, the view taken by both Leibniz^ and 
McTaggart0.
Such a view might be thought to be unacceptable for two 
reasons. In the first place, it seems to leave the relation 
between the.substance and its nature unexplained. Secondly, 
although it does not assume that a substance is an independent 
entity, it does appear to assume that it is a distinct entity 
over and above its nature; and yet, if we attempt to charac­
terise a substance, we can only do so in terms of its quali­
ties .
14-6. The first objection is, as I have argued previously, 
not conclusive. It might even be understood to beg two very 
important questions: (a) Whether the relation between a sub­
stance and its qualities ¿-4 explicable; and (b) Whether there 
is, in fact, any such relation. Concerning (a), I have already 
suggested that the fact that we are unable to explain the 
nature of the relation between a substance and its qualities 
does not entail that there is no relation. On the other hand, 
as Armstrong has pointed out, any attempt to explain the 
substance/quality distinction in terms of a relation between
two distinct kinds of entity would generate an infinite regress
. . 7of relations. Such a regress need not, however, be vicious ;
and a more serious criticism is to be found in the second 
objection.
Concerning (b), it has been argued by some philosophers^ 
that we should not, strictly, speak of a /iciation between a 
substance and its qualities. Rather, to avoid the above- 
mentioned regress, it is better to speak of a merely /o/imai 
distinction, or of a non-relational ’tie1 between them. The 
introduction of such a non-relational tie between a substance 
and its qualities seems, however, to be somewhat ad hoc, and 
little more than the introduction of a relation under a diff­
erent name. Furthermore, it still leaves us with the problem 
of explaining what a substance is, as distinct from its nat­
ure. In other words, it does not provide us with a satisfact­
ory answer to the second part of Bradley’s criticism. And to 
speak of a merely formal distinction between a substance and 
its nature implies that there is no matc/iiat distinction be­
tween them; which, in turn, seems to entail that it is imposs­
ible for the distinction between a substance and its qualities 
to be understood as a distinction between two distinct kinds 
of entity.
147. The view that the distinction between a substance and 
its nature is a merely formal distinction, and not a dis­
tinction between two different and irreducible kinds of entity 
does, however, have its attractions. The most important of 
these is that it provides us with a means of answering the 
familiar objection that, since a substance is not independent 
of its nature; and, since we cannot form a concept of a sub­
stance which is distinct from its nature, the notion of sub­
stance is therefore metaphysically otiose or vacuous.
A substance, we might reply, is simply a unity (more
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specifically, and to avoid a possible regress of relations 
analogous to that mentioned previously, a non-relational 
unity) of various qualities - which qualities comprise its 
nature. Subject to further qualification we might even, at 
this stage, propose that a substance be defined in this way.
If we accept this definition, then it seems to me that ,
£
there remains little force in Bradley's criticisms. Although 
some philosophers may doubt that such non-relational unities 
can exist, Bradley cannot be counted among them, since he 
explicitly ascribes this type of unity to the Absolute^, or 
that which is ultimately real; and to immediate experience”̂ .
He cannot then object to the notion of substance on the grounds 
that it would involve the recognition of non-relational uni­
ties. But there is not much else that Bradley could find ob­
jectionable in such a definition. To the question, "What is 
‘ a substance apart from its qualities?", we can reply that it 
nothing, and thereby agree with Bradley. But this is not to 
say that it is not something when taken in conjunction with 
its qualities; or, that it is not distinct from them - although 
as I suggested, the distinction is formal only. And although 
a substance is not independent of the qualities which comprise 
its nature, it cannot be reduced to their simple conjunction.
It is the non-relational unity of these qualities, and not a 
mere group or bundle of them. In the next chapter I will dis­
cuss this view of substance in more detail. But for the moment, 
it is enough that it should be acknowledged as a plausible 
reply to’Bradley's criticisms.
14-8. Bradley's criticism of the notion of substance has so 
far proved to be inconclusive. The remainder of Chapter II of 
AR is basically a critique of the 'bundle' theory of a thing
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or substance. According to this theory, a substance is simply 
various qualities in relation. It is clear, however, that 
whilst any objections Bradley raises against this theory may 
be important in their own right, they are not directly applic­
able to the definition of substance which I put forward in the 
previous section. But they are relevant to the proper under­
standing of the arguments in Chapter III. They also provide us 
with the basis for what I believe to be a conclusive refut­
ation of a commonly held view of the nature of ’things’.
14-9. According to Bradley, if we reject the view that a 
substance is an entity distinct from its nature whilst still 
desiring to retain the general notion of substance or thing- 
hood, our only option is to give an analysis exclusively in 
terms of qualities and relations. Bradley considers, and sub­
sequently rejects, two different approaches to this type of 
analysis. The first is to view the relations as characterist­
ics of the qualities. The second is to view the relations as 
both distinct from, and independent of, the qualities.
150. Concerning the first approach, the first point which 
Bradley makes is that any unity a substance might have cannot 
be found in any simple identity among its qualities. Each of ... 
the qualities of a substance differs from every other of its 
qualities. The lump of sugar which we mentioned in our previ­
ous example is said to be white and sweet. But the quality of 
being white, and the quality of being sweet, are not identical 
with each other; nor are they identical with any of the other 
qualities ascribed to the sugar. Furthermore, in so far as the 
qualities differ, they must be diverse - i.e. numerically dis­
tinct. But if each of the qualities of a substance is an entity 
in its own right, then the mere conjunction of these qualities
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will not yield the genuine unity of a substance.
The significance of this conclusion for the view that re­
lations are characteristics of qualities is obvious. If the 
relations are simply characteristics of the qualities, then 
they cannot provide a unifying ground between them; and the 
mere conjunction of diverse qualities with their respective 
characteristics will not, as I suggested above, provide the 
genuine unity which is to be ascribed to a substance.
151* But the view that relations are attributes or charac­
teristics of the terms which they relate is somewhat obscure, 
and it is possible that when it is stated in a more precise 
form, it can avoid the above objection.
Bradley considers two ways in which this doctrine might be 
interpreted. If A and B are two qualities which, we will ass­
ume, are related to form a substance; and if the relation be­
tween them is to be an attribute of the qualities, then it 
might be understood to be an attribute of either, but not of 
both, qualities; or, it might be understood to be an attribute 
of both qualities, i.e. what is sometimes called a two-term, or 
dyadic, predicate.
Now, if the relation is an attribute of A alone, then there 
is no unifying ground between A and B that is provided by the 
relation. The same conclusion follows if the relation is taken 
to be an attribute of B alone.
This difficulty is not avoided if the relation is understood 
to be an attribute of both qualities. It is, of course, poss­
ible, in' one sense, for two or more entities to share the same 
characteristic. A substance x may have the quality of being 
red, and another substance _y may also have the quality of being., 
red. And, providing we accept the reality of universal .
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characteristics, we can say of the two substances x anĉ  X "that 
they share the same quality. At the same time we should recog­
nize the importance of the distinction between a universal­
type., and a universal-toA^/z. Two substances may share the same 
quality-type, but not the same quality-token. The same prin­
ciple will apply to relations, if they are understood to be 
characteristics of qualities. The fact that two entities share 
the same type of relation does not mean that they share the 
same relation-token. Thus, two qualities might share the 
relation-type r, but they will not necessarily share the same 
relation-token. A will have a token r' as a characteristic; and 
B will have the token'rM as a characteristic. Ultimately, how­
ever, we will have two complex characteristics Ar’ and Br", 
composed of the qualities A and B, and «the relation-tokens r ’ 
and r". But they will not, when taken in conjunction, form the 
genuine unity of a substance. The view that relations are 
characteristics of the terms which they relate cannot, then, 
explain the unity of a substance.
It might be suggested that, not only do the qualities share 
the same relation-type, but they also share the same relation­
token; and that this relation-token, although not a proper 
constituent of either A and B, nonetheless relates them both. 
This, in effect, is to deny that relations are genuine charac­
teristics of their terms, and to grant them a distinct, and 
independent existence. And this brings us to the second way in 
which the theory that a substance is simply various qualities 
in relation might be interpreted. Bradley’s criticism is inter­
esting, and it is worthwhile quoting the relevant passage in
full.
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Let us abstain from making the relation an attribute of 
the related, and let us make it more or less independent. 
’There is a relation C, in which A and B stand; and it 
appears with both of them.’ But here again we have made no 
progress. The relation C has been admitted different from 
A and B, and no longer is predicated of them. Something, 
however, seems to be said of this relation C, and said, 
again, of A and B. And this something is not to be the 
ascription of one to the other. If so, it would appear 
to be another relation D, in which C, on one side, and, 
on the other side, A and B, stand. But such a makeshift 
leads at once to the infinite process. The new relation 
D can b.e predicated in no way of C, or of A and B; and 
hence we must have recourse to a f-resh relation, E, which 
comes between D and whatever we had before. But this must 
lead to another, F; and so on, indefinitely. Thus the 
problem is not solved by taking relations as independently 
real. For, if so, the qualities and their relation fall 
entirely apart, and then we have said nothing. Or we have 
to make a new relation between the old relation and the 
terms; which, when it is made, does not help us. It either 
itself demands a new relation, and so on without end, or 
it leaves us where we were, entangled in difficulties.
(AR pp.17-18)
152. The essential point of Bradley's argument is that any 
attempt to understand, or explain, the unity of a substance in 
terms of independent qualities and relations leads to a vicious 
infinite regress of relations. The regress arises in the foll­
owing way. If we assume that the relation r, between the
157)
qualities A and B is distinct from, and independent of, these 
qualities, then we are confronted with three diverse entities. 
The problem arises, according to Bradley, when we attempt to 
explain how, upon this assumption, these diverse entities can 
be united to form a single thing or substance. One plausible 
response would be to suggest that they are united to form a
4
substance in virtue of their being related to a single, dis­
tinct, substantive. But this reply is inadmissable, since the 
analysis in question is an attempt to avoid the introduction 
of any entities over and above the two qualities and the re­
lation .
If the only unities between qualities are to be 'relational1 
unities, and 'if qualities and relations are distinct entities, 
then any unity between the two qualities A and B must be a 
relational unity. But if the relation, r, is itself independ­
ent of both A and B, then it can only be united with them to 
form a complex unity by introducing two further relations, or 
a further three-term relation, which will 'unite* A with r, 
and B with r. But these further relations, being themselves 
distinct and independent entities, can only be united with A,
B, and r if we introduce four further relations, or a further 
four-term relation which will relate our original qualities A 
and B, our original relation r, and the further relations in­
troduced as a ground for uniting A and B with r.
It is easy to see that this process will lead to an infinite 
regress of relations. Now, an infinite regress need not be 
vicious, in which case no real problem arises - apart from 
those who object to any infinite regress as a matter of onto­
logical economy. But, in the above case, the regress is 
vicious, since the two original qualities A and B can only be
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united once we reach the final term of an infinite series of 
relations. Which is to say, they can never be united. The view 
that qualities and relations are mutually independent cannot, 
for this reason, provide a satisfactory account of the unity 
of a substance. The attempt to analyse a substance exclusively 
in terms of distinct and independent qualities and relations 
must, therefore, be rejected,
153* I believe that the above objection is conclusive if 
directed, as it is directed, against the attempt to explain 
the unity of a substance in terms of independent qualities and 
relations, I do not think that it is a conclusive objection to 
the reality of relations as such; since the infinite regress 
of relations, is only vicious when interpreted in the above 
manner - as an attempt to explain the unity of a substance in 
terms of independent qualities and relations alone. But then 
Bradley’s argument is not intended to be a criticism of re­
lations as such; and it would be unfair to assume that, at 
this stage, Bradley is criticising the doctrine of ’external’ 
relations - an assumption which has been made by some critics.
154« In the above arguments we have, I believe, the ess­
ential features of Bradley’s criticism of the notion of a 
thing or substance - as set out in Chapter II of AR. His arg­
uments against the reality of substances are, I have argued, 
inconclusive. The definition of a substance as a non-relational
unity of various qualities does not seem to have been con sid-_
ered by Bradley; and it consequently avoids his objections to 
the ’relational’ analysis of the unity of a substance.
His criticisms of the attempt to analyze the unity of a 
substance exclusively in terms of qualities and relations are, 
howvever, more satisfactory; and, in the case of the theory
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that qualities and relations are distinct and independent 
entities, probably conclusive.
Bradley1s critique of the notion of substance is not, how­
ever, restricted to Chapter II of A_R. It is continued in 
Chapter VIII under the title "Things1'. The basis of the criti­
cism in the latter chapter differs, however, from that in 
Chapter II. In the earlier chapter Bradley is concerned to show 
that no satisfactory analysis of a thing or substance can be 
given either in terms of an independent substantive with di­
verse qualities; or, in terms of distinct qualities and re­
lations. In Chapter VIII, however, his criticisms reflect a 
different approach. The main point of his criticism in this 
chapter concerns an alleged difficulty in the view that a 
substance, to be real, must endure thro-ugh a period of time -
i.e. be a continuant. According to Bradley, any identity which 
a substance retains through a period of time involves the 
disjunction of the what from the that9 of content from exist­
ence. The nature of any temporally bound substance, he claims, 
is thereby self-transcendent; and, in accordance with one of 
the criteria he uses to distinguish appearance from reality, 
thereby a mere appearance. Having outlined the basis for 
Bradley’s criticism in this chapter, we can now examine his 
arguments in more detail.
155. He begins by pointing out that the meaning which we 
attach to the terms "thing" or "substance" is often vague and 
imprecise. Rainbows, waterfalls, and flashes of lightning, for 
example, all may or may not qualify as substances - depending 
upon the criterion used. In spite of this fact, there does, he 
admits, seem to be a recognizable element of consistency in 
ordinary usage. A substance, it would seem, ought to have some
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degree of independence or self-existence, as well as a definite 
spatial location, and a temporal duration. This much at least 
seems to be demanded by the ordinary notion of a thing or 
substance. But each of these demands presents us, according to 
Bradley, with serious difficulties,
156, There is, first of all, the problem of the vagueness 
of meaning, and possible inconsistent usage, of the term 
"thing”. This, in itself, is not an insurmountable problem; 
and it certainly does not entail that the notion of a substance 
ought to be dismissed as philosophically unsound. Once this 
imprecision in general usage is pointed out we ought, how­
ever, to take steps to ensure that any inconsistencies are 
avoided when the term is used in a technical sense. This can
be achieved by the provision of clear definitions of the prin­
cipal terms used in subsequent discussion. But even at a more 
technical level, we often encounter uses of the term "thing" 
or "substance" which are vague and imprecise. This fact can, I 
think, be attributed to the failure, on behalf of philosophers,
to distinguish between at least four distinct, and historic-
11ally precedented, technical senses of the term.
There is, on the one hand, the use of the term "substance" 
to denote those entities which, in Aristotle's words, are 
"neither predicable of a subject, nor present in a subject" . 1 2
There is also the use of the term to denote those entities 
which are self-existent or independent. Descartes, for example, 
used it in this way.
We can mean by ¿udAtance. nothing other than a thing exist­
ing in such a manner that it has need of no other thing 
in order to exist.1^
Thirdly, there is the use of the terra to denote those 
entities which endure through a period of time; and which, 
consequently, are the subjects of change - entities which we 
have elsewhere described as continuants,
Fourthly, there is the view which equates substantiality 
with spatio-temporal position. This view is found in a number 
of works; but it is perhaps best exemplified in the theories 
of Samuel Alexander.
157. We have, then, at least four distinct technical senses 
of the term "substance". It is possible that there are others, 
but these four are, I believe, the most widely espoused, and 
they are particularly relevant to Bradley's criticisms. The 
fact that these criteria are distinct does not, however, imply 
that they are mutually incompatible. It is, pnima -£aci<c, poss­
ible, for example, that all existent substances should be at 
once the bearers of qualities and relations without, themsel­
ves, being either qualities or relations; that they should be 
self-existent, capable of enduring through time and change, 
and have spatio-temporal positions - thereby satisfying all 
four criteria. How, then, is each of these views affected by 
Bradley's criticisms?
Let us firstly consider the relevant passage of criticism. 
It can be found on page 61 of AR.
If the connexions of substantive and adjective, and of 
quality and relation, have been shown not to be defens­
ible; if the forms of space and of time have turned out 
to be full of contradictions; if, lastly, causation and 
activity have succeeded merely in adding inconsistency to 
inconsistency - if, in a word, nothing of all this can,
162)
as such, be predicated of reality - what is it that is 
left? If things are to exist, then where and how? But if 
these two questions are unanswerable, then we seem driven 
to the conclusion that things are but appearances. (AR
p.6 1 )
The force of this criticism is largely dependent upon our 
acceptance of the conclusions argued for in earlier chapters 
of Bradley1s work. Apart from the distinction between sub­
stance and quality, we have not, as yet, considered his criti­
cisms of the various categorial schemata and phenomena that he 
mentions in this passage. But is is clear that if his argu­
ments are, any of them, conclusive, then it will be difficult 
to find anything which could possibly satisfy any of the above- 
mentioned definitions of substance. If, for example, Bradley 
has conclusively shown that both space and time are illusory 
or mere appearances, then there can be nothing which can sat­
isfy either the third or the fourth of these definitions; and, 
if these were the only two consistent definitions of substance3 
there could, plainly, be no real substances.
We have seen, however, that the distinction between sub­
stance and quality is, in principle, defensible against Brad-_ 
ley’s criticisms. And he nowhere offers any objection to the 
view that identifies substantiality with self-existence Ox 
So, these two definitions would remain plausible 
should Bradley’s other arguments in the first Book of AR prove 
to be conclusive.
Fortunately, Bradley is not content to rest his criticisms 
entirely upon arguments set out in his earlier discussion; and, 
having made the above points, he then presents us with what I
163)
consider to be the central argument in the chapter,
138, The criticism which he raises is, as I suggested in 
Section 134-, based upon an alleged inconsistency in the notion 
of a continuant, i.e, a substance which endures through a 
period of time. If a substance is to endure through a period 
of time, then it must, according to Bradley, retain its self­
identity at each moment of the period through which it endures, 
as well as retaining its self-identity from any one moment of 
its duration through to any other moment. These two conditions, 
when taken in conjunction, are said to generate a paradox,
the continuity, which is necessary to a thing, seems to 
depend .on its keeping an identity of character. A thing 
Ia a thing, in short, by being what it iocla, And it does 
not appear how this relation relation of sameness can be 
real. It is a relation connecting the past with the pres­
ent, and this connexion is evidently vital to the thing. 
But, if so, the thing has become, in more senses than one, 
the /i&iatLon of passages in its own history. And if we 
assert that the thing is this inclusive relation, which 
transcends any given time, surely we have allowed that 
the thing, though not wholly an idea, is an idea essent­
ially. And it is an idea which at no time is ever real.
(AR p p . 6 1-63)
Now, according to Bradley, the fact that the identity of 
a continuant requires the identity of its present nature with 
its past nature, implies that its nature transcends the con­
tent of its present existence. And, wherever we have this 
transcendence, or disjunction of content from existence, we
have, according to one of Bradley1s criteria, appearance rath­
er than reality.
159. This argument is unsatisfactory for a number of reas­
ons. Firstly, as I have argued in Chapter 2 , the criterion 
which Bradley uses to condemn continuants as mere appearances 
- that they presuppose the disjunction of the wkat from the 
£kat - is itself basically incoherent.
Secondly, Bradley’s criticism is based upon the false ass­
umption that only what exists now exists at all. That he does 
use this assumption in his argument is evident from the foll­
owing passage.
And this identical content is called ideal because it 
transcends given existence. Existence is given only in 
presentation; and, on the other hand, the thing is a 
thing only if its existence goes beyond the now, and 
extends into the past. (AR_ p.6 2 )
That this assumption is false, we have argued in Chapter 
1. But it is only when we realise that Bradley’s criticism is, 
in fact, based upon this assumption, that we can understand 
his contention that the content of a continuant transcends its 
existence; i.e. its p/ie.Ae.nt existence. The fact that the 
identity of a continuant presupposes the identity of its 
present nature with its past nature does not, then, imply 
that its nature ’transcends’ its existence; so that, even if 
Bradley’s criterion for appearances were valid, we should still 
have no real reason for classifying continuants as mere appear­
ances »
Thirdly, there seems to be some confusion in Bradley’s
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argument between two distinct senses of identity. In one sense, 
all entities, including substances, can be said to be identi­
cal with themselves without this implying that they have any 
temporal duration whatsoever. This sense of identity is re­
flected in the logical axiom A = A. This axiom is held to be 
true without any reference to time or temporal position, i.e. 
tenselessly. In this sense, the identity of a substance holds 
whether the substance be a continuant, an occurrent, or simply 
atemporal.
But there is also a sense in which a substance is said to 
retain its self-identity through a period of time and change; 
so that a substance S, at a moment of time t, can be said to 
be identical with itself at a different moment of time t1, 
even though it may have undergone a change in its nature. Some 
philosophers, taking the view that substances do not have 
temporal dlme.nA ¿on*, have thought that this sense of identity 
raises some serious problems. Difficulties arise, it is sugg­
ested, .„when we attempt to explain how a substance, with a ... 
particular nature at one time, can be numerically identical 
with a substance which has a different nature at some other 
mement of time. The identity involved cannot, it is maintained, 
be merely qualitative, since the nature of the substance diff- 
0j»g from one moment of time to another• This is the basis of 
Bradley’s criticism. Any identity, he suggests, must ultimate­
ly be qualitative. Mere numerical identity, is claimed to be
impos sible.
All identity then is qualitative in the sense that it all 
must consist in content and character. There is no same­
ness of mere existence, for mere existence is a vicious
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abstraction. (AR p.5 2 7 )
We have already seen that the notion of substantial ident­
ity through change is impossible if the substance is conceived 
as being independent of its nature (Section 112). And yet, if 
it is to be the nature of the substance which remains identi­
cal, there seems to be no consistent explanation for the 
possibility of change.
Bradley’s response is to accept this difficulty as genuine; 
and to then argue that any identity we attribute to a contin­
uant must be ideal - that is, it must involve the abstraction 
or disjunction of some aspect of the nature of the substance 
at one moment of time, which aspect, in turn, is claimed to 
endure and recur at another moment of time. This abstracted 
aspect is sometimes called the of the substance; as
distinct from those qualities, or parts of its nature, which 
vary over periods of time, and are called accident* or acci­
dental qualities. But, in so far as this process of abstract­
ion involves the disjunction of content from existence, of the 
what from the that, the abstracted content - upon which the 
identity of the continuant is said to depend - is ideal, or a 
mere appearance. And if the identity of a continuant, i.e. 
that aspect of its nature which endures through time, is ideal 
or a mere appearance, then the continuant itself having no 
identity apart from its nature, is also ideal or a mere appear­
ance.
160. There are a number of replies to this argument of 
Bradley’s. The first is to point out that his argument is based 
upon the assumption that substances cannot have temporal di­
mensions. If, on the other hand, we allow this possibility,
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then there is no genuine problem involved in understanding the 
self-identity of continuants. The sense of identity involved 
is the same as that presupposed by the truth of the logical 
axiom of identity. For example, if a substance S is blue, in 
one r'e&'pect, at a moment of time t, and red in the same res­
pect at another moment of time t‘, this fact presents us with 
no greater conceptual difficulty than that involved in the 
presumption that it is possible for a substance to be the
bearer of diverse, and at times contrary, qualities throughout
• 15its spatial dimensions. There is no oLviou-A difficulty or 
inconsistency involved in the statement that a substance is 
red at one point in its spatial dimensions, and blue at another 
point. But if the validity of such statements is not problem­
atic, then there seems to be no real reason for believing that 
the validity of analogous statements involving the qualities 
of a substance’s temporal dimensions should be.
Secondly, as I have suggested previously, Bradley’s argu- . 
ment is based upon the tacit assumption that existence is a 
quality of present entities only. Once we reject this assumpt­
ion, as in Chapter 1 I argued that we ought, then his criti­
cisms become largely groundless.
161. The view that substances may have temporal dimensions,
16(although not necessarily temporal parts ), and, that both 
past and future states of a substance may exist in an unquali­
fied sense’does not, however, invalidate the notion of change. 
It does undermine the possibility of the analysis of change in 
terms of cl&ao becoming - in Broad’s sense of that express­
ion^. But just as we can, and do, speak of a multi-coloured 
entity changing its colour along one or more of its spatial 
dimensions, so we may, I suggest, speak of a substance changing
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its qualities along one or more of its temporal dimensions.
The substance may, at some stage of its temporal dimensions, 
cease to possess some quality which it possesses at some other 
stage. But this does not mean that it ceases, absolutely, to 
possess that quality; in the same way that a multi-coloured 
substance does not cease, absolutely, to possess a particular 
colour simply because it does not possess that colour through­
out all of its spatial dimensions.
162. The final point which Bradley makes in Chapter VIII is
that it is often difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the 
bounds of a particular substance. The example he uses is the 
familiar one of Sir John Cutler’s silk stockings, which were 
"darned with worsted until no particle of the silk was left in 
them, and no-one could agree whether they were the same old 
stockings or were new ones." (AR p.63). But this problem is 
actually a problem related to the individuation of substances, 
rather than to the nature of substance as such; and we will 
return to it in the next chapter. '
163. In this chapter I have been concerned to defend the 
notion of substance against Bradley’s criticisms. The conclus­
ions reached at this stage are, firstly, that Bradley has not 
pointed out any genuine inconsistency or incoherency in the 
view that a substance is both distinct from, and independent 
of, its nature; although we did suggest a number of other 
reasons for believing that a substance cannot exist independ­
ently of its nature.
The second conclusion which we reached was that no satis­
factory analysis of a substance could be given exclusively in 
terms of qualities and relations which are considered to be 
either mutually independent; or such that the relations are
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understood to be attributes of the qualities which they re­
late.
We have also put forward a tentative definition of a sub­
stance as a non-relational unity of various qualities. This 
definition, it was suggested, avoids Bradley’s criticisms, as : 
well as the further criticisms which we raised against the . 
notion of an independent substance. In the next chapter we will 
discuss this view of substance in more detail.
Finally, we concluded that Bradley’s criticisms of the 
notion of a continuant, in so far as they did not depend upon 
the prior conclusion that time is illusory, are inconclusive.
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164-. In Section 14-7 it was proposed that a substance be 
defined as a non-relational unity of various qualities. This 
definition has, I suggested, two important merits. In the first 
place, it enables us to avoid the contradictions involved in 
the view that a substance is both distinct from, and independ­
ent of, its qualities. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, 
it enables us to avoid the type of vicious infinite regress of 
relations which arises from the attempt to explain the unity 
of a substance exclusively in terms of distinct and independ­
ent qualities and relations.
But the pption of such a non-relational unity is, perhaps, 
somewhat unusual; and if our view of substance is to be ac­
knowledged as a genuine reply to Bradley's criticisms, as well 
as providing the basis for a consistent overall theory, it 
will be necessary to clarify some of the conceptual implicat­
ions of this view; and, at the same time, to consider some 
possible objections.
Furthermore, the definition of substance which we have 
proposed is not the only possible or actual definition. There 
are other views which display a p/iima £acle plausibility; and 
some of these views ought to be considered. But the advantages 
of our view will, I think, become apparent when we come to 
assess the ultimate consistency of these other views.
In this chapter we will, then, be concerned with a more 
detailed discussion, and defence, of our view of substances.
165. Perhaps the first point we should make is that the 
notion of a quality is taken to be primitive in our definition. 
That is to say, the meaning of the term "substance" is
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ultimately determined by the meaning of the term ’’quality".
The term "quality" is, I believe, both indefinable and ulti­
mate. We can, however, understand the meaning of the term by 
suggesting instances of qualities. The most obvious examples 
of qualities are, perhaps, the so-called ’sensible’ qualities. 
Red, for example, is a quality; as are all colours. McTaggart 
has suggested the following criterion for a quality. If some--.... 
thing is t/iue. 0/ an entity, then that something, say q, is a 
quality of the entity . But this is not a definition of a 
quality; and McTaggart goes on to show that any attempt to 
define a quality in this way will ultimately involve us in a 
vicious circle. '
Although the notion of a quality is taken to be a primitive 
element in our definition of a substance, this does not mean 
that qualities are more fundamental, in an ontological sense, 
than substances. Nor does it mean that qualities are capable 
of existing independently of substances. What is fundamental, 
both from an ontological, and an epistemological point of view, 
is the substance or concA.e.£um, The claim that, in perception 
for example, we are primarily aware of simple qualities, and 
only derivatively or indirectly aware of substances is, as 
Leibniz pointed out in reply to Locke , without foundation. 
Furthermore, if, as I shall argue at a later stage in this 
chapter, it is impossible for qualities to exist except as 
united with other qualities to form a substance, then substan­
ces must be taken to be fundamental from an ontological stand­
point •
-] 6 6 . The next point which should be made concerning our 
definition of substance is that, although the unity between 
the various qualities which comprise a substance is said to be
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norL-/ie.iatlonat, this does not mean that there cannot be any 
relations between the qualities in virtue of their being 
united to form a substance; it only means that these relations 
are not constitutive of the basic unity of the substance.
167. One of the most important of the relations which exist 
between the qualities of a substance in virtue of their being 
united to form a substance is the relation of Extrinsic Deter­
mination. According to McTaggart, who first drew attention to
3the importance of this relation , between each quality of a 
substance, and every other quality of the substance, there 
exists a relation such that it is impossible either that the 
substance might have had a nature other than that which it 
does have, and still be one and the same substance; or, that 
any quality of the substance should differ without this deter­
mining a change in each of the other qualities of the sub­
stance. It follows, according to this principle, should it be 
valid, that any inferences based upon the assumption that a 
particular substance might have had a different nature than 
that which it has, are invalid.
The validity of the principle of Extrinsic Determination 
can be seen to follow from our definition of substance. If a 
substance, X, has a nature which is comprised of the qualities^ 
a, b, c, and d, then, according to our definition, X is simply 
the unity of these four qualities. If we assume that X might 
not have had the quality d, for example, then our assumption 
amounts to the contention that it is possible for a unity com­
prised of the qualities a, b, c, and d, not to have the quality
d. And this contention is clearly false.
The principle of Extrinsic Determination might also be in­
terpreted in a stronger sense. Not only is the assumption that
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a substance might have had a different nature than that which 
it has invalid, but we also have no right to assume, as 
McTaggart has pointed out^, that had any of the qualities of 
the substance been different, then the others would have both 
remained, and remained the same. If the substance X, for ex­
ample, did not have the quality d, then we have no right to 
assume that there would have been a substance Y in its place, 
with all or any of the qualities of X except d. This conclusion 
follows from the fact that every quality of a substance has 
the further quality of being united with each of those partic­
ular qualities which constitute the nature of the substance; 
and that, if it did not have this further quality, it would 
not be the particular quality that it is. The quality d, for 
example, has the further quality d' of.being united with a, b, 
and c to form X; and if it did not have this quality d’, it 
would not be the quality d.
It might be objected that, in making this last claim, we 
have presumed that the qualities of a'substance are particular, 
rather than universal. On the other hand, if the qualities of 
a substance are universal, rather than particular, then our 
conclusion, it might be argued, would not follow. Redness, for 
example, it might be suggested, does not cease to be redness 
simply because one or more of its particular instances ceases 
to qualify a certain substance. But this objection is clearly 
valid only upon the assumption that there can be universal 
qualities. In Chapter 7 I will argue, however, that all quali­
ties are"necessarily particular; and that their nature, hence 
their identity, is determined by their relations with other 
existent entities.^ It is also valid only upon the assumption 
that such ’universal’ qualities are capable of retaining their
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self-identity irrespective of the nature and number of their 
particular instantiations. But it seems to me that there is no 
sound reason to believe that this assumption is true. For it 
is a quality of the ’universal1 redness that it is instanti­
ated by X; and it is clear that such universal qualities, if 
they are real, are no more capable of retaining their self­
identity independently of those qualities which comprise their 
natures than substances are.
168. There is further conclusion which follows from the 
validity of the principle of Extrinsic Determination. In Chapt­
er 1 , when discussing the relation between counterfactual 
conditional judgements and the reality of possible worlds, we 
remarked that Lewis' argument in favour of the reality of such 
possibilia was based upon the unargued«assumption that a 
substance is more or less independent of its nature; and, that 
things might therefore be, or have been, other than they are.
We are now in a position to support our original contention 
that this assumption is unjustified with an argument based 
upon a more detailed consideration of the nature of substance. 
On the basis of the conclusions reached above concerning the 
principle of Extrinsic Determination, we can see that counter­
factual conditional judgements, being based upon the assumption 
that substances are more or less independent of their natures, 
are necessarily invalid. So, one of the main reasons for ass­
uming the reality of possible worlds - that they are needed to 
provide truth conditions for counterfactual conditional judge­
ments - is thus undermined. Once again, it should be pointed 
out that our conclusion does not imply that judgements about 
possibilities are false or invalid; only that they should be 
analysed in such a way that the reality of possibilia is not
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assumed.
169. We have spoken of the relation of Extrinsic Determin­
ation as if it is the qualities of a substance. It is
not, strictly, an attribute or further quality of these qual­
ities; although it does determine the relational quality of 
being related by this relation in each of the terms which it 
relates. In these respects, the relation of Extrinsic Deter­
mination is like all relations. The fact that relations are 
distinct from, and do not inhere in, their terms does not, 
however, compromise the unity of the substance whose qualities 
they relate, since the relations between the qualities of a 
substance exist in virtue of, rather than as constitutive of, 
the unity of the substance.
It is also true that any relation between the qualities of'“ 
a substance will also, as we pointed out earlier in our dis­
cussion, determine an infinite regress of relations, as well 
as a corresponding number of relational qualities in the terms 
which it relates. But the regress of relations will not, in 
this case, be vicious; since it is not necessary that the 
series of relations generated be completed before we can truly 
say that the original qualities are united. Nor is it necess­
ary that the regress be completed before the qualities of the 
substance can truly be said to be related, since the regress 
is generated as a consequence of the qualities be related, and 
not as a basis for their being related.
170. Having briefly considered the question of the status 
of the relations between the qualities of a substance, we will 
now consider that of the status of relations between substan­
ces.
If we assume that there is more than one substance, then we
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must, I believe, conclude that there are relations between 
these substances. Even if there are only two substances, then 
these substances must differ from each other; a relation of 
difference thereby exists between them. From this apparently 
trivial conclusion we are, however, led to a very important 
result; namely, that the relations between substances deter­
mine the nature of the substances which they relate. The truth 
of this conclusion can be demonstrated by the following argu­
ment .
Any two substances X and Y, which are related by the re­
lation r, must, in virtue of this fact, each have as amongst 
the qualities which comprise their respective natures, the 
quality of standing in this relation with the other substance. 
Now, to say that a substance ha* a particular quality can only 
mean, according to our analysis, that this quality forms part 
of the nature of the substance. And this, in turn, means that 
the quality is one of those qualities which form the unity of 
the substance. But in accordance with*the principle of Extrin­
sic Determination, it is impossible that a substance should 
not have any of those qualities which it does have. If a sub­
stance has the quality of standing in a particular relation to 
another substance, it n£.ce-AAci/iiiy has this quality. Thus, any 
substance which stands in a relation to some other substance, 
necessarily (i.e. as a consequence of its nature) stands in 
that relation to the other substance.
In this way it is possible to retain the traditional view 
that relations between substances are distinct from these 
substances, whilst accepting the view that these relations at 
once determine, and are determined by, the substances which 
they relate.
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The view that relations between substances at one determine, 
and are determined by, the nature of these substances is, per­
haps, paradoxical. But it is paradoxical only if we make two , 
unjustified assumptions: That the relation of determination 
(by which I mean the relation of int/iinóic determination - see 
Section X) is an asymmetrical relation; and, that a relation 
cannot exist between a quality and another relation. Concerning 
the first assumption, we can see, from the following example, 
that the relation of intrinsic determination is, at least in 
some instances, symmetrical. If a man is married, then the 
relation of marriage between himself and his wife determines 
that he has the quality of being a husband; whilst the quality 
of being a husband determines that the man stands in a relation; 
of marriage to his wife. The relation of intrinsic determin­
ation thus holds between the quality of being a husband, and 
the relation of marriage. And in this case the relation is 
symmetrical. This example is also sufficient to show that the 
second assumption is false; since the'relation of intrinsic 
determination holds, in this case, between the quality of being 
a husband and the relation of marriage.
171. In Section 169 I suggested that the occurrence of a 
relation between any qualities of a substance determines both 
an infinite number of relations, and an infinite number of 
relational qualities in the terms which it relates. But it is 
also true that any relation between two or more substances, or 
between a substance and a relation, will determine an analogous 
regress of relations, and a corresponding infinite number of 
relational qualities in the substance which it relates. For 
example, if we have two substances X and Y standing in a re­
lation r, then this fact determines that both X and Y shall
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have, as among the qualities which comprise their respective 
natures, the quality of standing in the relation r. But it is 
also true, as Bradley pointed out with respect to the attempt 
to understand the unity of a substance in terms of independent' 
qualities and relations, that a further relation exists be­
tween any relation and its terms. Thus, between X and r, there 
will be a further relation, which we shall call r1; and this 
relation will, in turn, determine a further quality in X - 
namely, the quality of standing in relation to the relation r 1. 
Now, between this last quality, which we shall call q, and the 
relation r 1, there will be a further relation rM, and this will 
determine in X the occurrence of a further quality - that of 
standing in relation to r" - and so on, indefinitely.
The fact that any substance will sta-nd in an infinite number 
of relations and, consequently, have an infinite number of 
relational qualities, does not, however, point to any diffi­
culties for our view of substance. The regress of relations in 
this case is not vicious; since the truth of the original 
judgement that X is related to Y by the relation r, is not 
dependent upon the subsequent regress of relations being com­
pleted.
172. We have reached the conclusion that any substance which 
is related to any other substance must, in virtue of the sub­
sequent regress of relations and relational qualities, have
an infinite number of qualities. That is to say, there can be 
no substances with a ¿LnipLe. nature. But although there can be 
no substances which have a simple nature - i.e. which have only 
one quality - all substances, I will now argue, are simple in 
the sense that they do not have parts.
173. The relation of part to whole is generally thought to
be validly applicable to individual substances. McTaggart, for 
example, has claimed that all substances are infinitely divis­
ible, and that they therefore have an infinite number of parts 
This view, he claims, is evidently true.^
On the other hand, there are philosophers, such as Leibniz, 
who make a distinction between compound and simple substances; 
and while all compound substances can substances can, he main­
tains, rightly be said to have parts, this is not true of the 
simple substances or monads of which the compound substances 
are comprised.
1. The monad, of which we shall speak here, is nothing 
but a simple substance which enters into compounds; ¿Lmp~ 
¿e.y that is to say, without parts*
2. And there must be simple substances, because there
are compounds; for the compound is nothing but a coll-
7ection or agg/icgatum of simples.
The soundness of Leibniz’ argument is debatable. The con­
clusion that there must be simple substances because there are 
compound substances, only follows because he has implicitly 
defined a compound substance as an aggregate of simple sub­
stances. But there is nothing in the notion of a compound 
substance that determines that it be comprised of simple sub­
stances. It might be suggested, for example, as McTaggart has 
suggested, that all compound substances are comprised of fur­
ther compound substances ad infinitum. Leibniz' argument would 
appear, then, to involve a simple case of question-begging.
But the truth of the conclusion that substances are without 
parts can, I believe, be established by a different line of
181 )
argument.
174-* If a substance is to have parts, then relations must 
exist between each of the parts, and every other part of the 
substance. A relation must also exist between each part of 
the substance, and the substance as a whole. The first type 
of relation we may call a pa/it!pci/it relation; and the latter 
type a pa/itlwho ie. relation. Now these two facts preclude the 
possibility that the unity of the substance can be a simple 
or non-relational unity. But, as I shall now argue, unless 
the unity among the parts is a non-relational unity, we are 
faced with a vicious regress of relations similar to that 
discussed in the previous chapter.
Let us consider, firstly, the relation between the individ 
ual parts of a substance, and the substance as a whole, i.e. 
the part/whole relation. This relation might be analysed in 
either of two distinct manners. Each part of the substance _ 
might be understood to have a separate relation to the whole 
in which case the part/whole relation is a two-term or dyadic 
relation. Or, each part of the substance might be understood 
to be a single term of an n + 1 -term relation (where n repre­
sents the number of parts which the substance has), which 
relates each part of the substance to the substance as a 
whole. On either interpretation a vicious regress arises. If 
the relation is understood to be a dyadic relation, then we 
must also assume that the three distinct entities, viz. the 
substance as a whole, the individual part of the substance, 
and the relation between them, can only be united to form a 
complex whole by introducing a further relation as the ground 
for their being united - and so on, indefinitely. This regres 
of relations is vicious for the same reason that the attempt
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to explain the unity of a substance in terms of distinct 
qualities and relations led to a vicious regress; namely, that 
we cannot arrive at a genuine unity anong the original terms 
of the relation until we reach the final term of an infinite 
series - i.e. never. A part of a substance, and the substance 
as a whole, cannot, then, form a genuine unity.
The same argument will apply, m u t a n d i s , if the
part/whole relation is understood to be an n + 1-term re­
lation .
175» If we turn from the consideration of the relation 
between the parts of a substance, and the substance as a 
whole, to a consideration of the relations between the indiv­
idual parts r we will be faced with the same kind of problem.
Between any two parts, A and B, of a substance there will 
be a relation r, which professes to unite A and B. However, 
since A, B, and r are, themselves, distinct entities, they can 
only be united if we stipulate a ground for their being unit­
ed; and this can only be another relation r*. But r 1 is itself 
a distinct and independent entity, and it can only be united 
with A, B, and r if we stipulate a further ground distinct 
from the four terms A, B, r and r* for their being united.
This will be yet another relation r" which, in turn, requires
a further, distinct relation to serve as the ground for its _
being united with our previous four terms. In this way an 
infinite regress of relations is generated. Furthermore, this 
regress is vicious, since the parts A and B can only be united 
when we reach the final term of the infinite series of re­
lations. Which is to say, they cannot be united. If a sub­
stance is to have parts, then these parts cannot be related 
so as to form a genuine unity.
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176. The assumption that substances have parts thus leads 
us to two conclusions. The first is that there cannot be any 
genuine unity between the individual parts of the substance, 
and the substance as a whole. The second is that there cannot 
be any genuine unity between the individual parts of the sub­
stance. I believe that it would, however, be generally admitt­
ed that part of what is meant by a who te is that its parts 
should form genuine unities both with each other, and with 
the whole. But as we have seen in the previous two sections, 
the parts of a substance cannot form a genuine unity. The 
parts of a substance cannot, therefore, form a whole. And this 
surely is a /ie.ductio at at/>a/idum of the assumption that sub­
stances have parts.
177. We have seen that substances must be simple, or with­
out parts. We have also claimed that the relations between 
substances are not attributes, i.e. they do not inhere in, the 
substances which they relate; although the relations between 
substances at once intrinsically determine, and are intrinsic­
ally determined by, the natures of the substances which they 
relate. These two conclusions lead us to the further conclus­
ion that a g/ioup of substances is not itself a substance, or
a genuine substantive.
By a g/iou.p of substances I mean a collection of substances,
8which collection is determined by denotation. A group of 
substances differs from a class of substances in that the 
latter is determined by a class-concept. The pen on my table, 
the coffee-cup on the floor, and the chair in the corner of 
the room form a group of substances. The collection of white 
tea-cups, on the other hand, is a class of substances, and is--- 
determined by the class-concept white, te.a-c.iip. It is possible,
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however, for the members of a group to form a class. The 
various substances in my room form a group; but they might 
also be said to form a class, determined by the class-concept 
"substances in my room". The members of a group do not always, 
however, form a class, as is evident from the example of the 
pen, the coffee-cup, and the chair.
Now, according to the view of substance at which we have
now arrived, it is impossible for a substance to have parts.
It is therefore impossible for one substance to be a part of
another substance. But if a group of substances is, itself,
to be thought of as a substance, then the members of the group
would need to be parts of the group; and this, we have seen,
is impossible. Accordingly, if it is impossible for a group of
substances to be a substance, then it is impossible for the
Universe, which is a group of substances, to be a substance.
In this respect, our view of substance differs from the views
qof McTaggart and Armstrong , for example, who both claim that 
the Universe, as a group of substances, is itself a substance.
178. In Section 162 I briefly mentioned Bradley’s query as 
to the identity of Sir John Cutler’s silk stockings. I said 
that this is in fact a problem about the differentiation of 
substances, and postponed discussion until this chapter. At 
this stage we can offer a reply to Bradley’s query. The prob­
lem of the identity of the stockings through a process of 
gradual material replacement arises, I suggest, only upon the 
assumption that the stockings - which are divisible into a 
number of replaceable constituents, and hence are groups of 
substances - are genuine substances. But this assumption has 
now been shown to be false. The stockings, in so far as they 
are divisible into ’parts’, are, in fact, groups of substances.
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Any identity they have is therefore determined by their con­
stituent members; if the members change, then the stockings 
are no longer the same stockings,
179. The view that the Universe or, more generally, any 
group of substances, is not a substance might be thought to 
create a serious difficulty. Ordinary language would seem to 
suggest that, although groups of substances may not be actual 
substances, they are most certainly ¿ubAtantiueA, How is this 
fact to be reconciled with our conclusions? Although we have 
given an explanation of the way in which various qualities 
can be ascribed to a substance, we have not, thereby, given 
an account of the way in which qualities can be ascribed to 
groups of substances. The Universe, for example, is a substan­
tive which, according to our view, is not a substance. How 
are we to understand the relation between the Universe and its 
various qualities?
There are, I believe, two ways in which this problem might 
be approached. The first is the most drastic, although it is 
nonetheless defensible and consistent. It is to simply point 
out that it is impossible for any group of substances, includ­
ing the Universe, to be the bearers of qualities. To be the 
bearer of a quality, i.e. to be a genuine substantive, an 
entity must be genuinely one. entity. But a group of substances 
is not genuinely one entity; and any judgement which ascribes 
a quality to a group of qualities, qua group, is demonstrably
false.
Although perhaps somewhat paradoxical, this is, I believe, 
a defensible position to take. Whatever conflict there may be 
between this view, and that reflected in ordinary language, 
might simply be put down to an element of metaphysical naivety
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on the part of the latter. The view that groups of substances 
cannot be genuine substantives can be shown to be true, more­
over, by an argument similar to that which we used to show 
that groups of substances are not substances. If a group of 
substances is to be ascribed a quality, then the quality is 
not to be ascribed to the members of the group taken sever­
ally. It must be ascribed to the group taken as a whole. But 
the contention that a group as a whole has a quality can only 
be true if a group of substances can form a genuine unity. And 
we have seen that this is impossible. A group of substances 
cannot, therefore, be a genuine substantive.
180. I have argued that judgements which profess to ascribe 
qualities to groups are, strictly speaking, false. But this 
does not necessarily imply that they are meaningless. Although 
ostensibly judgements about a group as a whole, in many cases 
these judgements can be understood to be, in fact, judgements 
ascribing qualities to individual members of the group; and 
this provides us with the second approach to the problem of 
groups which are, or appear to be, genuine substantives. If 
it is said, for example, that the Universe as a whole is evil; 
or, that it is more evil than good, we might understand these 
judgements to mean that the total amount of evil which char­
acterises the individual substances which make up the Universe 
is greater than the total amount of goodness which character­
ises them.’ Or, again, that with respect to the individual 
substances which make up the Universe, there is a greater 
number which are characterised by a preponderance of evil than 
are characterised by a preponderance of goodness.
In this manner we may distinguish between the qualities 0/ 
a group, and the qualities with, iri a group. Judgements about
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the qualities of a group are, as I have argued, invalid. But 
in many cases, such judgements may be interpreted to be about 
qualities within a group. The Universe, for example, being a 
group of substances, is not a genuine substantive. It cannot, 
therefore, strictly be said to be either good or evil. But 
this is not true of the individual members of the Universe, 
which are genuine unities, and therefore capable of being 
ascribed value-qualities. For this reason, although judgements 
about the value 0/ the Universe are, strictly speaking, false; 
judgements about value u)itkin the Universe (i.e. about the 
value-qualities of the individual substances which make up 
the Universe) may be both significant and true.10
181. Apart from judgements which profess to ascribe value- 
qualities to groups of substances, one-of the most obvious 
classes of judgements which are commonly thought of as in­
volving the ascription of qualities to groups is the class of 
what may be termed e.nume./iatiD£. judgements - judgements which 
are concerned with the number of members which comprise a 
group. The judgement "The group comprising the pen on the 
table, "the coffee-cup on the floor, and the chair in the cor-’" 
ner of the room, has three members", is an example of an 
enumerative judgement.
A problem arises, however, when we attempt to give a corr­
ect analysis of such enumerative judgements. The above example 
might, for * instance, be understood to mean that the group, as 
a whole, has the quality of having three members. Enumerative
judgements have, in fact, been understood by some logicians to
11be essentially predicative. But we have seen that it is im­
possible for a group, qua group, to be the bearer of qualities 
If enumerative judgements are essentially predicative, then
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they must, when applied to groups, be false. It would be un­
reasonable, however, to deny that enumerative judgements 
correspond, in some sense, to a genuine fact about the world. 
How is it possible to preserve the significance of such judge­
ments whilst insisting that, when understood as involving the 
ascription of a quality to a group, they are false? '
There are, I believe, a number of possible answers to this 
question. But perhaps the most plausible is to suggest that 
enumerative judgements are not strictly predicative; that they 
do not satisfy the traditionally accepted subject-predicate 
form of judgements. It might be suggested, for example, that 
such judgements are essentially relational, rather than pred­
icative; that is to say, that they involve an assertion that 
certain entities are related in a particular fashion. The 
prejudice against such relational judgements has, I think, 
been successfully removed by Russell; and there seems to be no 
obvious reason for rejecting the possibility that enumerative 
judgements are to be included among the class of such judge­
ments .
182. But it is one thing to deny that enumerative judge­
ments are predicative. It is another thing to suggest a satis­
factory alternative analysis. There have been, of course, 
attempts to provide such an analysis. One of these is to 
interpret enumerative judgements in terms of statements about 
class-membership relations. A second is to interpret them as 
asserting a relation between the members of a group, and an 
abstract entity - a number. But there is one which, to my 
knowledge, has not been considered; although it is at once 
relatively straightforward, and faithful to the fact which it' ' 
professes to explain. If the truth of the judgement that a
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particular group has three members is to be determined by ••• 
whether or not it corresponds to some fact, then the fact in 
question cannot, as I have explained, be the fact that the 
group, as a whole, has the quality of having three members.
It may, however, be understood to correspond to a different 
fact; namely, the fact that the group-membership relation 
which exists between the members of this group is triadic or 
three-termed. In this way, what is, according to one analysis, 
a false judgement involving the ascription of a quality or 
predicate to a group as a whole, may in fact be understood to 
be a true judgement concerning the nature of the relation 
between the members of the group. This particular analysis 
may be generalised to cover any instance of an enumerative 
judgement; so that, for any judgement of the form "The group 
G has n members", we may understand this to mean that the 
group-membership relation which exists between the members of 
the group G, has n terms.
It is true that the judgement, "The group G has n members", 
and the judgement, "The group-membership relation which exists 
between the members of the group G has n terms" convey slight­
ly different meanings. But this does not preclude the possi­
bility that they both correspond to the same fact. The diff­
erence in meaning might simply be put down to the fact that 
each judgement expresses the same fact from a different point 
q£* view; in much the same way that two different perceptions 
can be said to perceive the same substance from different 
per spectiv e s.
Our analysis of enumerative judgements does involve the 
assumption that the group-membership relation is not determin­
ate with respect to the number of terms which it may relate.
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But this assumption is not gratuitous. There are many relat­
ions which have this characteristic. The relation of parent­
hood, for example, does not have an a p/iio/ii limit upon the 
number of terms which it may relate; although, as is the case 
with the group-membership relation, the number of terms which 
it relates will be determinate in any particular instance.
183. We have seen examples of the way in which judgements 
that profess to ascribe qualities to groups of substances can 
be interpreted as either judgements involving the ascription 
of a quality, or a set of qualities, to the individual sub­
stances which comprise the group; or, as judgements concerning 
the nature of the group-membership relation which exists be­
tween the members of a particular group. But it may not always 
be possible to give a satisfactory alternative analysis of 
judgements which profess to ascribe qualities to groups of 
substances; and where this is not possible, we ought to con­
sider the judgements in question to be false.
184. Two important points have, I believe, begun to emerge 
from our discussion. The first concerns the nature of re­
lations. When we considered the attempt to explain the unity 
of a substance interms of distinct qualities and relations,
we found that we were faced with a vicious infinite regress of 
relations. An analogous regress prevented us from accepting 
the possibility that substances have parts. And this, in turn, 
led us to the conclusion that a group of substances is neither 
a substance, nor a genuine substantive.
It seems clear, then, that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with any attempt to unite distinct entities by means of 
relations. This contention is, of course, probably the central 
thesis of Bradley1s work. But whereas Bradley was led to
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conclude that relations as such, and, consequently, any form 
of relational experience, cannot be ultimately real; the con­
clusion that ought to have been drawn is not that relations 
are unreal, but that they do not unite the terms which they 
relate. That is to say, relations /le-tate., but do not unite, 
their terms. There are, as such, no genuine relational or 
5̂yn.tke.tlc unities. Once stated, this conclusion does, I think,
present itself as a truism. But it is a truism which is often
1 2neglected by philosophers . An adequate discussion of this 
point would, however, take us beyond the immediate concerns 
of this chapter, and I shall postpone it until the next.
185* The second point concerns the emphasis that I have 
placed upon.viewing a substance as an individual, non-relat­
ional unity. In this respect, our view-of substance is sim­
ilar to Bradley*s views on the nature of the Absolute. It is 
also in agreement with, without presupposing, Leibniz* prin­
ciple that what is not truly one entity, is not truly one 
entity. ̂  But it differs from the tradition which considers 
pa/itlcuta/ilty to be the essential and even definitive charac­
teristic of substances. Our emphasis upon the unity, rather 
than the particularity of substances has, however, a number 
of advantages.
In the first place, the notion of particularity is not 
without ambiguity. Particularity is sometimes equated with 
kaecceity or i.tti.̂>nê >̂>\ at other times with ■LncL̂LD ■LcLu.cL̂.-Li.y, with 
u.niq.u.eneAA, or with spatio-temporal position. The failure, in 
some discussions, either to recognize, or to distinguish be­
tween these distinct senses of the term often generates ser­
ious confusions.
But secondly, and perhaps more significantly, it is, as I
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shall now argue, not clear that particularity in any of the 
above senses can be considered to be either an essential, or 
a definitive characteristic of substances.
186. Let us begin with haecceity. It seems clear that the 
notion of haecceity or 'thisness' - like the notion of 'new­
ness1 - only has meaning within the context of a cognitive 
situation. That is to say, a substance has haecceity only in
so far as it is either a cognitive act, or the object of a 
1 Lcognitive act . Now, unless we assume that all substances 
are either cognitive acts, or the objects of cognitive acts, 
haecceity is not an essential, or even a common feature, of 
substances. And it is obvious that any judgement which asserts 
that all substances are either cognitive acts, or the objects 
of cognitive acts, must be synthetic, it is not generally 
considered to be a part of the meaning of the term "substance" 
that its extension be limited to those entities which are 
constituents of cognitive situations. Particularity, then, in 
the sense of haecceity, is at best a contingent feature of 
substances.
But haecceity cannot be considered to be a definitive char­
acteristic of substances either. Even if we assume that all 
substances are either cognitive acts, or the objects of cog­
nitive acts, it does not follow that oniy substances have 
these characteristics. It has been suggested, for example, 
that there is a species of awareness which has for its objects 
qualities and relations pe,/i ¿e., rather than substances, or 
the qualties and relations of substances - in which case it  ̂
would appear that qualities and relations may also satisfy 
the criterion for haecceity.
187. In reply to the above argument, it might be suggested
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that I have failed to give an adequate explication of the 
notion of haecceity; and that, as well as the aspect of 
'thisness1, there is also a sense in which haecceity is under­
stood to confer uniqueness upon a substance.
This criticism would, however, be unjustified. As I sugg-  ̂
ested in §85, the various senses of the term "particular" - are 
often confused or conflated. Such is the case, I believe, 
with the wider meaning of haecceity - ’thisness' is either 
confused, or conflated with uniqueness.
By un-ique.ne./) />, I mean the quality of non-repeatability.
When applied to substances, it means that a substance has a ,
nature which is not shared, or cannot be shared, by any other 
substance. A substance which is unique might be said to be 
either essentially unique or contingently unique. It is ess­
entially unique if it has a nature which cannot, in principle, 
be repeated. It is contingently unique if, as a matter of 
fact, its nature is not repeated or shared by another. ̂
Now we can, I believe, show that haecceity neither implies, 
nor is equivalent to, uniqueness. Consider, for example, the 
case of what I have termed ’confused’ perceptions. The char­
acteristic feature of a confused perception is that two or 
more substances are perceived as one substance. In such cases, 
the description, "This (that I perceive)’’, satisfies more than 
one substance. Let us assume, further, that the principle of 
the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is false, and that it is 
possible that there are two substances which share the same 
nature. In the case of a confused perception, it would thus be 
possible for two substances with identical natures to be per­
ceived as one substance. But if we assume that haecceity is
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either equivalent to, or implies, uniqueness, then we may 
conclude that the judgement, "This (that I perceive) is ..
unique", is necessarily true. But if the description, "This 
(that I perceive)" is satisfied by two substances which are,
ky poth.e.s>*L, qualitatively identical, then the judgemement, # 
"This (that I perceive) is unique", will be false. Haecceity, 
accordingly, neither implies, nor is equivalent to, unique­
ness.
Although our argument, in the above form, is based upon 
the assumption that the principle of the Dissimilarity of the 
Diverse is false, our position would, in fact, be strength­
ened should the principle be true; since, in that case, the
r *' Juniqueness of any two substances would be implied by their 
numerical diversity, and not by »the fact that they are the 
objects of cognitive acts; i.e. by their 'haecceity'.
188. I have argued that haecceity is neither an essential, 
nor a definitive characteristic of substances. I have also 
claimed that haecceity does not imply uniqueness. We can now 
consider the question of the uniqueness of substances in more 
detail.
There is firstly the question of whether or not uniqueness 
is a definitive feature of substances. The traditional dis­
tinction between universals and particulars was originally 
understood to be a distinction between what is essentially 
repeatable, and what is essentially unique. But it has often 
been conflated with the distinction between substances and 
their characteristics; with the result that substances have 
been assumed to be essentially unique, whilst qualities and 
relations have been considered to be essentially repeatable.
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It is, I think, in this sense, that substances have often 
been referred to as 'particulars' . But it is fairly obvious 
that the distinction between universals and particulars is 
not equivalent to the distinction between substances and qual­
ities. There are many qualities, for example, which are 
essentially unique - such as the quality of being the most 
virtuous man in Australia. Uniqueness is not, therefore, a 
definitive feature of substances. _
But is it an essential feature? That is to say, is it poss­
ible for two substances to share the same nature?
We should firstly note that, according to our definition, 
a substance is not independent of its nature - it is simply 
the unity of those qualities which make up its nature. We can 
therefore reject the possibility that there may be two identi­
cal substances which have different natures. It should also 
be noted that there is no real basis for an ontological dis­
tinction between what have been termed 'original' qualities, 
and merely relational qualities. The nature of a substance 
comprises all those qualities which may truly be ascribed to 
it, including relational qualities. And, according to the 
principle of Extrinsic Determination, it is impossible that a 
substance should either fail to have any of those qualities 
it does have i or have qualities other than those which 
it has. The fact that a substance has certain relational 
qualities cannot, as such, be considered to be a contingent 
feature of that substance. We can thus reject the possibility 
that there might be two identical substances which have diff 
erent relational qualities.
Thirdly, we can reject the possibility that there might be
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two identical substances which are numerically different, or 
diverse. The fact that two substances, A and B are numerically 
different implies that they are dissimilar - since A will 
have the quality of being numerically different from B, and 
B will have the quality of being numerically different from . 
A. And neither quality can be shared by both substances.^
On the basis of these considerations we can, I think, con­
clude that it is impossible for two substances to share one 
and the same nature. And this, of course, is what is meant by 
the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. We can 
therefore consider this principle to be established. But even 
if the principle could be shown to be false, our view of 
substance would not be seriously affected - since we have not 
equated substantiality with uniqueness.
189. It has been argued that all substances are unique.
And, in so far as this conclusion does not follow directly 
from our definition of substances, it is a synthetic truth.
But it is also an a p/ido/id truth, since we have not based our 
argument for this conclusion upon any empirical premisses.
On the other hand, the conclusion that all substances are 
dnddudduat can be seen to follow from our definition of sub­
stances. By 'individual' , I mean indivisible, or without 
parts — what we have elsewhere described as simple . Earlier, 
I argued that the assumption that substances have parts leads 
to a vicious regress of relations j and that the assumption 
s h o u l d , 'accordingly, be rejected. This conclusion supported 
our then tentative definition of a substance as a non-relat­
ional unity. But our view of substance is also supported by 
the fact that the terms "individual" and "substance" or
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"thing" are often used interchangeably in ordinary language. 
The fact that the individuality of a substance can be seen to 
follow from our definition; and the fact that the above terms 
are used interchangeably in ordinary language, show that our 
definition is not a r b i t r a r y ^ . ,
Although the quality of individuality can be considered to 
be an essential feature of substances, it is not - as with 
uniqueness - a definitive feature; since there are also many 
qualities which are simple, and therefore individual.
Having drawn a distinction between haecceity, uniqueness, 
and individuality; and having subsequently shown that none of 
these qualities can be considered to be at once a definitive 
and an essential feature of substances, we can now consider 
the relation between substance and spatio-temporal position.
190. We may begin our discussion by distinguishing between 
that theory which equates substance with spatio-temporal pos­
ition; and that which considers spat To-temporal position to
be an essential feature of substances. We should also disting­
uish these two theories from the theory that equates particu­
larity, as distinct from substance or substantiality, with 
spatio-temporal position. I will consider each of these theor­
ies in turn, although it is clear that any criticism of the 
second view will be more or less relevant to the first view.
191. There are several reasons for doubting the soundness 
of the first theory. The first is that, by equating substance 
with spatio-temporal position, the proposition that there can 
be no substances which lack either a spatio-temporal dimension 
or spatio-temporal qualities, becomes analytically true. And 
yet even if this theory is true, it is surely not true simply
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by definition. Furthermore, such a restriction upon the
extension of the term "substance" is quite arbitrary; as is
18shown by the fact that some philosophers, such as Leibniz, 
have argued that no substances can have spatial dimensions; 
and others, such as McTaggart, have argued that no substances, 
can have either spatial or temporal qualities. •
Secondly, by equating substance with spatio-temporal pos­
ition, it is not clear whether it is meant that every spatio­
temporal position is a distinct substance; or, whether it is 
meant that a substance may occupy more than one such position 
or point-instant. If it is meant that every point-instant is 
a distinct substance, then we would seem to be committed to 
the conclusion that no single substance can have a spatial or 
a temporal dimension - since to have a spatio-temporal, or a 
spatial or a temporal dimension, it is necessary that a sub­
stance should occupy more than one point-instant, or point or 
instant. This conclusion is not, in i'tself, absurd or trouble­
some. But it does present a problem for those who, like Alex­
ander, wish to equate spatio-temporal position with substance; 
whilst insisting that all substances have spatio-temporal 
dimensions. If, on the other hand, it is meant that all sub­
stances have spatio-temporal dimensions, then we would be 
committed to the view that substances may have parts - each 
point — inst*ant being a part of a substance. But as we have 
seen, the assumption that substances have parts is unaccept­
able. .
Thirdly, it has been capably argued that point-instants in 
particular, and spatio-temporal positions in general, are 
either absractions or logical constructions, derived from
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something more fundamental; namely, events or processes. In
which case the notion of a substance is not a genuine or
• • . • - 19primitive category .
192. Apart from the somewhat questionable appeal to phys­
ics, or "total science" as the final arbiter in questions of 
ontology, the main reason for believing that spatio-temporal 
position is an essential feature of substances seems to be 
the belief that spatio-temporal position is essential for 
the individuation or differentiation of substances. But this 
view is unsatisfactory.
In the first place, it seems obvious that, in so far as 
spatio-temporal position does act as a basis for individu­
ation, i.e.J as a condition which determines uniqueness, it 
does so in virtue of the fact that it determines within each 
substance, a set of relational qualities which are unique or 
non-repeatable ; so that substances are differentiated not so 
much by the fact that they have a spatio-temporal position, 
as by the fact that they have qualities which are not shared 
by any other substance.
Secondly, spatio-temporal position can only act as a basis 
for individuation if there is only one system of spatio­
temporal co-ordinates. But it would seem to be possible, as
20Bradley and Broad have suggested , that there should be more 
than one such system; in which case spatio-temporal position 
alone — without specifying in which system it is located — 
cannot ensure uniqueness. Furthermore, diverse spatio-temporal 
systems can only be differentiated by some criterion other 
than spatio-temporal position; i.e. by some unique
quality.
200)
Thirdly, it is possible to individuate a number of kinds 
of substances which have no ostensibly spatial qualities or 
spatial positions, and which do not differ in their temporal 
positions. There are, for example, mental acts and states, 
and certain auditory and olfactory sensa which have no osten- 
sive spatial qualities, positions, or dimensions; and, in-so 
far as they are simultaneous, which do not differ in their 
respective temporal positions. And yet, they are still cap— 
able of being individuated. Thus, spatio-temporal position 
is not essential for the individuation or differentiation of 
substances.
193. But possibly the most important reason for rejecting 
the view that spatio-temporal position is an essential or a 
definitive feature of substances is that it leads to the 
unacceptable conclusion that substances have parts. That it 
does lead to this conclusion can be shown by the following 
argument. *■
If a substance occupies more than one point-instant, then 
it must have both a spatial and a temporal, or a spatio­
temporal dimension. I consider this conclusion to be evident­
ly true. And if a substance has either a spatial or a temp­
oral, or a spatio-temporal dimension, then it is divisible 
throughout these dimensions. But if a substance is divisible 
through any of its dimensions, it must have parts in that 
dimension. So, if a substance occupies more than one point­
instant, it must have parts.
The only way of avoiding this conclusion, it seems to me, 
is to insist that although all substances have spatio-tempor­
al positions, no substance can occupy more than one point-
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instant. But this reply is unsatisfactory for the reason that 
a single point-instant is not an indivisible unit of space­
time. It is, rather, an ideal limit of divisibility. A sub­
stance which occupied only a single point-instant would not 
occupy a spatio-temporal position as such; since a point­
instant is a minimal limit upon spatio-temporal occupancy.
194. The conclusion that any substance which has a spatio­
temporal position must have parts is important for another 
reason. It is a basic- precept of classical or 'Cartesian' 
materialism that there are material substances whose definit­
ive feature is that they have a spatial, and perhaps a spatio­
temporal, position. Now, we have seen that it is impossible 
for a substance to have a spatio-temporal position without 
this determining that the substance has a spatio-temporal, or 
simply a spatial, dimension. But if a substance has either a 
spatial, or a spatio-temporal dimension, then it is divisible, 
and therefore has parts, throughout that dimension. And the 
conclusion that substances have parts, we have seen, leads
to a vicious infinite regress of relations. We must conclude, 
then, that no substances can have a spatio-temporal, or a 
merely spatial, position. That is to say, classical material­
ism is false.
In this respect, our views on the nature of substances are
similar to the conclusions of Leibniz and McTaggart. But the
arguments which we have used to support these views are quite
different from those used by either philosopher; and, in the
. . 21case of McTaggart, are based upon very different premisses.
1 9 5 . Having argued that we cannot identify substance with 
spatio-temporal position; and, that we cannot consider spatio-
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temporal position to be an essential feature of substances, 
we will now briefly consider the view which equates particu­
larity - in any of the three senses which I have mentioned - 
with spatio-temporal position.
We will begin with that view which equates haecceity with 
spatio-temporal position. In §186 I suggested that a sub- ■ 
stance has haecceity or 1thisness1 only in so far as it is 
either a cognitive act, or the object of a cognitive act.
Now, unless we assume-that all cognitive acts, or objects of 
cognitive acts, have spatio-temporal positions, it is clear 
that we cannot equate haecceity with spatio-temporal position. 
And there are, I believe, conclusive reasons for rejecting 
this assumption.
In the first place, there are very good reasons for accept­
ing the Cartesian view that all mental substances, including 
cognitive acts, are essentially non-spatial. In which case, 
it would seem to follow, no cognitive acts can have a spatio­
temporal position. But cognitive acts can certainly be truly 
described as 'this' or 'that' cognitive act; and therefore as^ 
having haecceity. It is also possible, when introspecting, to 
be aware of cognitive acts, as well as certain olfactory and 
auditory sensa, as objects; so that there may be objects of 
cognitive acts which have haecceity, but which cannot unprob­
lematically be ascribed any spatio-temporal position. The 
only obvious reason to doubt that mental substances have no 
spatio-temporal position would be if, ns has been claimed by 
some materialists, mental substances are, in fact, parts of 
the brain; in which case, since all parts of the brain are 
spatio-temporally located (presumably), all mental substances
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must have a spatio-temporal position.
On the other hand, we have, I believe, established that 
there can be no material substances; so that mental substan­
ces, if they exist, cannot be identified with parts of the 
brain. There is, then, no sound reason to doubt our initial 
contention that mental substances lack a spatio-temporal . 
position. In which case our example does show that spatio­
temporal position cannot be equated with haecceity.
196. It might be objected that even though we may have 
shown that haecceity cannot be equated with spatio-temporal, 
or simply spatial, position, the fact that some mental sub­
stances can be described as being simultaneous with one an­
other, or as being either past, present, or future, implies 
that they can nevertheless be assigned a temporal position; 
and that this temporal position alone might be equated with 
haecceity.
In one respect, this objection is significant. If two 
substances can be truly described as being simultaneous with 
each other, or as being either past, present, or future, then 
it would seem to follow that they do have a temporal position. 
But it does not show that temporal position can be equated 
with haecceity. Now, a substance might be said to have a temp­
oral position in either of two ways: as a term in an A-series; 
or, as a term in a B-series . These two types of series diff­
er in that the terms of an A-series are ordered by their in-..
trinsic. .temporal qualities of being either past, present, or 
future; whereas the terms of a B-series are ordered by the 
relations, or corresponding relational qualities, of being
than, ^^LmuJiiane.ou^ or taLesi than. The fact that
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a substance is a terra in either series cannot, however, be 
equated with its assumed haecceity. Consider, firstly, the 
terras of a B-series. The birth of Christ, and the birth of 
Muhammad, can both be said to have positions in a single B- 
series - since the former is earlier than the latter. But r 
there is nothing, in this fact alone, which determines that 
either should be described as tkl/> or ttiat event.
Similarly, the fact that an event can be ascribed a pos­
ition in an A-series,' i.e. as either past, present, or fut­
ure, does not, in itself, determine that the event should be 
described as ’this' event. At best, it might be claimed that 
presentness is a necessary condition for 1thisness1 or haecc­
eity. But even this contention is questionable; since, as I 
suggested in Chapter 1, there does not seem to be any sound 
reason to doubt that past, and even future, events may be
directly cognised - thereby satisfying the conditions for
23haecceity. Furthermore, it has been cogently argued , that 
no existent substances can have the characteristics normally 
ascribed to terms in an A-series; in which case presentness 
could not be considered to be even a necesary condition for 
haecceity.
197. We cannot, then, equate spatio-temporal position and 
haecceity. But neither, I suggest, can it be equated with 
uniqueness. A substance is unique, according to our definition 
in §187, if it has a nature which is non-repeatable or not 
shared by any other substance. A distinction was then drawn 
between that which is contingently unique, and that which is 
essentially unique. As a consequence of our acceptance of the 
principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, it was
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concluded that all substances are essentially unique.
Now it is clear from our definition of uniqueness that 
spatio-temporal position does not me.an, and hence is not ... 
equivalent to or identical with, uniqueness. It might be 
claimed, however, that although spatio-temporal position does 
not mean uniqueness, it nevertheless intrinsically determines 
qualities which are essentially unique or non-repeatable in 
any substance which has a spatio-temporal position; thereby 
determining that the substance itself is essentially unique. 
But this claim is not, in itself, of great significance. Even 
if it is true, it only amounts to the contention that spatio­
temporal position is one way of determining uniqueness in a 
substance. It does not, and cannot, make the claim that it is 
the only way in which the uniqueness of a substance may be 
determined. And there are very good reasons for believing 
that it is false.
198. Firstly, as I suggested earlier, it is possible that 
there is more than one spatio-temporal system; and that these 
distinct systems are not spatio-temporally related. In which 
case, the fact that a substance has a spatio-temporal pos­
ition will not determine that the substance is unique. For 
this to be the case, we would need to be certain that the 
spatio-temporal system in which it is located is, itself, 
unique. But spatio-temporal systems can only be differenti­
ated by means of some criterion other than their respective 
spatio-temporal positions. So, ultimately, the uniqueness of 
a substance which has a spatio-temporal position is not de­
termined by the mere fact that it has a spatio-temporal pos­
ition; but by the fact that it has a spatio-temporal position
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in a system which is unique. And the uniqueness of a spatio­
temporal system cannot be determined, without involving us in 
a vicious circle, by -LLa spatio-temporal position.
We can also rule out the possibility that the uniqueness
of a spatio-temporal position is determined by the fact that ,
it is within spatio-temporal system; since haecceity■or
2 Athisness does not, as we have seen , determine uniqueness.
' 199. Secondly, as I have argued, it is impossible for any 
substance to have a spatio-temporal position without this 
determining that the substance has either a spatial or a 
spatio-temporal dimension; and this, in turn, leads to the 
unacceptable conclusion that substances have parts. So, if 
the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is true, 
and all substances are essentially unique, then their unique­
ness cannot be determined by their spatio-temporal position.
200. We have seen that spatio-temporal position is neither
equivalent to, nor determines, haecceity. And we have just 
argued that it is neither equivalent to, nor determines, the 
uniqueness of a substance. But we must also conclude that 
spatio-temporal position is neither equivalent to, nor deter­
mines, individuality. For, if a substance is to have a spatio­
temporal position, it must, thereby, occupy more than a sin­
gle point-instant . But if it occupies more than one point­
instant, then it must have a spatio-temporal dimension; and 
this implies that it has parts in that dimension. But a sub­
stance which, pe./i ¿mpo , has parts, cannot be individual
or simple. Spatio-temporal position is therefore incompatible 
with individuality.
201. We have thus established that spatio-temporal position
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is neither equivalent to, nor determines, either haecceity, 
uniqueness, or individuality. And since these are the only 
senses in which we have used the term "particular", spatio­
temporal position is neither equivalent to, nor does it de­
termine, particularity.
202. In conclusion, there are a some points which I would
like to discuss as a sort of prelude to the next two chapters
In Chapter 1 I drew attention to the need to distinguish be­
tween a quality-type and a qua1ity-token; that is, between a 
quality as such, and an instance of that quality. But we have 
not, as yet, made it clear in what this distinction consists.
I also suggested, in that chapter, that a quality can only
exist as the quality of a substance. But at that stage I did 
not offer any proof of this suggestion. Thirdly, we have not 
offered any proof that there are substances, as distinct from 
quality-instances; and yet such a proof would appear to be 
desirable if our theory of substance ‘is to be convincing.
These three apparently disparate points can, I believe, be 
shown to be intimately related; and an answer to the first 
will, I think, provide us with the basis for an answer to the 
remaining two.
203. The distinction between a quality as such, and an 
instance of that quality consists, I suggest, in a distinct­
ion between a quality, and an existent quality. However, 
since existence is itself a quality, and since we cannot 
simply equate two distinct qualities, we must understand a 
quality-instance to be a un^ty of the quality of existence, 
and the quality in question. We have seen, however, that the 
only unity which can exist between distinct qualities is a
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non relational unity. But a non-relational unity between two
or more qualities is what we mean by a substance; so that any
2 6quality-instance is a substance . We now have a reasoned 
basis for the previously unargued assumption that a quality 
can only exist as the quality of a substance; and, as long as 
we are granted the modest assumption that there is at least 
one qua1ity-instance, we have a proof that there are sub­
stances .
By equating a qua1ity-instance with an existent quality, 
we are able to understand why it seems implausible, and even 
meaningless to ask whether the quality of existence has any 
instances - since this would amount to asking whether or not 
existence exists - even though it is reasonable and meaning­
ful to ask this question of any other quality.
204. At this stage, and in light of the above discussion, 
we should qualify our earlier definition of a substance. Al­
though it has been defined as a non-relational unity of var­
ious qualities, it is evident that it cannot be a unity of 
qualities which are not real qualities. An unreal quality is 
not some sort of modally different quality. It is not a qual­
ity at* all; in the same way that a non-existent substance is-~- 
not a kind of substance. A substance should, then, be defined 
as a non-relational u n i ty of various real qualities.
Now we-can, I think, give a definition of a real quality.
A real quality is a quality which has an instance. This def­
inition's, I believe, in accordance with ordinary language. 
The quality of phoenixhood, for example, would appropriately 
be termed an unreal quality, since it has no instances. A 
real quality, then, is a quality which has an instance. But
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to say that a quality has an instance is, as I have suggested, 
to say that it forms a non-relational unity with the quality 
of existence. So that a real quality is a quality that exists. 
A substance can accordingly be defined as a non-relational 
unity of various quality-instances; and this means that, in
Spinoza’s words, "Existence belongs to the nature of sub- •
, „ 27stance .
Existence is thus a quality of every substance. That is to 
say, it is one of the-qualities which form a non-relational 
unity of various qualities, i.e. a substance. And it is a 
quality which is to be found as a constituent of every such 
unity. Furthermore, and in accordance with the principle of 
Extrinsic Détermination, it is impossible for any substance 
which has existence as one of its qualities (and all substan­
ces, we have seen, have existence as a quality) not to have, 
and impossible for it not to have had, this quality. In this 
sense, no substance which exists can -.cease to exist. All 
substances can be said to be eternal.
205. There remains one question which will lead us to the 
next chapter. This question is whether there is more than one 
substance. That is, whether the Universe is a group of sub­
stances, or a single substance. We have so far assumed that 
the common—sense presumption in favour of pluralism is true. 
But Bradley has argued that pluralism is impossible. His arg­
uments are based, however, upon a consideration of the nature 
of qualities and relations. In the next chapter we will con­
sider Bradley's criticisms of these two categories.
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Chapter 6 - O.aatdtÀ.2.̂  and. Re.JLatdon/>
206. In the previous chapter we arrived at certain con­
clusions concerning the notion of a substance. A substance, 
it will be recalled, was defined as a non-relational unity of 
various qualities. This account of substance, I argued, is 
immune from the criticisms which Bradley raises against the 
more traditional versions of the substance/adjective dis­
tinction, and the corresponding theories of substance.
So far, the notions of quality and relation have remained 
unanalysed. In this chapter I will defend the view, which we 
have more or less implicitly accepted as true, that qualities 
and relations are both real and existent. In particular, I 
will consider and evaluate the arguments against the ultimate 
reality of qualities and relations used by Bradley in Chapter 
III of A R . I will also, where relevant, consider some of his 
later views on this subject, as found, in ETR and the unfinish­
ed essay on relations included in C E .
In the next chapter I will defend a particular view about 
the nature of qualities and relations. It has often been 
assumed to be self-evidently true, and at times the theory 
has been explicitly defended, that qualities and relations 
are universal entities. I will argue that, quite independent­
ly of some of Bradley's own arguments, there are conclusive 
reasons for believing that this theory is false; and that 
qualities and relations are, as a matter of fact as well as a 
matter of logical necessity, particular, rather than univers­
a 1.
207. Bradley's main objection to the ultimate reality of
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qualities and relations is clearly stated in the following 
passage:
Relation presupposes quality, and quality relation. Each 
can be something neither together with, nor apart from, 
the other; and the vicious circle in which they turn1is 
not the truth about reality. (AR p.21)
The rest of the chapter is simply a development and expans­
ion of this argument. The chapter is divided into three sect­
ions. The first section, by far the longest, is devoted to an 
attempt to show that "qualities are nothing without relations" 
(AR p.21). The second section attempts to show that qualities, 
taken together with relations, are "unintelligible" (A_R p.25).
The objection to the reality of qualities and relations, 
as found in Chapter III of AR_ is, then, that the distinction 
between qualities and relations, and. consequently the quality/ 
relation schema, involves a vicious circle. Later in this 
chapter I will consider some different arguments which Brad­
ley elsewhere puts forward against the reality of relations. 
For the moment, however, we will be concerned with evaluating
the argument mentioned above. ..
208. Before considering Bradley’s argument in detail, it 
will be helpful if we try to clarify some of the terms and 
expressions which Bradley uses. For example, what are we to 
understand by the verb presupposes , when it is claimed that 
qualities presuppose relations, and vice. ue.n.Aa'l
The expression "X presupposes Y" might be understood to 
that X logically entails, or implies Y. Or else, it maymean
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mean that the existence of X is dependent upon, or determined 
by, the existence of Y. Now, by "presupposes” , I think that 
Bradley meant to cover both of these interpretations. But 
they are not equivalent expressions; and I suspect that the 
ambiguity of the term "presuppose" is exploited somewhat by 
Bradley to the extent that he might fairly be charged with 
resting his criticism upon an equivocation.
The above distinction between the two different senses of 
"presuppose" is important in that the fact that X and Y are 
taken to be mutuatJLy ¿mpJLi.cati.ue. does not, unless the pre­
supposition relation is understood to be asymmetrical, in­
volve us in a vicious circle. But it is quite clear that the 
presupposition relation, when taken to be equivalent to the 
relation of implication, is not necessarily asymmetrical. For 
example, the quality f, of being a father, implies a relation 
of fathering, between any entity X which is f, and another 
term Y, which is his child. In the same way, the relation of 
fathering implies the quality f, in at least one of its terms 
In other words, the quality of being a father, and the relat­
ion of fathering, are mutually determining or mutually implic 
ative. In accordance with the first interpretation of the 
presupposing relation we can say, then, that the quality f of 
being a father, and the relation r, of fathering, p/ie^uppo^e 
one anotIrer. But it is clear that, in making this contention, 
we are not involving ourselves in a vicious circle.
On the other hand, if we understand presuppose to mean, 
''existentially dependent upon , where dependent upon is an
asymmetrical relation, then the claim that F presupposes r, .
Qfid r presupposes F would involve us in a vicious circle.
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Bradley's claim that qualities and relations presuppose 
one another is only an objection to their reality if the 
relation of presupposition involved is asymmetrical. We can 
now consider his arguments in detail to see whether they do, 
in fact, show that the relation in question is asymmetrical. .
209. In Section I of Chapter III of A_R, Bradley argues, 
that qualities are "nothing without relations". He begins by 
pointing out that psychological - by which he means "phenom- .
e v i
enological (see CE Chapter XXII) -Awhich suggests that pe./i- 
ce.due,d qualities are altered by changes in their relations , 
within a Qe./>ta£t> is not strictly relevant in deciding wheth­
er or not qualities, as such, may exist independently of 
relations. The most that such evidence could establish is that, 
pe./ice,dv&d qualities cannot exist, or retain their identity, 
independently of relations.'*' This disclaimer is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it provides us with an explanation of 
what Bradley means by his statement that qualities are "noth­
ing without relations". He means that there are no original 
or independent qualities; that there are no qualities which : 
are £o gdcaJULy psidon. to relations.
Secondly, the disclaimer serves to emphasise the fact that
2Bradley is not, as has been suggested by M.J. Cresswell , :
explicitly basing his argument upon the assumption that real­
ity is experience. Whether or not he does in fact ignore such 
evidence when formulating his arguments is another matter. 
When we consider his later arguments against the reality of 
relations - as found in the essay on relations in CjS, for ;
example - it will, I think, become quite plain that appeals 
to what is gdvan in experience form a significant part of his
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argument to show that relations are not ultimately real.
210. Having made this disclaimer, Bradley then restates 
his argument in the following way.
You can never, we may argue, find qualities without 
relations. Whenever you take them so, they are made so, 
and continue so, by an operation which itself implies 
relation. Their plurality gets for us all its meaning ■ 
through relations; and to suppose it otherwise in real­
ity is wholly indefensible. (A_R p.22)
At first glance, this would appear to be merely a factual 
claim about qualities and relations - that qualities never 
are, as a matter of fact, found independently of relations.
But Bradley is claiming more than this. He wishes to make the 
stronger claim that it is impossible for qualities to exist 
independently of relations. In support of this contention he 
provides two arguments. The first involves an appeal to what 
is merely given in experience.
.. if you go back to mere unbroken feeling, you have no 
relations and no qualities. But if you come to what is 
distinct you get relations at once. (A R p .2 2)
The second argument does not appeal directly to the nature 
of what is given in experience; rather, Bradley argues that 
any 'separateness' or plurality of qualities implies a (prior j 
act of separation. And this act of separating, he further 1
claims, essentially involves the introduction of relations. :
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I will consider each of these arguments in turn.
211. According to Bradley, if we consider the nature of 
given experience, we find that, rather than it being comprised 
of a series of discrete sensory qualities, sensa, or mental 
states, it is instead, a continuous, unbroken, or non-relat­
ional whole of feeling. Now, within this felt continuum, we 
find what he terms "discernible aspects". But these aspects, ; 
cannot, he contends, be considered as qualities proper. '
For if these felt aspects, while merely felt, are to be 
called qualities proper, they are so only for the ob- , 
servation of an outside observer. And then for him they 
are given gm aspects - that is, together with relations.
(AR p .22)
3Qualities proper, he elsewhere argues, arise only a a the 
terms of relations. But if this is the way in which we are to 
understand the notion of a quality proper, then Bradley's 
earlier claim that qualities presuppose relations (i.e. cannot 
exist without relations), becomes true by definition - if a 
quality is simply a 'term' of a relation, then it is plain 
that it cannot exist independently of that relation. Bradley's 
actual argument to show that qualities presuppose relations i 
would appear, then, to be superfluous. The genuinely import­
ant question is whether or not the diverse felt 'aspects' in 
given experience can rightly be considered to be qualities.
If so, then, in so far as feeling is, according to Bradley, a 
pre-relational , hence non-relational, unity, then it would 
seem that we have, in feeling, the presence of qualities which
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exist independently of relations.
Is there any genuine reason, then, to suppose that the 
diverse aspects within feeling should not be considered to be 
qualities proper? I do not believe that there is any such 
reason. Even within the context of Bradley's own theories, it 
would seem that these diverse aspects ought to be considered 
to be qualities proper. For, within any felt whole, we find 
diverse, hence distinct aspects. And these aspects - in so fa<*i 
as they are distinct - must be qualitatively different; since 
according to Bradley, there can be no merely numerical differ­
ence between entities. The difference between the diverse 
aspects must, accordingly, be a difference of content. But I - 
am unable to discern any intelligible difference between what;' 
Bradley means by 'content1, and what is normally meant by the 
term 'quality'. Nor do I see that Bradley has made the dis- , 
tinction between content and quality at all significant, ex- , 
cept by introducing the ad hoc principle that qualities proper 
do not exist except as terms of relations. :i
Our objection to Bradley's initial argument for the view , 
that qualities may not exist independently of relations is , 
that he can only genuinely deny that the diverse aspects of i 
the non-relational unity of a felt whole are qualities proper,, 
by assuming what needs to be proved - that such aspects cannol 
be qualities proper because they exist independently of 
relations; and that, unless he makes this assumption, then the 
appeal to what is given in experience would tend to refute, 
rather than confirm, his conclusion that qualities presuppose 
relations.
212. In reply to this objection, it might be pointed out
220)
that even if we assume that these diverse aspects are qual­
ities proper, this will still not be sufficient to establish 
the conclusion that qualities may exist independently of 
relations. It might be suggested, for example, that if the 
diverse aspects are qualities proper, and if we further admit 
that these qualities are not united by relations in a felt 
whole (i.e. if feeling is a non-relational unity of these :
qualities), it would still appear necessary to admit that '
there are relations between the qualities of the felt whole, 
even though these relations may not be constitutive of the 
unity of the felt whole. And we might be asked to consider the 
fact that if there is a genuine diversity of the qualities of 
the felt whole, then there must be a difference between these 
qualities. But the fact that they are different would seem to 
imply that a relation of difference exists between the qual­
ities in question. So, it will be concluded, if there is a 
genuine diversity of aspects or qualities in a felt whole, 
then these qualities must be related by a relation of differ­
ence. Qualities cannot, then, even within a non-relational ,
unity of feeling, exist independently of relations. ■
This is, I believe, a plausible reply to our initial ob- , 
jection. And it is, in fact, the sort of argument which Brad­
ley uses in the second stage of his proof that qualities pre­
suppose relations. We will now consider this second stage.
2 X3 . By appealing to what is supposedly given in experience 
Bradley claims to have established that, as a matter of fact, 
qualities are never found independently of relations. We have 
seen that this appeal is inconclusive, and possibly inconsis’t* 
ent with other features of his philosophy. But he does not
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rest his position entirely upon such an appeal. And in res­
ponse to possible criticism, Bradley then argues that it is 
impossible for qualities to exist independently of relations.
One such possible criticism is that, even though qualities 
might never, in fact, be found apart from relations, this does 
not prove that qualities cannot exist independently of re­
lations - i.e. it does not show that the notion of independent: 
qualities is logically impossible or se 1 f-contrad ictory. To i 
demonstrate that it is impossible for qualities to exist in­
dependently of relations, Bradley asks us to consider the 
nature of the mental act of comparison, whence, it is claimed, 
the notion of a relation arises. The view which Bradley is 
considering ' can be found in the writings of Green; and is, 
perhaps, ultimately traceable through Kant to Leibniz. The 
suggestion is that pa/ica-ive.d d-i££a/ianca between qualities; 
although impossible without the introduction of a relation 
between the terms which are compared,-, and perceived to be 
different, does not imply that a relation of difference 
exists between the terms in question when they are not the 
objects of an act of comparison, or when they are unperceived., 
So, even though qualities which are perceived as different can, 
not exist independently of relations, this does not mean that 
there may not be qualities which are different, although they 
are not perceived to be different, and hence existing apart 
from relations; and the evidence for this is to be found in 
the fact that we may consider or imagine qualities as existing 
independently of relations.
214. Bradley's reply to this suggestion is somewhat obscur 
He points out, correctly I think, that we cannot validly
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conclude from the premiss that qualities can be considered 
independently of relations, as the result of a mental process 
of abstraction and/or comparison, that they can therefore 
exist as such independently of this ongoing process of ab­
straction or comparison.
But how this is to be taken as a reply to the view that- 
relations are either introduced by, or arise as a consequence : 
of, comparison and abstraction is not clear. On the one hand 
Bradley seems to be claiming that relations between qualities 
only arise as the result of comparison; that relations are 
what have been termed entta /iattonts>. But, on the other hand, 
he appears to admit that it is possible for qualities to be : 
considered i'n abstraction, or independently of relations - i.e 
that such mental acts do not involve the introduction of 
relations. He seems to be claiming, in other words, that 
dt^ttnct qualities, i.e. qualities which are perceived to be i 
different, qua distinct, cannot exist-, independently of re­
lations; whilst, at the same time, claiming that distinct 
qualities, qua at^t/iacta, can be considered independently of 
relations. But the question is whether qualities can, in fact,' 
be considered independently of relations. Bradley, at one '
point is saying that they can, and at another that they can't.
What needs to be shown, and I do not think that Bradley's 
reply does- establish this, is that it is impossible, i.e. 
self-contradictory, for a quality to exist independently of 
relations. If he has established anything, he has established : 
only that perceived qualities cannot exist independently of i 
relations. Now, we might agree that if, as the result of a 
process of comparison, two pens are perceived as having
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different qualities (for example, if one is perceived as red, 
and the other perceived as blue), then the fact that they are 
perceived as different implies the existence of a process of 
comparison. And we might even agree that this perceived diff­
erence implies the existence of a relation of difference 
between the two qualities; and, perhaps more importantly, -that 
this relation of perceived difference cannot exist independ­
ently of the process of comparison. But this does not show 
that it is impossible • for the qualities in question to exist
independently of this relation. In fact, as Bradley himself 
4admits , the act of comparison presupposes a difference in 
the compared qualities, which difference is independent of the. 
act of comparison. 1
By pointing out that Bradley has failed thus far to show 
that qualities cannot exist independently of relations, we 
have not, of course, established the truth of the contrary 
view - that they can exist independently of relations. But we 
do not need to do this in order to establish the inconclusive­
ness of his arguments.
215. We have assumed that Bradley has been arguing that 
perceived qualities cannot exist independently of relations. 
But perhaps what he wishes to argue for is the conclusion thaf 
qualities as such cannot exist apart from, and except as the 
products o-f, a process of abstraction and/or comparison. In 
which case it would be impossible for qualities to exist in­
dependently of relations. This is, I am certain, the actual 
nature of his criticism. It is, however, difficult to see any 
force in this approach; and there are a number of genuine
inconsistencies even in Bradley's exposition of this view.
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In the first place, it is the notion of a quality does not 
analytically imply that of a relation - so we cannot directly 
infer the existence of relations from the existence of qual­
ities. For example, if we are prepared to admit that green 
is a quality, then we cannot conclude that a single instance , 
of green inplies, or intrinsically determines, the existence 
of any relations. And Bradley is, elsewhere, prepared to admit 
this .
To take an ordinary sense-perception - say, for instance, 
that of a green leaf - as a unity which consists in one 
or more relations is to me to go counter to the plainest : 
f ac t . (C_E p . 633 ) 1
It seems to me, that the only way in which we may establish 
a relation of direct implication between the notion of a i
quality, and that of a relation, is to stipulate that an 
entity is not strictly a quality proper except in so far as it; 
is the product of a process of abstraction and/or comparison - 
in which case, as I mentioned in §211, Bradley's argument 
would become quite uninteresting.
Secondly, and relatedly, Bradley actually endorses the viev 
that there are what are generally called 'qualities' to be 
found independently of relations - in feeling or immediate 
experience. The perceived green leaf mentioned above is one 
such example. Now, to reconcile this view with his arguments 
in Chapter III, Bradley would need to deny that the felt green 
is not a quality proper; and we have already seen (§2 1 1 ) that 
there is no sound reason for making this denial.
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216. We may conclude, then, that the first stage of Brad-
lay's argument to show the unreality of qualities and re­
lations is unsatisfactory. The claim that qualities presuppose 
relations can only be supported either by defining the notion 
of a quality in such a way as to include the notion of a #
relation within the definition - in which case the argument 
and its conclusion becomes uninteresting; or, by appealing to . 
what is given in feeling or immediate experience - in which 
case we do, in fact, find (contrary to Bradley's assumption) 
qualities existing independently of relations.
Bradley has not, thus far, shown that qualities cannot 
exist apart from relations. And if his appeal to immediate ! 
experience is to be taken seriously, then he has, rather, pro^ 
vided us with an example of qualities which do not presuppose 
the existence of relations.
217. Even though Bradley may not himself have established i 
that qualities cannot exist apart from relations, there might 
still be other arguments which will support this conclusion.
One such argument is the following. If A and B are two 
distinct qualities, then A must be different from B. But, if i 
this is the case, then A and B are related by being different;i 
therefore a relation of difference exists between them. That 
is to say, it might be argued that there can be no diversity 
of qualities without relations. On the assumption that there 
exists more than one quality, it follows, accordingly, that 
such qualities cannot exist independently of, and therefore 
presuppose, relations.
On the other hand it might be pointed out that the premiss 
that there exists a plurality of qualities is an empirical
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premiss; and that it cannot be used in an a argument
which professes to show the logical impossibility of qualities 
existing independently of relations. This is, I think, a valid 
objection. But there is a possible reply to it; namely, that 
the assumption that there is only one quality equally implies( 
the existence of a relation, since the one quality is, presum­
ably, identical with itself, and this fact involves the re- : 
lation of self-identity as one of its constituents.
The soundness of this type of argument clearly depends upon 
the soundness of the inference from the premiss that two 
qualities are different from one another to the conclusion 
that a relation of difference therefore exists between them; 1 
and, in the second case, from the premiss that a quality is 
identical with itself, to the conclusion that this fact in­
volves a relation of self-identity as one of its constituents. 
We should ask then, whether the fact that A and B are differ- i 
ent has a relation of difference as a', constituent. Attempts 
have been made to show that such an analysis is unsatisfactory 
— the most notable of which being those of Leibniz and Lotze. 
Both claim that so-called 'relational' facts do not, in fact, ' 
have relations as constituents. For example, the qualities of i 
red and green differ from one another. Now, does this fact, 
that red and green differ, have or consist in, the qualities 
red and gr’een and a relation of difference? I do not see that 
it does, and I know of no cogent arguments which profess to 
show that it does. It is true that in order for us to know : 
that they are different, then it would seem (as Green has 
argued)5 , that they must be brought before the mind in an act 
of comparison and in some sense related. But I do not see that
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this implies that they are thereby related in the same sense 
apart from such an act - and yet this is what needs to be 
proved.
218. Bradley’s reply to this sort of objection is to merely 
assert that there can be no difference without a relation. (
I rest my argument upon this, that if there are no diff-i 
' erences, there are no qualities, since all must fall into 
one. But if there is any difference, then that implies a 
relation. (AJR pp.24-25)
It is plain from this passage that Bradley is claiming that 
the proposition that two distinct qualities must be related b>i 
a relation of difference is self-evidently true. But we would 
simply deny that the proposition is self-evidently true. We 
may agree with the view that if there are no differences, then 
there are no qualities as such, or qualities proper, "since 
all must fall into one". But this proposition is not equival­
ent, I would suggest, to the proposition that difference im­
plies a relation, and it is the latter which Bradley needs to l 
establish his conclusion. To talk of the relation of differ- i. 
ence between two entities A and B, as if we were talking aboui 
an entity distinct from either A or B is to uncritically acc­
ept a particular form of expression as denoting an existent 
entity. But such expressions, I suggest, are simply another ■ 
way of saying that A is different to B. The introduction of 
a distinct relation between A and B involves an unwarranted 
hypostatization of the meaning of relational expressions. A n d 1: 
to argue, as Bradley does, that the difference between A and 8
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must fall either "inside" or "outside" A or B, is, I suggest, 
to ignore the possibility that the "difference" is not an 
entity; and, as such, falls neither "inside" nor "outside" 
the different terms.
219. For these reasons, I do not believe that Bradley has 
established that qualities presuppose relations, in the sense 
that qualities are existentially dependent upon relations. The 
first stage of his arguments against the reality of qualities 
and relations is accordingly unsatisfactory. We will now con­
sider his arguments to show that qualities are incompatible 
with relations.
220. Before beginning our discussion of these arguments, we 
should note Jthat any such arguments, if sound, will support 
our coil elusion that Bradley has not shown that qualities pre­
suppose relations. For, if qualities are incompatible with 
relations, then we may safely conclude that, in the absence
of any sound arguments to the contrary, qualities do not, and 
cannot, presuppose relations. By denying that difference is a 
relation, we are not, however, committed to the denial of the 
reality of relations as such.
221. Bradley begins with the contention that qualities are 
unlnttLlllglLle. when taken in conjunction with relations. The 
meaning of the adjective unintelligible is not entirely
c 1 0  a r , however, and the reader is left here, as elsewhere, to 
presume that it means either 'self-contradictory' or ' inexplic-, 
able'. Now, the fact that qualities, taken in conjunction with 
relations, are inexplaicable is certainly not a valid object­
ion to their being real. We may not be able to explain the 
fact that qualities are almost invariably found in conjunctior.
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with relations, but this is not a sound reason to doubt the 
reality of either. We might, in fact, insist that the con­
junction of qualities and relations is simply an ultimate, an<j 
therefore inexplicable, fact; and the only reason to doubt the 
reality of either would be that this conjunction issued in a 
contradiction. Bradley's claim that the conjunction of quali­
ties is unintelligible can only be understood, then, to mean 
that their conjunction involves a contradiction. Do his argu­
ments establish that any contradiction is involved in their 
conjunction?
He firstly points out, correctly I believe, that qualities 
cannot be resolved into relations. I know of no attempt which 
has been made to deny the reality of qualities in favour of i 
relations. And Bradley's oblique reference to Hegel as a pro­
ponent of the doctrine that relations create their terms is,
I believe, misguided^. In the absence of any such attempt, and 
in view of the fact that any such view would appear to be 
intrinsically incoherent, we can therefore accept this premis; 
of Bradley's argument.
Having made this point, Bradley then states what amounts to: 
the essence of his criticism. Qualities, he claims, exist; and 
in keeping with the conclusion which he claims to have proven 
in the first Section of Chapter III, such qualities are also 
necessarily related, or stand in various relations to other 
entities. But this fact, he insists, leads to a contradiction.
Hence the qualities must be, and must a£¿o be related 
But there is hence a diversity which falls inside each 
quality. Each has a double character, as both supporting
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and as being made by the relation. It may be taken as at 
once condition and result, and the question is as to how 
it can combine this variety. For it must combine the 
diversity, and yet it fails to do so. (_AR p.26)
So, according to Bradley, the conjunction of a quality and 
a relation leads to the conclusion that any quality is both 
one and many; and this, in turn, is said to give rise to an 
infinite regress. •
A is really both somehow together as A(a-a'). But (as we 
saw in Chapter II) without the use of a relation it is 
impossible to predicate this variety of A. And, on the 
other hand, ^¿th an internal relation A's unity dis­
appears, and its contents are dissipated in an endless 
process of distinction. (A_R p.26)
222. There are a number of points which Bradley is making 
in these passages; and he tends, I think, to confuse some of 
them. There is also a suppressed premiss involved in his arg­
ument which, when made explicit, tends to undermine its cog­
ency.
The first point he makes is that any qua1ity-in-re1ation is 
complex - as both supporting, and as being made by the re­
lation. This is clearly the most important premiss in his arg­
ument, but its exact meaning is somewhat obscure; and when the 
obscurity is removed, I believe that it becomes much less 
paradoxical than Bradley would have us believe that it is. To 
say that a quality 'supports’ a relation appears to mean that
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the type of relations which a quality enters into are deter­
mined by the intrinsic nature of the quality. Red, for ex­
ample, is brighter than brown; but it cannot be either taller 
or shorter than M t . Everest since, by its very nature, it 
cannot enter into relations of extensive magnitude with other 
terms. This position is, I think, fairly uncontroversial. ■
On the other hand, to say that a quality is ’made 1 by a 
relation would appear to mean that the intrinsic nature of a 
quality is determined by the relations into which it enters 
into. If red, for example, is brighter than brown, then Brad­
ley would seem to be committed to the view that red is the 
quality that it is in virtue of it being related to brown by ; 
the relation; of being brighter than. And this position is, un-,; 
like the previous position, somewhat controversial. Is it true 
that the intrinsic nature of redness is determined by its ;
relation with browness? It is certainly true that if red were 
not brighter than brown, then it would not be red; but this is 
not true of say yellow. Both red and yellow stand in the same 
relation with brown, viz. that of being brighter than. But 
since red is not yellow, then it is clear that the intrinsic 
nature of these two qualities is not determined merely by this 
particular relation; even though their intrinsic natures can 
be said to 'support 1 this relation. So Bradley s second pos­
ition would appear to be in need of further justification if 
we interpret his statements in the above way. i
But if, following McTaggart7 , we make a distinction between 
a quality /?c/z. , and the nature of that quality, then it
might be maintained that even though the quality pe.ji is not,,
'made' by the relations in which it stands, it is nonetheless
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true that the quality in question has the further quality of 
standing in these relations; and that this quality forms part 
of the nature of the quality. For example, even though red is 
not red merely in virtue of its being brighter than brown, it 
is true that red has the quality of being brighter than brown; 
and this latter quality, being part of the nature of red, is 
'made' by this relation which it has to brown. So, we may _ 
conclude that even though qualities pe./i ¿e. are not necessarily 
made by their relations, the nature of the qualities is 'made' 
by its relations. And if we then proceed to deny that a qual­
ity, like a substance, can be independent of its nature, then 
it would seem to follow that a quality is 'made' by the re­
lations into'which it enters.
223. We may agree, accordingly, that every quality-in­
relation has, in the above senses, a diverse character. It is, 
in the first place, the ground or determinant of the type of 
relations into which it enters. And, in the second place, its 
nature is, in part, determined by the relations into which it 
enters.
But what conclusions ought to be drawn from this fact? The 
first, perhaps, is that every quality-in-relation must be 
either complex, or have a complex nature (according to whether 
or not the validity of the distinction between a quality and 
its nature-is accepted), since any quality will have the fur­
ther quality of standing in that relation. The second is that 
there is no genuine contradiction involved in the conclusion 
that every quality-in-relation is complex. A contradiction 
only arises if it is assumed that every quality-in-relation 
is simple.
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We might illustrate this last conclusion with an example.
If A is a quality-in-relation, then we may agree with Bradley 
that it therefore has a complex nature consisting of the 
quality a - its nature as supporting the relation, and a' - 
its nature as 'made' by that relation. But in making this ,
assumption we do not, as Bradley seems to think, thereby comm­
it ourselves either to the view that A is a distinct quality ; 
apart from these diverse aspects of its nature; or, to the 
view that the unity of A is 'destroyed' in virtue of its hav­
ing this complex nature.
With respect to the complex nature of A, we can say that A, 
which appears to be simple, is, in fact, complex, consisting 
of a and a' . 'A' , in other words, is the name of a complex ...j
quality consisting of a and a '. And with respect to the unity 
of A, we can say that no vicious regress of relations arises 
from the complexity of A if the unity of A as (a-a') is a 
non-/ie.£atlonal unity. A, in other words, turns out to be, in 
accordance with the definition proposed in the previous chap­
ter, a ¿u&Atance. - i.e. a non-relational unity of various 
qualities. In this way we may avoid the following criticism 
of Bradley's .
Every quality in relation has, in consequence, a divers­
ity within its own nature, and this diversity cannot 
immediately be asserted of the quality. Hence the quality 
must exchange its unity for an internal relation. But, 
thus set free, the diverse aspects, because each some­
thing in relation, must each be something also beyond. ■ 
This diversity is fatal to the internal unity of each;
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and it demands a new relation and so on without limit.
( A_R p . 2 7 )
It should be noted that, in the above passage, Bradley 
equates unity with simplicity. To suggest, as we have, that 
any quality-in-relation is complex does imply that it cannot 
be simple; but it does not imply that it is without any genu­
ine unity. Once again, as we pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the unity of a complex quality is non-relational; and 
while this precludes the possibility that the unity of the 
qualities can be constituted by a relation, it does not mean 
that there are no relations between the qualities. The fact 
that qualiti'es-in-relation are complex means that their con­
stituent qualities are related. But they nonetheless form a 
unity. We may conclude, then, not that the diversity of as­
pects is fatal to the unity of a quality, but that it is fatal 
to its simplicity. That all qualities\ in relation must be com­
plex does not, however, involve any genuine contradiction.
224. Bradley has not, then, shown either that qualities 
presuppose relations; or, that qualities are incompatible with 
relations. The first two stages in his critique of qualities 
and relations are, therefore, inconclusive. We can now consid­
er the third and fourth stages of his argument.
225. In- Section 3 of Chapter III, Bradley attempts to prove 
that relations are 'unintelligible' - either independently of, 
or in conjunction with, qualities.
He begins with the contention that relations cannot exist 
without terms. I think that this contention is obviously true. 
The relation "taller than", for instance, cannot exist
235)
independently of two entities of unequal height which it re­
lates. Although a relation is distinct from its terms, this 
does not imply that it can exist independently of them.
Bradley then argues that the way in which a relation 
’stands' to the qualities which it relates is unintelligible.
If it is nothing to the qualities, then they are not 
related at all; and, if so, as we saw, they have ceased 
to be qualities, and their relation is a nonentity. But 
if it is to be something to them, then clearly we shall 
require a ruzio connecting relation. For the relation hard­
ly can be the mere adjective of one or both of its terms; 
or, at least, as such it seems indefensible. And, being i 
something itself, if it does not itself bear a relation 
to the terms, in what intelligible way will it succeed in 
being anything to them? (AR p.27)
The problem is to find how the relation can stand to its 
qualities; and this problem is insoluble. If you take the 
connexion as a solid thing, you have got to show, and you 
cannot show, how the other solids are joined to it. And, 
if you take it as a kind of medium or unsubstantial at­
mosphere, it is a connexion no longer. (AR p.28)
There are several points to consider here. But there is one 
assumption which is evident in the above passages, and which 
is implicit throughout Bradley's entire critique of relations. 
The assumption in question is that relations un-ite. their terms 
- an assumption which we rejected as false in the previous 
chapter. For example, he speaks of relations as "connexions",
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and of them being "joined" to their terms; and the problem of 
understanding how relations stand to their terms is spoken of 
in terms of "links being united by other links".
On the other hand, once we reject this assumption, the 
question as to how relations stand to their terms is readily 
answered; and the supposed vicious infinite regress of re­
lations will turn out to be neither vicious, nor, according to 
some interpretations, genuinely infinite.
Let us consider, firstly, the claim that if relations are 
nothing to their terms, then the terms cease to be qualities. 
Now Bradley claims to have already established this point - 
although it is not clear to which argument he is referring. If 
it is the argument which professed to show that qualities pre-i 
suppose relations, then we have seen that it is inconclusive. 
But I am unable to discover any other argument which might be 
taken as an argument for this conclusion. So the first premiss 
of his argument is, at best, somewhat''questionable.
He next insists that if relations are not "nothing" - i.e. 
if they are "something" - to their terms, then both the terms 
and the relation require a further relation to "connect" them. 
This process is said to generate an infinite regress of re­
lations; and for this reason, the assumption that relations 
are something to their terms is rejected. Now, apart from the 
difficulty of understanding what is meant by the statement 
that relations must be either "something or nothing to 
their terms, there is also the difficulty, in Bradley's argu­
ment, of determining whether or not the supposed regress of 
relations is genuine and/or vicious.
It is clear from our previous discussion that relations
237)
do determine relational qualities in their terms. If some term 
A is conjoined with a relation r, then A, in virtue of this 
fact, has the quality a of standing in this relation. In this 
sense, all relations are 'something' to their terms. The real 
question, then, is whether or not this leads to a vicious 
infinite regress of relations. I believe that it does lead to 
a regress of relations; but I do not believe that the regress 
is vicious for the following reason. Suppose, for example, 
that John is taller than Paul. If we analyse this fact into 
three constituents: John, Paul, and the relation between them 
- J, P, and r, respectively - then it will be true that a 
relation exists between these three terms. We might call this 
relation r ' ! But there will also be a further relation betweer! 
J, P, r and r'; and a further relation between these four 
entities, and so on indefinitely. It is easy to see how an 
infinite regress of relations is generated in this way. But 
the regress is not vicious for the reason that the original 
fact JrP is a determinant of this regress, and does not pre­
suppose the completion of the regress for the statement John 
is taller than Paul" to be true. That is to say, the fact 
that John is taller than Paul, or JrP, implies [JrP]r', but it 
does not p/KLAup po <¡»c this fact; and the regress, though infin­
ite, is not vicious.
226. We* may summarize our objection to the third stage of 
Bradley's argument against the reality of qualities and re­
lations by saying that his arguments rest ultimately upon the 
assumption - which we have seen to be false - that relations 
unite their terms. Once we reject this assumption, the problen 
of understanding the way in which relations stand to their
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terras (i.e. qualities), is easily resolved; and the celebrated 
vicious regress of relations which is alleged to arise as the 
result of any attempt to explain this problem is avoided. In 
answer to Bradley’s initial question as to how relations stand 
to qualities, we may reply that they /icL-tate. them. And this 
reply, we have seen, does not commit us to any vicious regress 
of relations.
'227. The consideration of this last argument completes our 
study of Bradley's arguments against the reality of qualities 
and relations. We have concluded that none of his arguments 
can be said to conclusively demonstrate the unreality of 
either qualities or relations, or to indicate any genuine in­
consistency in the quality/relation schema. We have also seen 
that some of the premisses which he uses in his arguments are 
incompatible with some of his other views — in particular his 
views on the nature of what is given in experience.
228. In the following chapter we will be concerned with a 
problem that was not explicitly, or systematically discussed 
by Bradley; namely whether qualities and relations are partic­
ular or universal entities. The relevance of this discussion 
to some points which were raised in previous chapters will, 
however, become evident.
Notes '
1. Professor Sprigge makes considerable use of such evidence 
to support his view that all relations are what he terms 
relations — relations which are only to be found 
as constituents of, and whose nature's are determined by, 
a whole which is greater than the relations and their
2 3 9)
terms. See his "Russell and Bradley on Relations", in 
George W. Roberts (Ed.), Ban.tn.and Ra^^att flamon-tat Vot- 
u m a , George Allen & Unwin, London, 1979, Chapter 10; and 
his more recent book, 7ha VBncL7.cat7.on ofi At^otuta LdcatL- 
7/>m, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, esp. Chapter 5.
2. See Appendix - "Cresswell on F.H. Bradley". .
3. AR p.525.
4 . AR p .23.
5. See Pnotagomana to tthtc-6, Book 1, Chapter 1.
6 . Cf. McTaggart, Stud7cs> 7n Llcgcttan D7ataat7a, 2 nd Ed. 
(Rev.), Cambridge University Press, 1922, Chapter 1.
7. McTaggart, 7 ha Natu/ia o/ t-x.7s>tcncc, §90 & §91.
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Chapter 7 — Q.u.a£di.da./> and Re.ZaLdon^> (Cont. )
229. I have, in a number of places throughout this work, 
made reference to the view that qualities and relations are 
particular, rather than universal, to support somg of the con-, 
elusions that we have reached. One of these conclusions is' 
that the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is a 
necessary truth should qualities and relations be particular. 
Another conclusion concerns the principle of Extrinsic Deter­
mination. This latter principle is true, according to Broad^, 
should the qualities and relations of things be particular 
rather than universal. In this chapter I will argue that qual­
ities and relations are, in fact, particular; and that, as a : 
consequence, both of the above-mentioned principles are defen­
sible against the often-cited objection that qualities and 
relations are universal^.
230. In a paper entitled, "The Nature of Universals and
3Propositions", and in a subsequent series of articles , G.F. 
Stout argued that the qualities and relations of particular 
entities are particular, rather than universal. Stout is not,'” 
of course, the first, or the only, philosopher to take this 
view. Among past philosophers, it has been ascribed to Aris­
totle^, St. Thomas Aquinas^, and Spinoza. And it has been 
explicitly* held by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. More recently it 
has been advocated by Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl among 
continental philosophers; and by D.C. Williams and Keith 
Campbell.^
The theory that the qualities and relations of things or 
substances are particular, I will call pantdeutan-i^m. The
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theory that the qualities and relations of things or substan­
ces are universal I will, following an established convention, 
call /ie.aJLd.4rri, Realism, thus understood, is opposed to partic­
ularism; and it should be distinguished from that version of 
realism which claims that there are universal entities - name­
ly type.A or - but that it is only particular instances
or tokens of these types or kinds , and not the types or kinds1 
themselves, which characterise or relate existent entities. 
This last version of realism was advocated by H.W.B Joseph^,
g
and Edmund Husserl , and it is obviously compatible with what 
I have termed "particularism".
The order of this discussion will be as follows. Firstly, I 
will attempt to clarify the meaning of, and where possible to 
define, the key terms 'quality' , 'relation' , 'particular' and 
'universal' . Secondly, I will consider some of the main reas­
ons for believing that particularism is true. And thirdly, I 
will discuss some recent attempts to refute particularism.
231. What do we mean by a qua£dty of a thing? And what do 
we mean by a /le.JLatlon'l I believe that these terms are indefin­
able. This is not to say that we are unable to understand what 
is meant by these terms. Nor does it imply that we cannot pro­
vide any satisfactory criteria for determining what kinds of 
entities count as qualities, and what count as relations. We 
can understand what a quality is by providing examples of 
qualities; such as the red which characterises my pencil, or 
the blue which characterises the unclouded sky. And we can ... 
understand what a relation is by providing examples of re­
lations; such as the relation Latt^n. than, which exists be­
tween Mt. Everest and M t . Kosciusko.
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Some suggestions have been made concerning possible cri­
teria for qualities and relations. It is sometimes suggested, 
for example, that any universal entity is either a quality or 
a relation - qualities being one-term, or monadic, universals; 
and relations being many-termed or potyadlc universals. But 
this criterion is unacceptable for a number of reasons. In the1 
first place, it begs the question as to whether or not quali­
ties and relations are, in fact, universal. And, if combined 
with what Armstrong has described as a po¿tc/ilon.1 realism, it 
leads to the absurd conclusion that it is an open question 
whether or not there are any qualities or relations at all. 
Secondly, there are a number of entities which would generally 
be considered to be qualities, such as omnipotence, or being 
the most virtuous person in Australia, which, in virtue of 
their very nature, cannot be predicated of more than one thing 
and therefore, by most standards, cannot be considered to be 
genuinely universal. Thirdly, it leads to the view that there 
cannot, by definition, be any monadic relations; and yet there! 
is a whole class of entities - called /ic/Ltoclvc relations - 
which are generally considered to be both genuine relations, 
and genuinely monadic. This class of relations would need to 
be rejected a p/ilo n-L, as spurious, should we accept the cri­
terion in question.
A more -satisfactory criterion has been proposed by McTagg- 
art^. He suggests that anything which is t/iuc o/ some entity, 
is a quality of that entity. And we may distinguish qualities 
from relations by stipulating that, although qualities are ; 
qualities o/ entities, relations are not relations of entities 
rather, they are relations tctioccn entities The notion of
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betweenness' is not, of course, to be understood as having .... 
exclusively spatial connotations; even though we might speak 
of a 'logical' space which relations occupy between entities.
A more fundamental criterion for qualities might possibly 
be found in Bradley's distinction between the that and the 
tohat. All real entities, according to Bradley, combine these 
two fundamental and irreducible features. A quality might thus 
be understood to be any distinct element or constituent of the 
whatness of entities. -There are, however, difficulties with 
this criterion. In the first place, as we argued in Chapter 5, 
the that is understood by Bradley to be existence, and exist­
ence, I have claimed, is itself a quality. But secondly, even 
though this 'criterion might prove satisfactory for determining 
what kinds of entities count as qualities, unless we deny the 
ultimate irreducibi 1 ity of relations to qualities, I do not 
see see that it could be accepted as providing a criterion of 
relations; and we ought, I think, to accept McTaggart's cri­
teria for both qualities and relations as the most satisfact- \ 
o r y .
232. Both qualities and relations, then, I consider to be 
both indefinable and ultimate. But what are we to understand 
by the adjectives 'particular' and 'universal'?
We should perhaps begin by pointing out that these terms 
are genera! 1 y considered to be contraries — so that an entity 
cannot be both particular and universal, although it may be 
neither; and sometimes contradictories - so that an entity 
cannot be both particular and universal, but it must be one or 
the other. At this stage we may assume that there is nothing 
in the notion of a quality as such, or that of a relation as
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such, which determines that they are essentially either par­
ticular or universal; and, when applied to qualities or relat-s 
ions, the adjectives 'particular' and 'universal' might, for 
the present, be understood to be contraries only.
233. Various definitions of the adjective 'universal' have 
been proposed by philosophers. I have listed what are probably 
the more commonly cited and interesting definitions. An entity 
X is said to be universal if:
(a) it is predicable of, or true of, more than one entity;
(b) it is shared by, or is common to, more than one entity;
(c) it is repeatable - (cl) there is, or might be, more than
one instance of its kind;
r; (c2 ) there is, or might be, more than
one instance of X;
(d) it is identical in diverse contexts;
(e) it is a quality or a relation.
And, by way of contrast, X is said, to be particular if:
(a_) it is not predicable of, or true of, more than one entityj 
(_b) it cannot be shared by, or be common to, more than one 
entity;
(q ) it is unique — (̂ _1 ) there is not, and cannot be, more
than one instance of its kind;
(c_2 ) there is not, and cannot be, more 
. than one instance of X;
(d) it is not identical in different contexts;
(e) it is a substance or a substantive.
234. Among these definitions, some may be rejected from the 
outset; and almost all are in need of further clarification.
We may reject, for example, the fifth definition of
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'universal*. The proposition that qualities and relations are 
universal would, according to this definition, be equivalent 
to the analytic truth that qualities and relations are either 
qualities or relations. But the former proposition, if true, 
is clearly a synthetic truth.
For a similar reason we can, I believe, reject the fifth 
definition of 'particular*. The proposition that qualities 
and relations are particular is not equivalent to the propos­
ition that qualities and relations are either substances or 
substantives. To equate qualities and relations with substan­
ces is to commit what has been termed a "category" mistake.
And to insist that all qualities and relations are substant­
ives,. is to assert little more than would be admitted by most... 
realists as an obvious truth; namely that qualities and re­
lations are the bearers of further qualities. But it is clear 
that if realism is true, and qualities and relations are uni­
versal, then we would seem to be committed, by accepting this 
definition of particularity, to the conclusion that qualities 
and relations may be at once particular and universal - in 
which case the contrariety of the terms 'particular' and 'uni­
versal' is destroyed.
235. Concerning the remaining definitions, we may reject 
one version of definition (c), namely (cl), as being compat­
ible with particularism. The fact that there may be more than 
instance of one and the same kind of quality or relation is 
compatible with the fact that each instance of the kind is 
particular in any of the senses (a_) , (Jb) , (c_2), or ( d_) . The 
view that the instances of a universal kind are particular is, 
in fact, the view of Stout - who is often cited as a leading
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exponent of particularism.
Definition (b) might be thought to be compatible with par­
ticularism depending upon (i) whether or not a part of one 
entity can be a part of, or be shared by, another entity; (ii) 
whether or not a relation which relates two or more entities 
can be said to be shared by, or be common to, those entities 
which it relates. With respect to (i), it is clear that if the 
qualities of a substance are - as Meinong, for example, held 
them to be - parts of -that substance; and if one substance or 
a part of that substance can be a part of another substance, 
then, upon the assumption that the qualities of a substance 
are particular in accordance with (c_2 ), it would be possible 
for one and the same particular quality to be shared by more 
than one entity, and therefore universal according to (b). And 
with respect to (ii) it is clear that if a relation which re— 
lates two or more entities can be shared, in the sense which 
I have described, by those entities, then relations which are 
particular according to definitions (c_l) or (c_2 ), may also 
be universal according to definition (b).
We are left, then, with (a), (d) and (c2). As a definition
of the term 'universal' which could be applied univocally to 
both qualities and relations, we ought to reject (a). In the 
first place, the view that relations , as distinct from re­
lational qualities , are strictly predicable of the terms which 
they relate, in the same way that qualities are - i.e. as 
constituent elements of the terms or their natures - would 
find little support among philosophers. Relations, as I sugg­
ested earlier, are not strictly tn.ue. o£ their terms in the 
same way that qualities are. Rather, they are their
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terras. And secondly, even if relations can be said to be 
predicable of their terms, the fact that all except reflexive 
relations have more than one terra would imply that most re­
lations are predicable of more than one term. All relations, 
then, with the exception of reflexive relations, will satisfy 
the definition of 'universal' given in (a) - although they< 
will be particular according to (c_) and (d_) .
Of definitions (c2) and (d), I think that the latter is the 
more fundamental, although (c2 ) does seem to capture at least 
part of what is usually meant when it is said that an entity 
is 'universal'. In accordance with (d), strict numerical 
identity is, I think, almost unanimously thought to be an 
essential feature of universal entities. But, at the same time 
and in accordance with (c2 ), it is also generally held that, 
not only do such entities have diverse instances (this view, 
we have seen, is compatible with particularism), but that they 
are identical with these diverse instances. In other words, a 
universal entity is an entity which is at once, numerically 
one and many. This definition is, I believe, fundamental; and 
it can be seen to be so by the fact that it is compatible with 
each of the other definitions of 'universal' that I have 
listed.
235. Concerning a definition of 'particular', I suggested 
earlier that the terms 'universal' and 'particular' are con-.-, 
traries. In keeping with the above definition of universal , 
and with-this principle in mind, we may define a 'particular' 
entity as an entity which is essentially one and riot many.
236. The definition of a universal entity which we have 
arrived at is, of course, self-contradictory. And this is, I
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a perfectly good reason for denying that there are, or can be, 
any universal entities in general, and any universal qualities 
or relations in particular. That the notion of a universal 
entity does involve such a contradiction is rarely, if ever, 
admitted by realists. Rather than acknowledge that the notion 
of an universal entity is self-contradictory, realists often 
use language which appears to be entirely consistent. Univers- 
als are said, for example, to have. dnttanceA , or to be dn^tan- 
tdatcd ky particular entities. Or else, particular entities 
are said to pan.tdc.dpatc d n , to ex.e.mp£d£.y, or to be token./> o-fL, 
what is universal. In this way a p/idma £acde distinction is 
established between that which is one and that which is many, 
and an explicit contradiction avoided. In the next part of 
this chapter I will consider some arguments in favour of par­
ticularism. And I think that what will emerge from this dis­
cussion is that most of these arguments amount ultimately to 
a more or less explicit recognition of the fact that any gen­
uine realism is, despite appearances to the contrary, committ­
ed to the above-mentioned contradiction.
237. Before discussing the arguments for particularism, it 
will be helpful to firstly distinguish the different versions 
of realism.
The view that universal entities are literally dn their 1 
diverse instances, so that, as Joseph puts it, there would be 
no squareness unless there were squares , is the doctrine of 
undvcsiAatda dn sic, or what Armstrong has called immanent 
realism".
The view that universal entities are eternal, or timeless, 
and exist independently of their instances, is the doctrine of
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untven.aSLta ante, nem , or what Armstrong has called "transcend­
ent realism".
The view that there are no strictly universal entities, but 
that we are able to have "universal" knowledge about an indef­
inite number of particular entities by means of concepts or 
ideas which correspond to, or represent, more than one partic­
ular entity, is the doctrine of untuen^atta poòt /lem, or con­
ceptualism .
238. Both conceptualism, and transcendent realism, are, I 
suggest, spurious realisms. Neither is committed to the view 
that there are genuinely universal entities in the sense which 
I have described. The fact that one and the same concept or 
idea may correspond to more than one particular entity does 
not imply that the concept itself is other than a particular 
entity; and it does not imply that such concepts are universal 
in accordance with our definition. Most conceptualists, in 
fact, consider such concepts or ideas, to be particular.
And the view that there are eternal entities which are re­
lated - by the relation of panttctpatton, for example - to 
many particular entities does not imply that these eternal 
entities are genuinely universal. All existent entities are 
related to more than one other entity; but this does not mean 
that they are, in virtue of this fact, universal. The only way 
in which transcendent realism might appear to qualify as a 
species of genuine realism would be if it were stipulated that 
the relation between the eternal entity, and the instances to 
which it is related, is a relation of numerical identity. But 
£^ g g  are two problems with this view. In the first place, it 
.ĵg gĵ -̂j-0 ju0 _̂y doubtful whether numerical identity can be
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12 •construed as a relation proper . But secondly, and more im­
portantly, it would reduce transcendent realism to a species 
of immanent realism - with the qualification that all instan­
ces of the universal must be eternal.
The only version of realism that might qualify as a genuine
realise is, I suggest, the doctrine of uni.D2./iAa£-La i.n n.e.y or.
immanent realism. If an entity is literally -In. more than one 
entity, then it follows, I believe, that the former entity 
must be universal according to our definition - i.e. literally 
one and many.
239. In arguing that particularism is true, I will not, 
then, be concerned to show that conceptualism is false; since 
I am only attempting to show that there are no universal qual­
ities or relations. Conceptualism, as such, is obviously com­
patible with the view that qualities and relations are partic­
ular.
Nor will I be concerned to show that there are no transcend 
ent ’universals', since it is clear that it is possible for . 
there to be eternal entities which are related to qualities 
and relations, even though these qualities and relations are 
particular.
This leaves us with the doctrine of immanent realism to be 
considered. According to this theory, when applied to quali- 
^i_gg and relations, all qualities and relations are universal 
entities. It is also commonly held that the only universal 
entities are qualities and relations. But the fact that only 
qualities and relations are universals does not, of course, 
imply that all qualities and relations are universals.
So, the view that all qualities and relations are particular
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follows, I suggest, directly from the conclusion that immanent 
realism is false.
240. What reasons are there for believing particularism to
be true? The most obvious, and most important reason is, of 
course, the claim that immanent realism is committed to the  ̂
se1f-contradictory view that qualities and relations are at 
once one and many. As I suggested before, this is, I believe,
a conclusive reason for believing that any genuine form of
realism is false. But - I will now consider some more concrete 
arguments for particularism; and I hope to show that most, if 
not all, are species of this general objection to realism.
241. If I look at my desk I can see two red pens. Now,
although I am unable to discern any qualitative difference 
between their respective colours, I am nonetheless capable of 
pointing to, and distinguishing between tht/> red, and that 
red. According to any normal criterion, this fact would imply 
that this red, and that red, are not one and the same entity 
- i.e. that they are diverse entities. Stout makes this point 
in the following way.
When I see two oranges on the table before me, however 
similar they may be, I perceive them as two distinct 
things each occupying its own distinct place and separ­
ated ’by a distance. In just the same way I perceive the 
shape of each as distinct from that of the other, as 
occupying its own distinct place, and separated from 
other shapes by an intervening distance. There is no 
reason for asserting the oranges to be distinct partic­
ulars which is not also a reason for asserting their
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shapes to be distinct. Indeed I could not perceive the 
two oranges as distinct if I did not perceive the shape
I Oof each as distinct from that of the other.
The underlying premiss of Stout's argument is that if .
spatial distance is a sufficient condition for numerical ;
diversity, then a quality which is spatially distant from
another quality is thereby numerically distinct from that
other quality; i.e. they cannot be one and the same quality.
1 4Elsewhere , he explicitly states that one and the same colour 
cannot, at the same time, be in two places. To deny this prem­
iss is, in other words, tantamount to admitting that an entity 
can be one and many. The only way to avoid this conclusion is 
to either deny that spatial distance is a sufficient condition 
for numerical diversity; or to deny that the shapes or colours 
in question have any spatial location.
Now,, if we deny that spatial distance is a sufficient con­
dition for numerical distinctness, then, according to Stout, 
we can have no genuine reason to admit that there are, in the 
case of the above example, two oranges; or, in my example, two 
pens on the table, rather than one orange, or one pen.
And if we deny that the qualities in question have any 
spatial location, then it follows, according to Stout, that
(i) there is no sound reason to assume that the oranges or the 
pens have any spatial location; since, unless we adopt the 
unacceptable view that a substance may exist independently of, 
and apart from, its qualities, it is impossible to perceive a 
substance as having a spatial location except in virtue of 
perceiving its sensible qualities - e . g . its colour or shape -
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as having a spatial location.
Stout’s argument against realism, then, is simply that if 
qualities in particular, and all entities in general, are 
spatially distant, then they are, in virtue of this fact, num­
erically distinct or diverse. The realist, according to Stout, 
is committed to the view that qualities which are spatially 
distant, may be numerically identical. That is to say, the 
realist, according to Stout, is committed to the self-contra­
dictory view that a quality may be at once one and many.
It is clear that this argument is a species of the general 
objection to realism mentioned in §240.
242. The next argument for particularism which we will con­
sider is based upon an assumption that is accepted by a number 
of philosophers - predominantly 'empiricist'. The argument is 
as follows.
(1) Whatever exists is particular.
(2) Qualities and relations exist.
Therefore,
(3) Qualities and relations are particular.
The cogency of this argument is, of course, debatable. But 
it is based upon two premisses which are both widely accepted 
- often as being self-evident truths. Both premisses have,
( however, been denied to be true. Immanent realists, such as • 
Blanshard1^, are prepared to accept the second premiss, al­
though they would deny the first. And transcendent realists, 
such as Russell in 1 h e  P/io(L£emA o-fL P h h J L o -60p h y , would accept 
the first, but deny the second premiss. Both, however, would 
accept the further premiss:
(4) Substances or things exist, and they are particular.
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Is it possible, then, to accept (4) and to deny either (1) 
or (2)? I don't think that it is. Consider, firstly, the view 
of Russell. Now, the only way to accept (4), and to deny (2) 
is to accept the view that substances may exist independently 
of their qualities, or that a substance is something apart 
from its qualities. But in Chapters 4 and 5 we argued that 
such a view is untenable. A substance, we concluded, is simply 
a unity of various qualities. And in so far as we deny that a 
substance or thing is-independent of its nature, our views are 
in accordance with those of Stout and Meinong; although they 
differ from the former's in that Stout considered the unity of 
a substance to be constituted by a relation of conc/i£4£/ice, 
and from Meinong's in that he believed that the unity of 
various qualities to form a substance is constituted by a 
part/whole relation.
But if we accept, as a further premiss:
(5) A substance is a unity of various, qualities, 
and the premiss:
(6) The parts of an existent entity are existent.
which latter I consider to be an evident truth, then it is 
impossible to accept Russell's view that both (1) and (4) are 
true, and that (2) is false. On the other hand, by accepting 
(5) - which we have argued to be true - the initial argument
in favour *of particularism becomes quite cogent as concerns 
qualities. However, since relations are not generally consid­
ered to-be parts or constituents of substances, the argument 
does not show that relations are particular; and I will, at a 
later stage, propose a separate argument to show that relat­
ions are particular.
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243. If we now consider Blanshard's view, we are faced with 
further problems. Unlike Russell, Blanshard accepts premisses 
(2) and (5), although he does not accept (1). But in order to 
establish (4), Blanshard commits himself to the principle of 
the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. But this principle is not,
I would suggest, compatible with the view that all qualities 
are universal. For consider, if a substance is is a unity of 
various qualities - say A,B,C and D - and if each of these 
qualities is universal, then we can draw two conclusions. The 
first is that if the principle of the Dissimilarity of the 
Diverse is true, then A,B,C and D must comprise a 
dLo.̂ c/1-iptZon of that substance; there cannot accordingly, be 
another substance with that description. The second is that 
if A,B,C and D is a sufficient description of the substance, 
then it is a complex quality which is unique. And from these 
two conclusions we may draw the further conclusion that A,B,
C and D is a complex quality which is. particular - because 
unique. But this conclusion contradicts Blanshard's initial 
premiss that all qualities are universal. So, we may say that 
Blanshard is committed to the view that every substance must 
have a sufficient description - in keeping with his acceptance 
of the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse; and that 
no sufficient descriptions can exist - since all qualities are 
universal .•
To avoid a contradiction Blanshard must either deny that 
all qualities are universal, or deny the truth of the prin­
ciple of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. The first leads 
inevitably to Particularism, and the second involves a re­
jection of premiss (4).
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It would seem, then, that if we accept (4), (5), and (6),
and either (1) or (2), then the conclusion that qualities and 
relations are particular (3) is established.
244. A different argument for Particularism was put for­
ward, at one time, by Meinong. It has also appeared, in a .
. . 17slightly different form, in an article by Keith Campbell .
Let us consider, once again, the two red pencils on my table.
Now if, as the realist supposes, the red of the first pencil
is one and the same quality as the red of the second pencil,
it follows that, should one pencil be destroyed, one and the
same quality would both exist and not exist. Meinong concludes
that this shows that the red of one pencil is not numerically
identical with the red of the other pencil.
Once again, this argument is clearly an example of the 
general objection to realism. An entity can only both exist 
and not exist if it is at once one and many - which is imposs­
ible. '
245. Each of the arguments discussed so far has professed 
to show that qualities are particular; but it is not clear 
that any can be applied to relations. Are there any arguments 
which might show that relations are particular? There is one 
argument which I believe to be conclusive in establishing that 
relations are particular.
Let us -assume that John is the father of George, and that 
he is also the father of Mary. In other words, John is related 
to George by a relation (Ld-ing th.d ¡4athd/i o£. He is also re­
lated to Mary by a relation (Ld-Lng tkd JLattidfi o / .  Does one and 
the same relation exist between George and John, and between 
Mary and John? The realist would claim that it does. But this
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is impossible. The relation between George and John has the 
quality of having George and John as its terms, and the re­
lation between Mary and John has Mary and John as its terms. 
The relation between George and John therefore has a quality 
which is not possessed by the relation between Mary and John; 
which means they are dissimilar, and therefore diverse. :
It might be suggested that this argument simply begs the 
question against the realist. The realist, it might be pointed 
out, would reply by saying that one and the same relation has 
both of these qualities; and that the conclusion that the 
relation between George and John is numerically distinct from 
the relation between Mary and John will only follow if the 
above-mentioned qualities are incompatible.
The reply to this objection is fairly obvious. The qualit­
ies are, in fact, incompatible. And they are incompatible in 
the following way. The relation between George and John is a-" 
two-term, or dyadic, relation; as is -the relation between 
Mary and John. In this respect the relations are similar. But 
if it is to be one and the same relation that relates George 
and John, and Mary and John, then that relation has three 
terms. That is to say, the realist is committed to the con­
tradictory view that one and the same relation is at once a
dyadic, and a triadic relation.
It is interesting to apply this argument to the case of 
resemblance relations. For example, if there are four entities 
A, B, C ,- and D; and A resembles B, and C resembles D, but A 
does not resemble either C or D, and B does not resemble 
either C or D. Now the relation between A and B is symmetri­
cal, as is the relation between C and D. But if the realist is
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correct, then not only does it follow that one and the same 1 
relation is at once dyadic and tetradic, but the relation also 
has the contradictory qualities of being both symmetrical and 
not-symmetrical among its terms. And if it is one and the 
same resemblance relation which exists between A and B, as 
exists between C and D, then A, B, C, and D are all terms of 
a single resemblance relation. But since neither A nor B re­
sembles C or D, the relation will have the quality of not 
relating some of its terms - which is clearly absurd. The 
resemblance relations between A and B, and between C and D 
must, therefore, be numerically distinct.
We may generalise our initial objection to a realist theory 
of relations' in the following way. For any n-term or n-adic : 
relation, there are, by definition, only n terms. But if real­
ism is true, then any n-term relation will have at least n + 1- 
terms - which is impossible. So, no relations can be univers­
a 1 . '
246. We have considered some specific arguments in favour 
of particularism, and found that they are convincing enough to 
at the very least establish a presumption in favour of the 
truth of this doctrine. But if particularism can be shown to 
be an-inherently inconsistent view, then we might be prepared"" 
to accept the reality of self-contradictory universal entities 
as a more ontologically economical theory. I will now consider 
some attempts to show that particularism is inconsistent.
247. In Chapter 1 of his recent book on the philosophy of 
Meinong18, Reinhardt Grossmann puts forward a number of criti­
cisms of the view, held at one time by Meinong, that qualities 
and relations are particular. According to Grossmann, realists
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and particularists are both offering theories which profess to 
explain a common feature of ordinary experience. Suppose, for 
example, that we are presented with two red billiard balls; 
and, that these two balls resemble each other exactly in res­
pect of their colours.
According to the realist's view, one and the same prop- 
ert is then exemplified by the two balls. On Meinong's 
view, however, each ball has its own colour. If, for the 
sake of brevity, we call the respective shade of red 
simply 'red' , then it would not be accurate to say, acc­
ording to Meinong's view, that both the ball A and the 
ball B are red. Instead, we should have to say, describ­
ing the ontological situation more perspicuously, that 
A is red^, while B is red^ Red^ and red2 are thus not 
properties in our sense of the term (i.e. universal qual­
ities). I shall from now on call-, these entities ¿nttan- 
19ce./>.
The problem for Meinong, according to Grossmann, is that 
of how to account for the fact that some qualities belong to 
different groups or c!& sses j and for the fact that some qual — 
i£igs are members of the same group or class. Grossmann men— 
tions two -possible answers to this problem which he believes 
q i~ q compatible with particularism. The first, which he as­
cribes to Husserl, is a form of transcendent realism. Accord­
ing to this view, qualities are members of the same group or 
class' if they are particular instances of a single 'property' 
which is distinct from its instances. But this theory is, as
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I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, a spurious real­
ism, since it is not committed to the reality of genuinely 
universal entities. The 'properties’ in question are them­
selves one-and-not-many, and thus particular according to our 
definition - although they are related to their many instances 
by 'instantiation' relations. =■'
248. The second view - attributed to Meinong - is that 
particular instances are classified together because they are 
related by a relation -of cquattty between them. By cquattty, 
we might understand what is commonly known as axac.t ¿tmtta/i- 
tty. It differs from the relations of similarity or resemb­
lance , in that it is a transitive relation. If, for example,
red^ is equal to red 2 * and red 2 is equal to red^, then red^ is
20 ’equal to red^- Guido Kilng adds that the relation is, more 
precisely, what Carnap described as attotcari^tttDc, which is 
a qualification introduced to exclude the possibility of re- 
flexivity, and is expressed formally in the following way:
(x)(y)(z)(Rxy.Ryz.x?^z -> Rxz)
Red , for example, is equal to, but not identical with, 
red2 • And it is in virtue of this fact that they are said to 
be members of the same class. On the other hand, red^ is not 
equal to, -i.e. it is uricquat to b 1 u e , and that is why r e d ̂ 
and blue^ belong to different classes.
Grossmann's objection to this view is that it can only ex­
plain the supposed unity of the class if the relation of 
equality is itself a universal entity.
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Otherwise we can ask what there is in or about two or 
more instances of the similarity (i.e. the equivalence) 
relation that makes them all instances of this particular 
relation.^
But this objection involves a simple misinterpretation of 
Meinong's position. He is not arguing that two qualities be­
long to the same class in virtue of a relation of equality 
between them, but that- they belong to the same class because 
they are equal. If two entities are equal, then they are re­
lated by a relation of equality. But they are not equal simply 
because they are related by a relation of equality. In the 
same way, two distinct equality relations are members of the 
same class of relations because they are equal, and not be­
cause. t.hey are related by a relation of equality. And it is 
clear that such an explanation of the basis for class-member­
ship does not generate any vicious infinite regress. To argue, 
as Grossmann does, that two qualities are equal in virtue of 
some single, common, feature; or, that two particular relat­
ions are equal in virtue of some common relation, is to simply 
beg the question against the particularist.
249. Grossmann next considers, and subsequently rejects, 
the argument for particularism which we considered in §244. 
This argument, it will be recalled, is that if there are two 
red pencils on the desk, and if these two pencils are exactly 
similar, or equal, in respect of their colours; and if one is 
subsequently destroyed, then the redness of one cannot be 
numerically identical with the redness of the other, since 
this would imply that one and the same entity may at once
262)
exist and not exist. Grossmann claims that this argument is 
valid only upon the assumption that the qualities of a sub­
stance are parts of that substance.
On the other hand, if we think of properties as being , 
exemplified by individuals, then it does not follow at 
all that the destruction of the individual leads to the 
destruction of its properties. The property of being a 
triangle, for ex ampie, is exemplified by the triangle A. 
If A is destroyed, then A no longer stands in the exemp­
lification relation to this property, but the property
r 22itself is not at all affected by the destruction of A.
The reply to this criticism is that it is based upon a 
theory of substances, and upon a theory of universals — both 
of which we have rejected as unsound. Grossmann is committed, 
firstly, to the view that a substance\is distinct from, and 
independent of, its nature; and this is a theory which Meinong 
rejected, and which in Chapters 4 and 5 we argued was unten­
able. Secondly, Grossmann escapes Meinong's criticism of the 
realist theory only by appealing to the doctrine which we 
rejected when first considering Stout s argument for partic­
ularism; namely, the doctrine that the qualities of spatially 
located substances do not, themselves, have a spatial locat­
ion. Thirdly, his argument is based upon the tacit acceptance 
of the theory of transcendent realism; and this theory, I have 
suggested, is not a genuine form of realism.
Concerning this last point, if the 'property' of triangu­
larity does not literally inhere in triangular particulars or
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substances, if it is simply related to many substances, then 
there is no need to assume that it is both one-and-many. But 
as we have seen, if the property of triangularity is one-and- 
not-many, it is particular. Grossmann’s argument, even if we 
accept his premisses, shows only that one version of partic­
ularism is false. It does not show that particularism in • 
general is false, or even implausible.
250. The next argument in favour of particularism which 
Grossmann considers is the following.
The entity t/itangutantty 0 / A is different from the ent­
ity tn.tangutan.tty of B, because it has the property of 
t<2.tng the. tntangutantty  0 / A, even though the entity
tn.tangutan.tty or the property tntangutan  is identical in 
23both. J
Grossmann claims that this argument is unsound, since the 
same type of argument would, if sound, prove that the quality 
¿on ofL John  cannot belong to the same entity as the quality 
¿on of Plany. In other words, Grossmann is suggesting that 
Meinong has simply assumed that the qualities tntangutantty 
of A and tn.tangutan.tty of B are incompatible in the same way 
that the qualities ¿on of John  and ¿on of Paut are incompat­
ible. But -the realist, according to Grossmann, would deny that 
the qualities are incompatible in the same way; and so Mein- _ 
ong's argument does not present any genuine problem for him.
However, if we accept two premisses - which Meinong did 
accept - namely (i) that the triangularity of A is a part of 
A (since A is simply a complex unity of various qualities);
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and (ii) that two distinct entities cannot have common parts; 
then the qualities ta.-ian.gal.a/1-it.y o-fL A, and t/i-iangii-la/ilty o/ B 
are incompatible qualities - assuming, of course, that A and 
B are distinct substances. Meinong1 s argument, in this case, 
would appear to be sound. ,
251. The fourth argument considered by Grossmann is attrib­
uted to Brentano. Bren tano argues - according to Grossmann - 
in a way which resembles the general objection against the 
reality of universal entities which we have put forward, that
the notion of a universal entity contains a contradiction. He 
suggests that if we believe that there are universal qualities 
then we must believe that two distinct entities can agree in 
every respect. And this is said to imply that two entities, 
say the redness of A, and the redness of B, are identical, 
i.e. one entity.
Grossmann claims, quite correctly, that the realist would 
deny that there are two entities involved. However, if we be­
gin with the assumption that there are two entities involved, 
then the realist is committed to the se1f-contradictory view 
that two entities are one entity. To avoid this contradiction, 
the realist must assume that there only cippza/i to be two ent­
ities involved .
What we see is not the same property in two different 
places, but - accurately speaking - the same property 
as exemplified by different individuals in two different 
places . ̂
In other words, if two pencils A and B are spatially
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distant, then even though the redness of A appears to be in 
the same location as A, and the redness of B appears to be in 
the same location as B, they do not, according to Grossmann, 
actually have any spatial location at all. And even though we 
seem to receive two reds, we do not, he claims, actually per-, 
ceive two reds.
I am prepared to suggest that this admission amounts to a 
/ie.du.ctdo a(L ad^u/iclum of Grossmann's theory. But apart from 
this, his theory is open to the objection which Stout has 
raised against similar views; namely, that it is only possible 
to perceive particular substances as having a spatial location 
if their sensible qualities are perceived as having a spatial 
location; and if we do, in fact, perceive the substances as 
having distinct spatial locations, this can only be in virtue 
of perceiving their respective qualities as having distinct 
spatial locations. From this it follows , if we accept the 
premiss that spatial distance is a sufficient condition for 
numerical diversity, that the sensible qualities of spatially 
distant substances must be diverse, and hence particular.
252. The final argument for particularism which Grossmann 
considers is an argument which he attributes to Stout. The 
argument in question can be found in Stout s original article 
on particularism, "The Nature of Universals and Propositions .
Stout starts with the assumption that we may perceive 
two perceptual objects as distinct, even though we do not
Gros smann s of the argument is as follows.
perceive any difference in their respective properties 
(their shapes, sizes, colours, etc.). He assumes,
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secondly, that a perceptual object is a complex of 'prop­
erties’. Hence, if one perceives two perceptual objects 
as distinct, one perceives two complexes as different.
But complexes differ only in their parts. Hence we must 
in this case perceive a difference in at least one part 
between the two perceptual objects. We must perceive that 
object A contains at least one part which object B does 
not contain, or conversely. Now, if the parts of A and B 
were really properties, then we could not perceive the 
two objects as distinct. Therefore, the 'properties' of
the two objects must really be particular. They must be
• u . • 25instances rather than properties.
Grossmann begins his criticism by suggesting that there is 
an apparent contradiction in Stout's argument since he starts 
with the assumption that the 'properties' are perceptually 
indistinguishable, and yet he reaches the conclusion that they 
must be perceptually distinguishable.
Now, as a reconstruction of Stout's actual argument, the 
above is quite inaccurate. There is, in fact, no such apparent 
inconsistency in Stout's actual argument. The assumption with 
which he actually begins is, that if two objects are perceived 
as distinct, and if the distinction is not p/iocondtttonod ty 
any dtAoa/znttJLa dtAA-LTnatcLfitty tattoo.on th.o q.ncLt'LttaS) , the qual­
ities must primarily be known as separate particulars, not as 
universals2^ . In other words, Stout does not assume that we 
may perceive two objects as distinct even though we do not 
perceive any difference in their qualities; only that we may 
perceive two objects as distinct even though we we perceive no
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dds> dm.ddLan.dLy between their qualities, i.e. even though we 
perceive their qualities as exactly similar or equal. The con­
clusion that the qualities must be particular is not, however, 
incompatible with the assumption that they are perceived to be 
exactly similar - since two particular qualities may, accord­
ing to Stout, be exactly similar and yet distinct, i.e. numer­
ically diverse.
After admitting that Stout may not be committed to any gen­
uine contradiction, Grossmann then admits that, if perceptual 
objects are, as Stout insists that they are, complexes of 
qualities, then it is plausible to assume that these qualities 
are as particular as the objects themselves. His whole case 
against Stout, and particularism in general, rests upon an 
assumption that Stout rejected - that substances or things 
have .qualities, although these qualities are not constituent 
parts or elements of these substances.
Grossmann seems to admit, in other, words, that the only 
way to avoid the truth of particularism is to assume that 
transcendent realism is true. But we have already seen that 
transcendent realism is, in fact, compatible with particular­
ism - as long as it is not combined with immanent realism.
And, since Grossmann rejects immanent realism, we may conclude 
that he has not shown that particularism is either false or 
inconsistent.
253. We have considered some arguments against particular­
ism from the point of view of transcendent realism. We will 
now consider the case against particularism as presented by 
an immanent realist.
2 54. In Chapter 8 of Undue.n.̂ d.yb and Scdo.nt.df.de Rca-id^m,
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D.M. Armstrong argues that the view that qualities and re­
lations are particular is false. His critique of particularism 
is divided into three stages. In the first stage he considers, 
and subsequently rejects as inconclusive, some arguments in 
favour of this doctrine. In the second stage he argues that 
the particularist is unable to give a satisfactory solution to 
what he calls the "problem of universals". In the final sect­
ion he argues that particularism is actually an incoherent 
doctrine. • :
255. We have already mentioned most of the arguments for 
particularism which Armstrong considers, so we can concentrate 
upon his specific criticisms of these arguments.
The first argument which he considers is actually a con- 1 
flation of two different arguments. The first of these is 
Meinong's argument that the realist is committed to the view 
that one and the same entity may at once exist and cease to 
exist. The second is Stout's argument, that one and the same 
quality cannot, at the same moment of time, occupy two or 
more distinct spatial positions. Armstrong describes the latt­
er as the problem of "multiple location". The fact that Arm­
strong does not offer any specific reply to Meinong s argument 
would seem to suggest that he erroneously considers it to be a 
species of the multiple—location argument. And his reply to 
the latter is that he considers it to simply beg the question 
by assuming, against the realist, that identity of substance 
is the same as identity of quality or property.
A particular (or substance) cannot be wholly present in
a multitude of different places and times. But a property
269)
can. This is to say no more than: a number of different
. 27particulars can all have the very same property.
Unfortunately, Armstrong does not explain why it is imposs­
ible for a particular to be wholly present in a multitude of 
different places and times. Presumably it is because it would 
imply that a particular may be what we have described as a 
universal entity - an entity which is one-and-many, and there­
fore impossible. But if properties may be wholly present in : 
more than one place at the same time, they must also be what 
we have called "universal", hence contradictory, entities.
The particularist is not arguing that substances and qualities 
do not haveJdifferent 'identity conditions'; but that neither,' 
under pain of contradiction, can be genuine universal entit­
ies. Furthermore, to say that a property or quality can be 
wholly present in more than one place and at more than one 
time is, as we have just seen, to say. considerably mo/ie. than 
that a number of different substances can all have the same 
property - since the latter view is held by transcendent 
realists such as Grossmann, who deny that properties can have 
any spatial or temporal location.
256. The second argument for particularism which Armstrong 
considers is based upon the fact that there are expressions 
such as "His poor condition led to his collapse , which osten­
sibly refer to particular , i . e . unique, qualities. The partic- 
ularist argues that such expressions cannot be translated into 
realist terminology without a significant and appreciable loss 
in meaning. For example, it is not the poor condition of Harry 
which is the cause of Paul's collapse, even though both Harry
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and Paul are in poor condition. So the poor condition of Harry 
must be numerically distinct from the poor condition of Paul.
Armstrong attempts to reply to this argument by introducing
the notion of a ¿tate. ofL a£JLa*Ln./>, or what McTaggart and others
have called a /aci. A state of affairs is defined as M a par-,
ticular's having a certain property, or two or more particu-
2 8lars standing in a certain relation" . The introduction of 
states of affairs is said to provide an account of the truth- 
conditions for expressions such as the one mentioned above, 
which account does not involve any reference to particular 
properties. It is the state of affairs, constituted by a par­
ticular and a property, or a set of properties, which is re­
ferred to by the expression "his poor condition". And it is 
this state of affairs which, Armstrong claims, is responsible 
for the person's collapse.
Now, it might be true that the introduction of states of 
affairs gives us a satisfactory account of the truth-condit­
ions for such expressions. But it does not, I suggest, avoid 
the problem of multiple location. Nor does it avoid Meinong's 
argument concerning the possible existence and non-existence 
of one and the same quality at a single moment in time. For 
example, if the state of affairs to be considered is that of 
a pencil having the quality of redness; what are we to under­
stand that* happens when this state of affairs ceases to exist 
— for example, if the pencil is painted blue? It can only be 
that either or both of the constituents of the state of aff­
airs in question ceases to exist. But it cannot be the pencil 
(i.e. the particular) which ceases to exist, so it must be the 
quality (i.e. the redness). But if the redness of the pencil
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is one and the same red as the red of my chair, for example, 
this would imply that the red of my chair ceases to exist 
when the red of the pencil ceases to exist - which is clearly 
untrue. To avoid this conclusion we must either accept that 
the red of the pencil is particular; or, adopt the theory of 
transcendent realism - according to which a state of affairs 
is constituted by a particular having a relation to a tran­
scendent property or quality, and according to which a state
of affairs ceases to exist when a particular ceases to be ..
related to a transcendent quality, i.e. when the relation 
between them ceases to exist. But neither solution would be 
accepted by Armstrong. So, we may conclude that his answer to 
the particularist's argument is ultimately unacceptable.
257. The third argument for particularism considered by 
Armstrong is directly attributed to Stout. It is stated brief­
ly in the following way.
The propositions:
(1) A particular is nothing but the sum of its prop­
erties ;
(2) Two particulars can resemble exactly;
(3) The identity view of properties is correct, 
form an inconsistent triad. Not all three can be true.
But (1) and (2) must be accepted. So (3) must be reject- 
ed.29
We have considered this argument already in relation to 
Grossmann's critique of particularism. And, like Grossmann, 
Armstrong claims that the only way to avoid inconsistency is
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to reject (1). But whereas Grossmann rejects it in favour of 
a relational, transcendent realism; Armstrong rejects it in 
favour of a non-relational, immanent realism. Now, we have 
seen that Grossmann's reply does not refute particularism. Can 
the same be said of Armstrong's. I think that it can.
Armstrong first of all suggests that it is an "intelligible 
possibility" that two particulars should have exactly the same 
nature, and that the realist can therefore accept (2) and (3) 
without being committed to the untenable doctrine of a Lockean 
"substratum" which is distinct from, and independent of, its 
qualities. But what does Armstrong mean by the phrase "exactly 
the same"? And is (2) an intelligible possibility for an imm­
anent realist theory? '
If the phrase "exactly the same" means "one and the same , 
then Armstrong is faced, once again with the problem of mult­
iple location - if the two distinct particulars in question 
have distinct spatial locations (which Armstrong claims, at a 
later stage, that all particulars have), and if immanent real­
ism fa true, he must admit that one and the same nature can ..—  
be, at a single moment of time, in two distinct spatial loc­
ations. But if spatial distance is a sufficient condition for 
numerical diversity, then Armstrong is committed to the self­
contradictory conclusion that one and the same nature is two. 
He cannot; for this reason, deny (1) and accept (2) and (3) 
if either immanent realism is true; or if particulars may have 
distinct spatial locations.
If, on the other hand, "exactly the same" means only "ex­
actly similar but numerically diverse", or "equal", then (3) 
is false, and Armstrong's theory is indistinguishable from
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particularism. In other words, contrary to Armstrong's claim, 
propositions (2) and (3) are n o t compatible either with each 
other, or with immanent realism.
258. Our discussion of Armstrong's replies to the partic­
ularisms arguments shows, then, that none is conclusive; and, 
that his own theory is not a genuine alternative to particu­
larism .
259. The second stage of Armstrong's critique of particu­
larism concerns the particu1arist's reply to what he calls the 
"Problem of Universals". What the exact nature of the problem 
is, however, is not entirely clear. It would seem to be that 
of explaining the fact of the One-over-Many. But if this is 
the nature of the problem, then the particularist should replj 
that there is no such problem to be resolved if particularism 
is true. For, if particularism is true, then there is, in fact 
no One which is over, or in, the Many. There is simply the 
Many . '•
This does not amount to a denial that things are, as a 
matter of fact, classified together. It is simply a denial of 
the view that they are classified together in virtue of any 
single common feature. For example, the many reds can be 
classified together because they are equal, and this equality 
between them is an ultimate fact incapable of further explan­
ation. The fact that many reds are classified together does 
not, furthermore, imply that they are therefore, in some 
sense, one entity, namely a ctci a -6. To talk of the class of 
reds is, rather, an elliptical way of saying that many reds 
are, in fact, classified together. It follows that, to a very 
real, and perhaps bewildering extent, the basis for classify­
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ing entities together is arbitrary; and determined by the
persons who do the classifying, rather tham by any objective
feature of the entities which are classified. It also follows
that there can be no classes which have only one member; since
to say that a class has only one member is, according to our
view, simply an elliptical way of saying that one entity is
3 0classified together with itself - which is nonsense .
We can also agree, with Armstrong, that the relation of 
equality between two terms is determined by the nature of the 
terms, i.e. in virtue of the terms being equal, rather than 
v dee. V(LfiAa; since we do not claim that the relation of equal­
ity between the two terms is the basis for them being classi­
fied together (i.e. for them being members of the same class).
Particularism, then, is not committed tofinding a solution 
to the problem of universals; since, if particularism is true, 
there is no such problem to be resolved.
260. Armstrong concludes his critique of particularism by 
attempting to show that it is positively incoherent. He offers 
two arguments in support of this contention.
The first argument isbased upon the premiss that a partic­
ular cannot instantiate a property more than once.
To say that a is F a n d that a is F is simply to say that
• tt 31 a is *r .
Armstrong considers this proposition to be self-evidently 
true. And he claims that its truth is incompatible with the 
truth of particularism.
But rather than being self-evidently true, the proposition
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is demonstrably false. If it were true, then it would be im­
possible for a cubic entity to instantiate the quality of 
being square-sided more than once, which it clearly does.
261. In his second argument, Armstrong argues that partic­
ularism must be supplemented with immanent realism to explain 
how particular qualities and relations can be classified and 
sorted; from which it is supposed to follow, in a way which is 
not entirely clear, that the original, particular qualities 
are not, in fact, particular but universal. But since the 
desired conclusion rests upon the premiss that particular 
qualities cannot be classified or sorted except in virtue of 
their possessing universal qualities, we can undermine Arm­
strong's criticism by showing that this premiss is false.
Now, if we are presented with the following particular 
qualities: red^, red2 > blue^, blue2 > upon what basis can they 
be sorted and classified? Why, for example, should red^ and 
red2  be classified together, and blue.̂  and blue2  be classified 
together; but blue^ and red^ be sorted apart? Armstrong claims 
that it is only if red^ and red2 have the universal quality 
redness; and if blue^ and blue2 have the universal quality 
blueness; and if neither red^ nor red2 has blueness, and if 
neither bluê  ̂ nor blue2 has redness. But this claim is clearly 
false. Red ̂ and red2 should be classified together because 
they are equal; and b 1 u e ̂ and blue2  should be classified to­
gether because they are equal. On the other hand, blue^ and 
red^ should be sorted apart because they are unequal. This 
does not mean that blue^ and blue2  should be classified to­
gether because they have a common or universal quality (Le.i.rig 
(tq.iLa.-t. It does imply that blue^ has the quality of being equal
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to blue2 ; and, that blue2  has the quality of being equal to 
blue^. But neither of these qualities is universal, and neith­
er is a necessary basis for classifying blue^ together with
blue2•
262. Neither of the above arguments establishes that part­
icularism is incoherent. And since none of Armstrong’s earlier 
replies to the various arguments in favour of particularism is 
conclusive, we may conclude that he has failed to show that 
particularism is false. •"
263. We may conclude this chapter by briefly pointing out 
the relevance of the truth of particularism to the principle 
of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. If particularism is true, 
then it follows that it is impossible for two substances to 
have one and the same nature; and if this is what is meant by 
the principle, then it is a necessary truth. But it is some­
times understood to mean that any two substances must have 
une.qu.al natures; in which case the truth of the principle does 
not follow from the truth of particularism. But it might still 
be true; and it might be capable of being proved to be so on 
quite different grounds.
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Appendix - C/ie.sswe.11 on 7.H. B/iadle.y
In his article, "Reality as Experience in F.H. Bradley", 
(Aust/ialas ian ¿oii/inat 0/ Philosophy, Vol.55, 1977, pp.169-188), 
Professor Cresswell has defended the following thesis concern­
ing the philosophy of F.H. Bradley.
the doctrine that reality is experience., is the found­
ation and presupposition of his whole metaphysics and.. 
the anti-relational and anti-pluralistic arguments which 
occur earlier in AR_ can only be understood on the assumpt­
ion that we already hold the view that reality is experi- 
1ence.
The establishment of this thesis is presupposed in Cress- 
well’s later article on Bradley’s theory of judgement (Canadian 
2- ou/inai ol Philosophy, Vol.9, 1 979, pp.575-594), and reference 
will not be made to this article except where it is directly 
relevant to the article under discussion.
In this paper I will argue that Cresswell has failed to 
establish his thesis. I will argue that the doctrine that 
reality is experience is neither a presupposition of, nor a 
self-evident axiom within, Bradley’s philosophy; and, that the 
’anti-relational’ arguments are both intelligible and defens­
ible, regardless of such a doctrine. In contrast to Cresswell,
I believe that if the above thesis could be established, it 
would render the greater part of Bradley’s arguments and con­
clusions more problematic, and less challenging, than they in
fact are.
I have divided my paper into three sections. In the first,
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I discuss Cresswell's account of Bradley’s view of the nature 
of experience, including the explanation he offers for Brad­
ley’s denial of the infallibility of judgements about immediate 
experience. The second section is concerned with Cresswell's 
interpretation of the arguments in the first three chapters 
of Appe.an.ance and Reality. In this section I reject Cresswell's 
contention that the arguments in these three chapters presupp-
ose the acceptance of the doctr 
and offer my own interpretation 
conclusions.
In the final section I discu 
Cresswell's paper with which I 
account of Bradley's theory of
1. In the first section of h 
Bradley's views on the nature o 
features of his discussion sugg 
to fully appreciate the signifi 
ley's position.
(a) On page 172, Cresswell, 
Bradley's view of experience as 
The sense in which the term "pr 
stood remains, however, unclear 
describe a theory of experience 
images, etc. are "passively ent
Its principal use was insi 
theory which conceived of 
or taHata n.as>a on which ar 
of events, inner or outer.
m e  that reality is experience, 
of these arguments and their
ss some further aspects of 
disagree - in particular, his 
degrees of truth and its basis.
is paper, Cresswell discusses 
f experience. A number of 
est, however, that he has failed 
cance and uniqueness of Brad­
following Wollheim, describes 
essentially "presentational", 
esentational" is to be under­
. Wollheim used the term to 
according to which ideas, 
ertained" by the mind.
de a more general psychological
the mind somewhat as a screen
e projected the inert pictures 
2
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He then adds that Bradley used the expression much as any­
one else who would have subscribed to this "cabinet” theory 
of mind. When Cresswell informs us, on page 1 7 2 , that, accord­
ing to Bradley, experience is something that "comes to us", 
or is "given to us", he seems to be using the term "present­
ational" in much the same way as Wollheim does.
This description of Bradley's views on the nature of exper­
ience is, I believe, incorrect. Taken literally, it would 
imply that all experience is experience -fLon. a subject - whether 
this subject be some sort of transcendent Ego, or analogous to 
an empty cabinet or tatuia /iclacl. Such a view is, I believe, ■ 
implicit in Cresswell’s claim, on page 171, that Bradley con­
sidered all,,experience to be conscious experience. Secondly, 
such a view would seem to presuppose the existence of a 
substantial self as the owner of the experiences; and, further, 
that this self is, or can be conceived of as being, something
distinat from, and transcending its experiences. .
But none of the above views was accepted by Bradley. In the 
first place, he denied that his view of experience involved 
any relation to a subject or Ego. When he speaks of experience 
as glve.n> this does not mean that experience is presented to 
a subject. In a number of places he explicitly rejected any 
such implication. In his unfinished essay on relations, for
example, he writes:
And if we mean by ’given’ here to imply a relation of 
object to subject, then we must certainly avoid the word 
’given*. For immediate experience, taken strictly, is
. 3free from every kind of relation.
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Secondly, he 
experience - if 
consciousness.
denied that all experience is 
conscious experience is to be
conscious 
identified with
Consciousness is not co-extensive with experience. It is 
not original, nor at any time is it all-inclusive, and it 
is inconsistent with itself in such a way as to point to 
something higher. (ETR, p.192)
The sense in which Cresswell uses the expression "conscious 
experience" is unclear, and it is possible that, when ascribing 
the view to Bradley, he would not wish to identify conscious 
experience with consciousness. On the other hand, it is diffi­
cult to understand how any experience oould be a contclouA 
experience if it did not involve a relation to a subject. The 
being of an object for a subject is, I suggest, the mark of 
consciousness; and, as I have suggested above, Bradley rejected 
the view that experience is co-extensive with consciousness.
To say that, for Bradley, all experience is conscious experi­
ence is, for this reason, if not incorrect, at best misleading.
Thirdly, Bradley denied the reality of a substantial self. 
The conclusion he draws as a result of his inquiry into the 
status of the self is that it is at best a coru>t/iuctlonf and 
hence neither fundamental nor ultimate in experience. The self, 
according to Bradley, has an acLje.ctiuat rather than a ¿udAtant- 
lai mode of being. This conclusion is probably one of the 
better known features of Bradley’s philosophy, and it is in­
compatible with a presentational view of experience, and with 
the view that all experience is conscious experience.
(b) There is yet another feature of the presentational view
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of experience which is incompatible with Bradley's actual 
views. A presentational account of experience typically effects 
a division, in the manner of Kant, not only between subject 
and object, but also between thought and sensation and their 
respective faculties. It is a prevalent preconception - shared, 
to an extent, by Cresswell (notably on pages 170-173, when 
describing the ’levels' of experience) - that, according to 
Bradley's views on the relation between thought and experience,, 
the former somehow operates on, and subsequently dismembers, 
what is initially given as an harmonious and self-consistent 
whole or Qe.s>tatt. This view may have gained some credence from 
Wollheim's use of the passage from Valery as an epigraph to 
his book on Bradley. Thinking, accordingly, is understood to 
be an impeachable activity which someho-w falsifies the merely 
given. The resultant implication being that if we can refrain 
from thought, and simply contemplate the given, then we will 
have reality in its true character as immediate experience. 
Furthermore, this falsification of the given is understood to 
be the work of an active subject or Ego upon passive material - 
it is io£.y as finite subjects, whom, it is alleged, are respon­
sible for corrupting what would otherwise remain unblemished. 
This view may have attractions, and it is not without phil­
osophical precedent, but as a strict account of Bradley s 
views it is quite inaccurate. Its acceptance would involve, for 
one thing, 'the introduction of something like a faculty theory 
of the mind - a view which Bradley found neither appealing nor 
consistent/ Secondly, it would imply that thinking alone is 
responsible for the felt discord involved in the process of 
what Bradley called ideation - the loosening or disjunction of 
the u>hat from the that, of content from existence.
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As against a faculty theory of the mind, with its emphasis
upon the exclusivity and discontinuity between the various
faculties, Bradley constantly stressed the continuity and ,
interdependence of all aspects of our mental life. And, as
against the related tendency to see thought as the merely
subjective and spontaneous activity of isolated and self-
enclosed monads, Bradley considered it to be an activity of ■
the Universe in and through finite centres of experience as its
primary differentiations. In stressing the continuity of these
finite centres with the rest of the Universe, judgement and
inference are described as being the ideal self-development
5of the Absolute. ;
As for the responsibility for the disruption of the immedi­
ate unity of experience involved in ide-ation, this must be 
shared. We read, for example, that "the immediate unity in 
which facts come to us, has been broken up by experience, and 
by reflection." (AR p.19)» And, when explaining the 
concept of ideation, he adds:
It is not manufactured by thought, but thought itself is 
its development and product. (AR p.14-8)
It is clear, then, that although, on Bradley’s view, all 
thought involves ideation, he does not hold that all ideation 
is the result of thought alone. In so far as Cresswell fails 
to emphasise, or even to acknowledge, this point, he accord­
ingly fails to capture a significant feature of Bradley's 
views on the levels of experience. In keeping with the present­
ational view, Cresswell describes the level of immediate 
experience as "what is presented to us before any reflection
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has taken place" (p.171); and, as "the level at which experi­
ence comes to us before the mind has put it into a relational 
framework" (p.171).
But Bradley did not maintain, as might be inferred from 
Cresswell’s account, that the level of immediate experience 
is transcended at the relational level in the sense that the 
aspect of immediacy is completely lacking in the latter; or, 
that the first two levels are mutually exclusive. Immediate 
experience, according to Bradley, "is not a stage which may or 
may not at some time have been there and now has ceased to 
exist." (ETR p.178). In a later note he adds:
We never in one sense do, or can, go beyond immediate 
experience. Apart from the immediacy of ’this1 and ’now1 
we never have, or can have, reality. The real, to be real, 
must be felt.. Distinction and separation into substant­
ives and adjectives, terms and relations, alienate the 
content of immediate experience from the form of immedi­
acy which still on its side persists. (ETR p.190n)
The three levels of experience should not, then, be under­
stood as being distinct stages in an hierarchical structure. 
They are better understood, instead, as indicative of a shift 
in emphasis or attention from the immediate to the mediated 
aspect, which together are said to characterise all experience, 
The notion of levels of experience, like that of degrees of
reality cannot, accordingly, be taken as being ultimate - a
 ̂ -+ ^point which Bradley himself elsewhere admits.
The doctrine is a difficult one to grasp, and possibly even 
more difficult to explain without recourse to misleading
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metaphors. But it does have some advantages. It is, for 
example, perhaps the one view which allows us to understand 
how the distinction between experience and what is experienced,, 
or between feeling and what is felt, can be more or less valid, 
without being ultimate.
(c) Cresswell’s account of Bradley’s view of experience as 
strictly presentational, and his apparent failure to appreciate 
the essentially relative nature of the distinction between the 
levels of experience has also, I believe, led to his misunder­
standing the basis for Bradley’s denial of the infallibility 
of judgements about immediate experience. According to Cress- 
well (p.171), the reason why Bradley thought that such judge- : 
ments are, in principle, subject to error, was that he took 
immediate experience qua object of knowledge, to be different 
from immediate experience pevi ¿e..
The problem with immediate experience is that we cannot 
use it as it stands because the moment we use it in 
Bradley’s view, we change it. The experience becomes in 
his terminology, the object of experience and therefore 
changes its character. This is the reason he believes 
that although immediate experience itself is infallible,_ 
no judgement about immediate experience is infallible.
(p.171 )
Now, it might be the case that, as Cresswell suggests, 
immediate experience qua object of knowledge is different from 
immediate experience pe./i But we have no right to simply
assume that it is; and if Bradley's argument did rest upon 
such an assumption it would not, as such, be sound. Furthermore
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there is nothing in the passage cited by Cresswell to support 
his contention that this is, in fact, the basis of Bradley's 
argument.
A more satisfactory basis for the denial of the infallibil­
ity of judgements about immediate experience is to be found,
I believe, in Bradley's theory of the essentially conditioned, 
and conditional, nature of all judgements. According to this 
theory, all judgements, including judgements about immediate 
experience - or what, in Ike, P nincip ie./> o-fL Logic,, are termed 
"analytic judgements of sense" - are at once conditioned and 
conditional, and, for this reason, subject to error. Unlike 
the view put forward by Cresswell it does not rest upon any 
intuitive appeal to what is merely given in experience, Nor 
does it presuppose the acceptance of the premiss that reality 
is experience.
Although the theory of the conditioned and conditional 
nature of judgement is discussed in Cresswell's later article, 
I don't see that he anywhere acknowledges the connection be­
tween this theory and Bradley's denial of the infallibility of 
judgements about immediate experience. Cresswell's statement 
on page 581 of the later article, that Bradley's principal 
reason for denying the infallibility of such judgements "is 
the familiar one that experience comes to us as a whole and 
not split up into parts", confirms my belief on this point.
2. I will now consider Cresswell's interpretation of Brad­
ley' s arguments in the first three chapters of Appea/iance, and.
Re,aiity.
In Section II of his paper, Cresswell attempts to show that 
the arguments in Chapters 1 to 3 of AR presuppose the '
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identification of reality with experience. I will now argue 
that this contention is unjustified; that the arguments used 
by Bradley are both intelligible and defensible regardless of 
this assumption.
Parts (a), (b) and (c) of this section of my paper deal
respectively with Cresswell's interpretations of Chapters I,
II and III of Appe.a/ianc.2. and Rzatity,
(a) Cresswell’s discussion of Bradley’s arguments against 
the soundness of the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is, I believe, based upon a confusion. He assumes 
that the arguments are designed to show that neither the 
primary, nor the secondary qualities are real. Bradley’s in­
tention is, however, quite different. His arguments are intend­
ed to show not that both primary and secondary qualities are 
unreal, but that the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, and the subsequent attempt to uphold the reality 
of one type, the primary, to the exclusion of the other, is 
ultimately indefensible. My interpretation is supported by 
Bradley’s own conclusion at the end of the chapter, where he 
writes:
We have found then that, if the secondary qualities are 
appearance, the primary are certainly not able to stand 
by themselves. (AR_ p.15)
The argument to show the unreality of the secondary quali­
ties in Chapter I (AR pp.9-11) is not, as Cresswell assumes, 
a statement of Bradley's own views. It is, rather, as is point­
ed out on page 9 , a restatement of the view, which he attrib­
utes to the 'materialist', that the secondary qualities are m
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some way derivative, or that they are mere appearances of the 
primary qualities which are alone considered to be real.
Bradley's own distrust of the distinction between the ,
primary and secondary qualities of a thing is based upon the 
belief that the argument used by the materialist to show that 
the secondary qualities are unreal is equally forceful, if
applied consistently, in demonstrating the unreality of the ..
primary qualities. In addition to this problem, the materialist 
is also, according to Bradley, faced with the problem of ex­
plaining how, if the secondary qualities are unreal, they can 
be related to the primary; and, why, if they are derivative, 
it is the case that we can neither conceive, nor image, the :
primary qualities apart from the secondary.
r' J
Accordingly, the four arguments foun,d on pages 12 to 1$ of 
AR are not, as is alleged by Cresswell (p.174-), intended to 
prove that the primary qualities are unreal. Rather, they are 
directed against the materialist who takes the primary quali­
ties to be the only real qualities of things. The first of 
these four arguments is based upon an alleged inconsistency in 
the term/relation schema, and as such does not receive an 
adequate treatment until Chapters II and III.
The second of the four arguments highlights the difficulties 
inherent in any attempt to explain the relation between the 
secondary or merely apparent qualities, and the primary or 
real qualities. If the primary are understood to be the only 
real qualities of a thing, then an account must he given of the 
ontological status of the secondary qualities. To grant them 
apparent existence is said to be meaningless. And to deny them 
any existence whatsoever is said to be fatal to the validity of 
the distinction in question. For, if the secondary qualities
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do not, as such, exist, then it is not strictly correct to say 
that they are the secondary qualities anything. The dilemma 
which, according to Bradley, is faced by the materialist, might 
be expressed in the antinomy that the secondary qualities must 
belong, and yet cannot belong, to the primary.
If, on the other hand, we attempt to avoid this contradict­
ion by granting both the primary and the secondary qualities 
independent existence, then it is absurd to say that either is 
a mere appearance of the other; and we are left to affirm a 
relation between the two classes of qualities which, in terms 
of the theory, remains unexplained and inexplicable. Further­
more, to say that the'secondary qualities are genuine qualities 
and then to insist that they are merely apparent qualities, is 
to affirm a contradiction. So, whether .we adopt the view that 
the secondary qualities are mere appearances of the primary, 
or whether we consider them each to have an independent mode 
of existence, the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities remains unacceptable.
The third of the four arguments is largely an application 
of the materialist's own argument against the reality of the 
secondary qualities, to show that it is equally valid against 
the primary qualities. Bradley's point is, that the argument­
ation used by the materialist to prove that the secondary 
qualities are mere appearances, i.e. because they do not exist 
except in relation to a sentient being, will equally prove that 
the primary qualities are mere appearances. The quality of 
spatial extension, for example, in so far as it is a perceived 
quality of things, is no better off with respect to its ulti- , 
mate reality, than the secondary qualities. Our awareness of 
the spatial extendedness of things is, as in the case of their
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colour, taste, texture, etc., related to, and consequent upon, 
the affection of sensory organs which, themselves, have no 
spatial extension except in relation to another sensory organ 
(AR p.13). We do not, as Bradley remarks, seem to have any 
"miraculous intuition" of spatial extension apart from sense 
experience. But, if not, extension, as a so-called "primary" 
quality, ranks with the secondary qualities and shares their 
ontological fate.
The fourth of Bradley’s arguments follows Berkeley, to an 
extent, by denying the conceivability of primary qualities 
apart from the secondary. The persuasiveness of this type of 
argument is debatable, and the assessment of its merits would 
involve a discussion of principles beyond the scope of this 
paper. The point is well made, however,- if it places the onus 
of proof of the possibility of the existence of independent 
primary qualities on the side of the materialist. In so far as 
we do not, as a matter of fact, perceive the primary qualities 
thus isolated, I think it achieves the required shift in the 
onus of proof. The very least that needs to be shown, on the 
materialist's behalf, is that what he takes to be real is not 
little more than the illegitimate offspring of a process of 
vicious" abstraction - a point which Bradley makes on pages 11 
and 1 5 •
None of Bradley's arguments in Chapter I of AR, thus under­
stood, depends upon the premiss that reality is experience. 
Cresswell's thesis remains, thus far, unsubstantiated.
(b) Before discussing Bradley's arguments in Chapter II of 
AR, we should note that it is not his intention, in this chapt­
er, to criticise specifically the concept of a s u b s t a n c e .  The 
distinction between a substance and its attributes or qualities
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is only one instance of the more general general distinction 
between substantive and adjective criticised by Bradley. The 
notion of a substance, and the consequent distinction between 
the substance and its qualities, often has a narrower, and 
more technical application than that of a substantive. For 
example, it is p/iima £ac.ie, possible for a quality to be a 
substantive - as the bearer of further qualities - although it 
is, by most definitions of a substance as that which has qual­
ities without being itself a quality, impossible for a quality 
to be a substance. This distinction is important for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, if the substantive/adjective schema, rath­
er than the substance/quality schema is shown to be untenable, 
then it will be impossible to consistently ascribe any relat­
ional qualities to a quality; and this,, as I hope to show, has 
a significant bearing upon Bradley's arguments in Chapter III. 
Secondly, if the substantive/adjective schema is shown to be 
untenable, then there will be a basic inconsistency in the 
view, considered below, which takes a thing to be simply 
various qualities in relation.
Cresswell1s brief discussion of Chapter II of AR is rather 
difficult to follow. His interpretation seems to be based upon 
the understanding that Bradley subscribed to the logical theory 
that the copula in a predicative judgement of the form Sugar 
is white", affirms the ungrounded identity of the subject and 
the predicate terms (p.175). Wollheim takes a similar view 
when he attempts to show that Bradley believed all subject- 
predicate type judgements to be concealed or implicit identity 
statements; and, ultimately, reducible to tautologies7. Accord­
ing to this theory, the judgement "Sugar is white" is to be 
read as "Sugar = Whiteness". Such a judgement, whether read
in intension or extension, is clearly false; and, according to 
Cresswell, gives rise to a contradiction.
Consider the case of a red apple. When presented with this 
in immediate experience we are only presented with one 
thing. In experience, the redness and the apple are one.
On the other hand we do not yet have, Bradley would I 
think rightly claim, the apple as a thing apart from its 
qualities. It is as if we were presented with two quali­
ties, appleness and redness. But, and this for Bradley is 
the important point, at the. toioe-òt tevet, the. tevet 0/ 
im.me.di ¿ate ex.pe/iienee, theòe tivo aste one. Put as baldly as 
this of course the assertion is blatantly contradictory. 
And its contradictoriness is precisely the reason why we 
move to the next level up. (p.175)
This interpretation is unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it fails to point to any internal inconsist­
ency in the substantive/adjective distinction. At best it shows 
that this schema is inappropriate when applied to the level of 
immediate experience. Given the additional assumption that 
reality is immediate experience, it would, perhaps, lead to 
the conclusion that the substantive/adjective schema is in­
appropriate when applied to reality. But the argument, m  this 
form, neither supports Cresswell1s overall thesis, nor does it 
faithfully present Bradley's actual views. Cresswell*s overall 
thesis is that the arguments in Chapter II presuppose the 
doctrine that reality is experience; but the argument, as
tated above, is based upon the premiss that reality is immecL-
- rr,1~~ distinction is significant in so far as
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Bradley explicitly denied that immediate experience can he
gtaken as a criterion of reality.
Secondly, Bradley does not, at any point in his argument in 
Chapter II, make any claims about what is, or is not merely 
given, at the level of immediate experience. Nor, as I hope to---- 
show, need any assumptions about what is given at the level of 
immediate experience be made to render his arguments plausible 
or intelligible.
Thirdly, it is incorrect, or at best misleading, to suggest 
that Bradley is here, or elsewhere in his work, committed to 
the view that the copula in a predicative judgement affirms 
the identity of the subject and predicate terms. Cresswell 
himself, earlier in his article admits, somewhat inconsistent­
ly, that Bradley explicitly rejected such a reading when con­
sidering the analysis of predication. It is also against the 
whole spirit of the discussion in Chapter II to commit Bradley 
to a predetermined view on the significance of the copula. What 
significance, if any, is to be attached to the copula, and 
whether or not there is any consistent theory of inherence or 
predication, are the precise questions at issue in this chap­
ter. And it would be simply question-begging by Bradley to 
base his criticisms upon the assumption that the U  in a 
judgement such as "Sugar is white", is alsways the is> of
identity.
Bradley's actual reasons for rejecting the soundness of the 
substantive/adjective distinction can, I believe, be shown to 
rest upon quite different grounds to those put forward by 
Cresswell. There are, according to Bradley, two ways in which 
the substantive/adjective distinction might be understood. In 
the more concrete example of a thing and its qualities, the
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‘thing’ might be considered to be distinct from, and independ­
ent of, its qualities; or, the thing might be considered to be 
its various qualities in relation. The discussion of the 
latter view is continued in Chapter III.
According to the first view, the thing is not to be identi­
fied with one or more of its qualities. To say that sugar is 
white, hard, and sweet, is not to say that it is merely white­
ness, hardness and sweetness. The simple conjunction of the 
diverse qualities does not, according to Bradley, constitute a 
genuine unity; and we cannot simply unite the diverse qualities 
without stipulating a ground for their being united. Thus, it 
is maintained, the ’thingr must be postulated as a distinct 
and unifying ground. According to this view, the thing is not 
identical with its qualities; it simply.ka* them. The copula 
in a predicative judgement is to be understood, accordingly, 
as signifying a relation of ’ownership’ between the entity 
denoted by the subject term, and the entity denoted by the 
predicate term. But to say that a thing ’has’ its qualities 
does not, according to Bradley, resolve the initial problem of 
inherence. It only introduces a new, and unexplained metaphor 
to disguise the difficulty. The thing might be said to have or 
to own its qualities, but an explanation must then be given of 
what it means to say that a thing ’owns’ its qualities - and I 
don’t think that this is a problem for jurisprudence.
It might also be pointed out that if the copula is under­
stood to signify a relation of ownership between the thing and 
its qualities, not only are we faced with the need to give an 
intelligible account of the meaning of this relation, but, in 
making such a distinction between the thing and its qualities, 
we seem to have thereby granted a measure of independence to
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the respective terms of the relation. We are then faced with 
the problem of explaining in what way a thing can be said to 
be independent of its qualities.
Whether or not it is possible for a thing to exist independ-' 
ently of its qualities is an important question. And, although 
Bradley does not explicitly discuss this problem, there are, I 
believe, perhaps conclusive reasons for denying that it is 
possible. If each is granted an independent existence, then to 
say that they are uni t e d to form a thing, or substance, can only 
mean that they stand in some relation which unites them. And 
this is to assume that relations do, in fact, unite, rather 
than simply relate, their terms - an assumption which is, I 
believe, false; or at best, highly contentious. Furthermore, 
if it is in principle possible for a thing to exist apart from 
its qualities, then it must be possible for it to exist inde­
pendently of the quality of existence - which is absurd. And if 
it is suggested that existence is not universally admitted to 
be a quality of things, we might still argue that a thing can 
not exist independently of the quality of thinghood or sub­
stantiality - and to deny this, once again, is absurd.
It might be suggested, however, that to speak of trying to 
@xplain the relation between a thing and its qualities is to 
beg an important question; namely, whether there is, in fact, 
any such relation. In support of this contention, it might be 
pointed out that a non-sie,tationat unity between the thing and 
its qualities is what we are given in experience, and any 
attempt"to understand this non-relational unity in terms of a ” 
relational re-construction is bound to lead to difficulties.
It seems to me that there are two possible replies to this 
suggestion. The first is to point out that such a unity would
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seem to preclude the existence of a relation of difference 
between the two terms; and this, in turn, would involve sac­
rificing the mutual independence of the thing and its qualities 
- which* contradicts our initial assumption that they are mut-'~~ 
ually independent. Secondly, it would not relieve us of the 
problem of determining whether such a unity is intelligible. 
According to Bradley, all thought is essentially discursive, 
and can function only through the machinery of terms and re­
lations. A non-relational unity may be fact, but it remains 
strictly unintelligible.
The second way of construing the distinction between a 
thing and its qualities which Bradley considers is that which 
takes the thing to be nothing more than its various qualities
in relation. *
An obvious criticism of this view is that it is unable to 
offer any satisfactory account of predication or inherence - 
which is the basis of the substantive/adjective distinction.
If we reject the notion of a distinct thing, of which the 
qualities may be predicated, or in which they inhere, then it 
becomes strictly incorrect to say that the qualities are the 
qualities o/ anything; and the more general substantive/adject 
ive distinction becomes meaningless. We might, however, uphold 
the distinction by a kind of licence. Although the qualities 
do not literally belong to a distinct and independent thing, 
they might still be said to comprise a thing when related in a 
particular fashion. The plausibility of this view rests ultim­
ately upon the assumption that the quality/relation schema is 
internally consistent; and in Chapter III, Bradley argues, of 
course, that it is not. But for the moment we can, I think, 
reject this view on quite different grounds.
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Bradley considers three possible interpretations of the 
view that a thing is simply its various qualities in relation. 
The first is to take the relations to be further qualities of 
the original qualities of the thing; i.e. to reduce relations 
to qualities of the terms which they relate. The second attem­
pts to reduce the qualities to relations. The third takes re­
lations and qualities to be distinct and mutually independent 
entities. Bradley argues that none of the above views can give 
a satisfactory account of the assumed unity of the thing.
The difficulties with the first of these views are set out
by Bradley on page 17 of AR. Two qualities, A and B, which
stand to each other in the relation r, are said to comprise a 
thing. The relation cannot, however, be a quality of only one 
of these terms; since it would not, then, unite both terms, 
and the unity which is said to be constituted by the two terms 
A and B in relation would be dissolved into two independent 
terms - one with the relation as a quality, and one without. 
Nor can* the relation be predicated of the two terms taken 
severally. If I say that A is larger than B, the relation 
ia/ig&si than is not equally a characteristic of both A and B.
To say that A has the relation La/ige./i than, and B has the
relation largest than, is not equivalent to saying that A is 
larger than B. If the relation is to be a characteristic of 
the two terms taken severally, they are simply not related.
A different criticism can be made against the second view - 
that qualities are ultimately reducible to relations. If we 
deny the irreducibility of qualities to relations, then we 
would seem to be committed to the view that it is never true 
that a relation has the quality of being a relation; or, that 
any one relation differs from another - since relations can
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only, presumably, differ from each other by means of their 
different qualities. But I don’t think that it is necessary 
to press criticisms of this view. I don’t believe that it has 
ever been genuinely advocated, and I don’t see that it possibly 
could be.
The third, and probably the most plausible, alternative 
open to the view which equates a thing with its various qual­
ities in relation, is that which takes the qualities and the 
relations to be independent existents. Bradley’s discussion of 
this view pre-empts, to an extent, the discussion of the 
quality/relation distinction given in the next chapter. His 
conclusion, at this stage, is simply that if qualities and 
relations are distinct and independent existents, and if we 
are unable to consistently predicate the one of the other, 
then they can be united only oy stipulating a distinct and 
independent ground for their being united. Having rejected the 
possibility of this ground being an independent substance or 
substratum, the only other ground for their being united would 
appear to be a further relation, r ’, itself an independent 
existent. But this relation, in turn, requires an independent 
ground for its being united with the original qualities A and 
B, and the original relation, r. This further ground can only 
be provided by another relation, r ’’; and so on indefinitely. 
The regress of relations thus precipitated is vicious, however, 
since there must be a last term in the series in order that 
there may be a genuine unity between the original qualities,
A and B ; and yet, because of the nature of the terms involved, 
and because of the nature of the regress generated, there 
cannot be a last term in the series. In the end we are left 
with a plurality of qualities and relations, each independently
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real, without any genuine unity between them. And this, of 
course, fails to provide a solution to the question of the 
basis for the supposed unity of the thing.
It should be noted, at this stage, that Bradley does not 
assume that relations are independently real. On page 18 of 
AR he explicitly rejects this view. Nor does he assume that 
they are of the same ontological type as qualities. He merely 
points out that if either of these assumptions is made to be 
the basis for an explanation of the nature of a thing, then 
inconsistencies will arise which oblige us to either abandon 
these premisses, or dismiss the supposed unity of a thing as 
a fiction. According to the latter conclusion, there are no 
’things1 as such, only simple qualities and relations. Whether 
or not such a view is ultimately tenable is further discussed 
in Chapter III of A_R. But even at this point, there are, acc­
ording to Bradley, reasons to doubt that such a view could be 
consistently held. For, if these simple qualities are truly 
simple, they cannot, themselves, have further qualities. It 
would, for this reason, never be literally true to say that 
they have the quality of being related to each other - which 
seems to be a /idcLuci- ¿0 ad̂ usiclum of the attempt to explain 
the unity of a thing in terms of independent qualities and 
relations.
Once again, Bradley's arguments, thus interpreted, do not 
rest upon "bhe assumption that reality is experience. And I 
don’t see that they would be rendered any more plausible if 
this assumption were to be included as a premiss.
(c) On page 176 of his article, Cresswell states that the •­
arguments in Chapter III of AR are intended to prove that re­
lations are unreal. But this contention is not, strictly
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speaking, correct. In a number of places (e.g. AR_ pp.21 & 28), 
Bradley points out that it is his intention to show that there 
is a problem with the more general quality/relation schema.
His ultimate conclusion is that both qualities and relations 
ought to be rejected, not just relations. The failure to 
appreciate this fact has led some critics and commentators to 
believe that Bradley was a proponent of the doctrine of in­
ternal relations - according to which relations are either 
ultimately reducible to charcteristics of their terms, or else 
determined by the nature of their terms. In rejecting the 
entire quality/relation schema, he thereby rejected both the 
doctrine of internal, as well as that of merely external re­
lations; although he considered the former doctrine to be less 
misleading with respect to the ultimate status of relations 
than the latter.
Bradley’s argument has four main stages. The first is to 
show that qualities presuppose relations; the second that they 
are incompatible with relations. The third and fourth stages 
profess to show that similar difficulties arise from the side 
of relations, i.e. that they at once presuppose, and are in­
compatible with, qualities. Cresswell's discussion is confined 
mainly to the first two stages.
Apart from the attempt to show that Bradley’s argument is 
more easily explained if the assummption that reality is ex­
perience is used as a premiss, Cresswell's treatment of the 
first stage is not very contentious. He himself admits, on 
page 177, that he has failed to show that the argument does 
rest upon this assumption.
The upshot of the remarks made in the discussion of the
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first argument is that while perhaps we are not given 
absolutely conclusive evidence that Bradley is here 
depending upon the assumption that reality is experience 
yet its length and complexity are I believe considerably 
more easily explained by that assumption.
The actual basis of Bradley’s argument is, as Cresswell 
earlier would seem to admit (p.1 7 6 ), to be found in the con­
tention that all difference implies a relation; and that, since 
there are no qualities, as such, where there is no difference 
or distinctness, there can be no qualities without relations. 
Bradley^ s supports this conclusion with two lines of argument., 
The first attempts to show that the conclusion is justified 
from an empirical standpoint; the second is based upon meta­
physical considerations and, as such, is the most important.
The first line of argument points out that, as a matter of 
fact, qualities are never found independently of relations. To 
the possible objection that we are nonetheless capable of 
thinking of them independently, and that it is therefore poss­
ible that they may exist independently, Bradley replies that 
this argument rests upon what he considers to be the unjusti­
fiable separation of the product of a process of abstraction 
from the process itself.
This is not, however, a conclusive refutation of the view 
that qualities may exist independently of relations. At best 
it achieves a shift in the onus of proof. What is needed is a 
proof that qualities cannot exist independently of relations. 
This is, I think, provided by Bradley's second line of argu­
ment .
The proof is quite straightforward, and can be set out in
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the following way.
Premiss 1 : There are no qualities, as such, where there is no
diversity.
Premiss 2 : There is no diversity where there is no difference. 
Premiss 3 : There is no difference without a relation. 
Conclusion: There are no qualities, as such, without relations.
The only premiss which might be doubted is, perhaps, the 
third. Cresswell (p.176) states that the common-sense view on 
the matter is that Mof course there cannot be a plurality with­
out a relation". To my mind, the premiss is evidently true. 
Bradley apparently thought otherwise, and offered the following 
argument in its favour. '
We are asked to consider two distinct qualities, A and B. 
Bradley argues that if the difference falls anywhere ’outside1 i 
or ’between’ the two qualities, then we have a distinct re­
lation between them. The difference, on the one hand, cannot 
be a quality of A, since A would then have a diverse nature - 
it would, in fact, be two qualities in relation, and the prob­
lem of inherence would arise once again. The same difficulty 
arises if we take the difference to be a quality of B. The 
difference between the two qualities cannot, accordingly, be 
identified with a quality of either, or of both terms. It must, 
pp pp pg real, fall (L£.t,u)£.iz.ri A and B. But this sense of an 
irreducible 'betweenness1 is precisely that which is understood 
by some philosophers9 to be a definitive feature of relations. 
Wherever there is a diversity or difference, there is, accord­
ingly > relation.
It might be suggested that the difference, as such, arises
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only as the result of a mental process of comparison; and, 
that all relations are thus dependent upon a mind which com­
pares the various terms. This is essentially the view of both 
Green and Lotze . But even if this theory is true, it does 
not undermine our conclusion that all difference implies a 
relation between the different terms. It only obliges us to 
maintain that relations are mind-dependent. The relation is 
still understood to be External1 to, or ’between1 its terms.
This feature of Bradley’s argument is significant for the 
additional reason that it undermines the basis for the belief 
that, following Lotze and (according to some interpretations) 
Leibniz, he attempted to reduce all relations to qualities of 
their terms.
Having shown that all difference imp-lies a relation between 
the different terms, Bradley once again stresses the fact that 
where there are no differences, there are no qualities proper, 
"since all must fall into one" (AR_ p.25). His overall conclus­
ion being that the notion of a quality existing independently 
of any relations is absurd.
The second stage of Bradley's argument against the quality/ 
relation schema is intended to show that qualities are incom­
patible with relations. Cresswell's analysis of this stage of 
Bradley's argument is, at times, difficult to follow. On page 
177, for example, he suggests that tying unde,/i a is a
relation; he then proceeds to argue as if it is a relational 
quality. In a footnote to that page he deliberately conflates 
’ the two,"and suggests that, "for present purposes", the dis­
tinction is unimportant. But the failure to acknowledge the 
importance of the distinction between relations and relational 
qualities has, I believe, left his argument in this section of
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his paper (pp.177-179) both inconclusive and confusing. As an 
example of the confusion generated by the conflation of re­
lations and relational qualities, I will cite an argument founJ 
on pages 177 through 179.
Suppose that an apple is lying under a tree. In this case
i ■
the quality is appleness and the relation is the relation ■ 
of lying under a tree. Now if we had retained our sub­
stance and quality view of things there would be no prob­
lem. For it is the very same thing which is the apple and 
which is lying under a tree. And the identity of the 
substance provides a ground of connection between the 
quality appleness and the relational property of lying 
under a tree. But of course in Chapter 2 qualities are 
left dangling with no substance to attach to, and so our 
ground of connection has been removed and there is nothing! 
to hold the quality and the relational property together.
Now it is quite a different thing to say that a substance 
provides a ground of connection between a quality and a re­
lational quality, and that it provides a ground of connection 
between a quality and a relation. The former view is, I think, . 
widely accepted as true. The latter view, however, as Russell 
repeatedly stressed, implies the truth of monism - the theory 
that there is only one real substance. But, unless we assume 
that relations and relational qualities are identical - which 
Bradley does not - then the above analysis of his argument is 
quite irrelevant to the main point at issue; namely, the way 
in which a relation stands to a quality. And, although Cress- 
well may have shown, on page 179, that a problem arises when
307)
we attempt to understand the way in which a quality stands to 
a relational quality, he has not, thereby, shown that there is 
a problem in understanding the way in which a quality stands 
to a relation. For this reason, I believe that Cresswell’s 
interpretation of Bradley’s argument is unsatisfactory, and I 
will now offer my own interpretation.
Bradley’s overall contention, at this stage of his argument, 
is that qualities are incompatible with relations. In support 
of this contention he first of all argues that qualities cannot 
be resolved into relations. This point was discussed previous­
ly, and I don’t see that it can be genuinely denied or queried. 
Bradley claims that we can only resolve a quality into a re­
lation by rendering the concept of a relation meaningless. A 
relation which relates nothing but relations is claimed to be 
ultimately absurd.
Secondly, he insists that any existent quality must stand 
in some relation. This is based upon the conclusion of the 
first argument to the effect that qualities presuppose re­
lations. This premiss is said, however, to lead to the further 
conclusion that any quality is internally diverse.
Each (quality) has a double character, as both supporting 
and as being made by the relation. (AR p.2 6 )
The quality is made by the relation in the sense that no 
quality can exist, as such, independently of a relation. And 
it supports the relation in the sense that it determines the 
relations it enters into in virtue of its intrinsic nature. 
Since all qualities have this diverse nature, all qualities, 
according to Bradley, must be complex.
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At this point a difficulty arises. Having rejected the 
substantive/adjective schema, we are unable to ascribe this 
diverse nature to a single substantive - in this case the 
original quality. It is therefore strictly incorrect to say 
that the quality has a diverse nature. This, in turn, forbids 
us to say that the quality is complex; which contradicts our 
earlier conclusion that all existent qualities must be complex..
The only meaning which might be given to the view that a 
quality is complex, and which would avoid the above difficulty, 
is that what is believed to be a complex quality is, in fact, 
two or more qualities in relation. But this approach leads to 
an infinite regress. Any quality in relation must be complex; 
and yet, as .we have seen, it cannot be complex. In order to 
explain the apparent complexity of the .quality we must intro­
duce two or more qualities in relation to account for the 
original 'complex1 quality. But each of these further qualities 
is itself a quality in relation, and therefore 'complex'. The , 
apparent complexity of these further qualities can only be 
explained by the introduction of further qualities in relation, 
and so on ad infinitum..
This argument is, I think, conclusive, so long as we accept 
the premiss that all qualities in relation (since all qualities 
presuppose relations, all qualities are qualities in relation) 
are complex. Even if Bradley's own, somewhat obscure reasons 
for accepting this premiss are questioned, it can, I believe, 
be established by a slightly different argument. The argument 
is as follows.
Every quality, we have seen, stands in some relation. In 
virtue of this fact, every quality has the further quality of 
this relation. Each relation thus determines, instanding in
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the terms which it relates, the occurrence of a relational 
quality. The original quality therefore has a diverse or 
complex nature - it is the bearer of relational qualities. This 
is also true of the generated relational qualities.
We might try to avoid this conclusion by denying that 
relational qualities are really qualities at all. But such a ■ 
view is hardly defensible. Our conclusion is, rather, a trivial 
truth. But the fact that it is trivially true does not make it ; 
any the less true.
The above argument is, I believe, in keeping with the spi­
rit of Bradley’s own approach to the problem, and it allows us 
to share his conclusion:
Every quality has, in consequence, a diversity within its 
own nature, and this diversity cannot immediately be 
asserted of the quality. Hence the quality must exchange 
its unity for an internal relation. But, thus set free, —  
the diverse aspects, because each something in relation, 
must each be something also beyond. This diversity is 
fatal to the internal unity of each; and it demands a 
new relation, and so on without limit, (AR pp.26-27)
The third stage of Bradley’s argument is similar in approach 
to the previous arguments, and is intended to show the incom­
patibility* of qualities and relations when approached from the 
side of the relations. Cresswell does not discuss this argument 
in detail; and, since it is similar in principle to the argu­
ments already discussed, I will ignore it and pass to the 
final section of my paper.
Before doing so, it is important to once again stress the
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fact that the arguments used by Bradley up to this point are 
not^iased upon the assumption that reality is experience. If, 
as Cresswell maintains, the arguments are compatible with this 
assumption, then this might serve to strengthen our conviction 
that they are true. But this is not to say that the arguments 
are based upon this assumption.
3. In conclusion I will discuss some issues raised by 
Cresswell1s treatment of Bradley’s doctrine of degrees of 
truth.
Cresswell1s discussion of Bradley’s theory of judgement in 
his initial article is, as he points out, subject to revision 
and expansion in his later article. There are, however, some 
rather questionable interpretations of Bradley’s views made in 
the first article which recur, without revision, in the second. 
On page 18$, for example, Cresswell claims that, according to 
Bradley, all judgements express, or attempt to express, the 
unqualified identity of the subject and predicate terms. For 
example, when I judge that the apple is red, I am, according 
to Cresswell’s account, implicitly affirming that the apple 
is identical with redness. And this affirmation, he claims, is 
clearly false.
as Bradley very quickly realized, not only are other 
things beside the apple red but they and it have all sorts 
of other properties as well; and so we must also incorp­
orate all other concrete universals in our attempt to 
arrive at a true judgement which includes the original 
subject and predicate. At each stage we will have more 
truth than before, but at no stage will our truth be
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complete until we end up with the assertion that the 
whole universe is identical with itself, (p.186)
As I understand Bradley's theory, this is not what he means
to assert. According to his views on the nature of thought,
the content of all judgements is confined to universals. The 1
universals used in judgement are abstract, and are identified
with the judgement's ideal content - the u/iat disjoined from :
the that - of which he elsewhere speaks. These universals do
not, as such, exist. The connection of content within the
11judgement is said to be a "marriage" of universals . The 
judgement that the apple is red is thus restricted, with res­
pect to its content, to affirming a connection between apple- 
ness and redness. Having made this point, a distinction is 
then drawn between the logical and the grammatical subject of 
the judgement. The logical subject is, as Cresswell would seem 
to acknowledge, reality - albeit, in general, some restricted 
sphere of reality. In the case of the ‘judgement in question, 
the logical subject is not 'the apple', but rather the concrete 
reality in which appleness and redness are united.
The next step is to point out that any attempt to unite 
distinct qualities without stipulating a ground for their being 
united is, on Bradley's view, a contradiction. In the case of 
Q-jjp judgement, if we merely conjoin appleness and redness, and 
fail to state the ground for their being united, we are, acc­
ording to Bradley, affirming a contradiction.^
Things are self-contrary when, and just so far as, they 
appear as bare conjunctions, when in order to think them 
you would have to predicate differences without an
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internal ground of connexion and distinction, when, in 
other words, you would have to unite diversities simply, 
and that means in the same point. This is what contra­
diction means, or I at least have been able to find no 
other meaning. (AR p.5 0 5)1^
The only way to avoid a contradiction is to stipulate the 
ground for their being united within the judgement itself. Any 
judgement which fails to supply these conditions, in total, 
is said to affirm the connection of its content subject to 
unstated conditions - which renders the judgement conditioned. 
And, because the conditions are never, according to Bradley, 
completely knowable, or completely statable, the judgement is
•"  i
essentially conditional. *
This theory of the conditioned, and conditional nature of 
all judgements is the basis for the theory of degrees of truth. 
That judgement is absolutely true which stipulates all the 
conditions which ground the unity of the diverse elements 
which comprise the content of the judgement. The greater the 
extent to which the conditions are made explicit in the judge­
ment, the greater its degree of truth or, what Bosanquet called
1 Zits "logical stability".
There are a number of passages which might be cited in 
defence of my interpretation of Bradley's views. But his theory 
is perhaps nowhere more explicitly stated than in the following 
passage from tAAay-à on 7/iuth. and Reality *
Every partial truth therefore is but partly true, and its 
opposite also has truth. This of course does not mean that 
any given truth is merely false, and, of course also, it
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does not mean that the opposite of any given truth is 
more true than itself. These are obvious, if natural, 
misunderstandings of our view. But surely it should be 
clear that you can both affirm and deny 'R(x)a' so long 
as x remains unspecified. And the truth on one of these
two sides surely becomes greater in comparison, according
(
as on that side, whether of affirmation or denial, you 
are able to make the conditions more complete. But, as 
long and so far as the conditions remain incomplete, the 
truth is nowhere absolute. ’It is possible to produce 
sparks by striking flint' is, I understand, offered as an 
instance of unconditional truth. But the opposite of this 
truth surely is also true. The thing clearly, I should 
have said, is possible or not possible according to the 
conditions, and the conditions are not sufficiently ex­
pressed in the judgement. You have therefore a truth 
which can at once be affirmed and denied, and how such a 
truth can be absolute I fail to perceive. The growth of 
knowledge consists., in getting the conditions of the 
predicate into the subject. Ike mon.e conditions you a/ie 
aLie to inciudct tke g/ieate/i is the tenth, But so long as 
anything remains outside, the judgement is imperfect and 
its opposite is also true. (ETR pp.232-233 - my emphasis)
The length of this quotation is, I think, justified by the 
light it sheds upon the question of the basis for Bradley's 
theory of degrees of truth. The sense in which all judgements 
_rm an identity between subject and predicate can be ex­
plained in terms of an identity of content and existence - of 
the u)kat and the that. The judgement both affirms the ideal
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content of reality, and affirms it, as such, to be real^. But 
there is always a discrepancy in a judgement between content 
and existence; and, unless this discrepancy or disjunction is 
maintained, judgement and thought will lose an essential char­
acteristic. Judgement at once presupposes the ’loosening1 or 
disjunction of content from existence, and yet is the attempt ' 
to unite these two aspects of reality. It is this inconsistent, 
even contradictory, character of judgement and thought which, : 
I believe, gave Bradley his reason for claiming that it must 
be transcended in the Absolute.
Bradley’s characterisation of thought and judgement is, of 
course, disputable. But the above interpretation is, I believe, 
a faithful, if brief, account of the essential features of his 
analysis. •
In so far as. all judgements are, in the sense explained 
above, implicit identity statements, they are not reducible to 
tautologies; and the ideal of truth, according to Bradley, is 
not to be found (as Cresswell suggests on p.186) in the bare 
tautology that the Universe is identical with itself. The 
ideal of thought is, rather, the ideal expression of the Uni­
verse as a systematic and coherent unity, including the com­
plete sum of conditions of its own expression as truth. But, 
according to Bradley, thought always falls short of its ideal 
because it never is what it means. Truth is essentially ideal, 
and yet, whilst it remains ideal it is not, as such real. In 
this sense alone, I believe, can the following passage quoted 
by Cresswell (p.186) be understood.
Truth should mean what it stands for, and should stand for
what it means; but these two aspects in the end prove
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incompatible. There is still a difference, unremoved, 
between the subject and the predicate, a failure which, 
while it persists, shows a failure in thought, but which, 
if removed, would wholly destroy the special essence of 
thinking. (AR_ p.3 1 9 )
The unremoved difference of which Bradley speaks is not, as 
Cresswell implies, the difference between the two sides of an 
identity sign. It is, rather, the difference between content 
and existence, between the what and the that,
Finally, on page 177, Cresswell claims that Bradley held a 
possible worlds view of truth; and, later (p.187), that he was 
a realist about possible worlds. I have already dealt with the 
basis for Bradley’s doctrine of degrees of truth, and I have,
I believe, shown that the introduction of possible worlds is 
irrelevant to the understanding of this doctrine. Concerning 
the contention that Bradley was a realist about possible 
worlds, I don’t see that there is any evidence for this con­
tention in Bradley’s writings. It would be more correct to say 
that he was a poAtltititt about the real world. Judgements 
which are not true of the world co-extensive with my body in 
waking consciousness might, according to such a view, never­
theless be true of the various worlds of imagination, dreams, 
fiction, etc.. Any restriction of the real world such as to 
exclude these realms is, according to Bradley, ultimately 
quite ■ arbitrary"*^. In keeping with this view, statements about., 
possibilities can be analysed along the lines suggested by 
McTaggart17, as statements about implication relations between 
actual characteristics; or else, as statements grounded m  
categorical judgements about the existent. What Bradley did
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argue for was not the proliferation of merely possible worlds,
1 8but rather the extension of the boundaries of the real world . 
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Addendum
Spatial Signal Resolution in Coherent Communication Systems
1 INTRODUCTION
In Section  3.3 of this thesis, a direct angular resolution method of the incident signals 
on a linear antenna array is described. In this method, the physical cophasal requirement 
of the incom ing signals is tacitly  assumed. The purpose of this Addendum is to exp lic itly  
d iscuss th is cophasal requirement and to provide a plausible implementation of such a 
system.
2 ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALYSIS
In th is Section we considered a special situation where there are identical signal 
sources transm itting narrow band signal of the same frequency. These sources are in 
different spatial d irections with respect to a receiving antenna array as shown in Figure 1.
The signal sources are assumed highly correlated in phase and the signals are 
assumed to propagate through the same spatial medium. The incident signal wavefronts 
are therefore also highly correlated in phase at the antenna array. This coherent 
com m unication [1,2] situation is common in the star connected sate llite/terrestria l 
com m unication networks [3,4] where the transm it oscillator of the remote term inals are 
phase synchronised to the master clock of the transm itting hub [5,6,7] in a multip le 
access protocol such as TDM protocol. The two main advantages of th is configuration are 
that the remote term inals can assume the high frequency stability offerred by the 
precision master osc illa to r of the hub. Such frequency standard is usually extrem ely 
expensive and it would not be cost effective to instal one in each of the hundreds maybe 
thousands of the remote term inals in the network. Secondly, the phase locking 
configuration increases the signal coherence and thus degrades the overall probability of
error signal.
Under th is phasal relationship, therefore, whenever a remote term inal gains access to 
the hub, it is possib le for the remote term inal to maintain a constant phase at the hub 
rece iver through a duplex resynchronisation stage in a sim ilar manner as a conventional 
^ synchron isation  process [2]. As a consequence, a constant phase can be maintained by
1
F igure  1. The linear antenna array configuration
all the remote term inals through this process.
Figure 2 shows a conventional star connected com m unication  network. Figure 3 show s 
one of a number of conventional rece iver to transm itter c lo ck  synchronisation schem es.
It is assumed that the received signals at the antenna array carry random phase no ise  
w h ich  arises from  either the non-hom ogene ity  of the atm osphere or the transm it/rece ive  
hardware such as o sc illa to r phase noise d istribution [9].
The probability d istribution function for the phase no ise of th is nature can be assum ed 
to  be conform ed to T ikhonov d istribution [8],
Let 0 be the phase noise [9] of signal s r S ince 0 j; ¡=0,1,2,... are identical and 
independent random processes, they possess the same probability d istribution  function , 
variance and mean.
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Figure 2. A typical star connected communication ne tw o rk1
The probability d istribution function fo r the phase noise in question is,
where
pdf(B)._eSnr_cosB_
2 tt Iq snr
snr is the signal to noise ratio
I0 is the modified Bessel function of the 1th kind.
Fo llow ing  the preceding assum ptions, the physical signals model at hand y ie ld s  the
E x t r a c t  f r o m  re f.3  p p .2 7 5
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D o p p l e r  
♦  O K i l l a i o r Recetver
F igure 3. One of the phase synchronisation schem es2
results be low :-
• Expected value for 8 is zero for 8 being normally d istributed w ithin the range 
of - tt< or = 8 = or < it.
j8
• Expected value of e 1 is non zero for all i, if signal to no ise  ratio is non zero 
over the range of - tt< or = 8 = or < tt.
iB iB-
• From the preceding resu lt , E[e °]=E[e 'L i*1,2,....m.
Where E[.] denotes the expected value of.
Thus, Referring to Figure 1, the signal at the output o f nth antenna array e lem ent is.
^ E x tra c t  f r o m  re f  5 p p .4 1 2  w ith  m o d if ic a t io n s
sn=e' jHtI V J (* i+8*)
m
where m is the number of incident sources
<t>m={2mTTd sina}/X 
d is the inter element spacing 
. a is the signal amplitude
X is the wavelength
a is the incident direction of the signal 
Therefore, from  resu lts 2 and 3, the detected output after the sam pling p rocess is,
<sn>rkI ame^ m
ra
where k is a constant.
Figure 4 show s a well known PSK dem odulation schem e in which the QPSK phase 
inform ation  is extracted.
The fo llow -on  analysis on the spatial angular resolution by a linear antenna array can 
be found in Section 3.3 of th is thesis. The next section in this addendum is to describe a 
rea listic  application scenario.
3 SPATIAL RESOLUTION OF COHERENT ALOHA COLLISION SOURCES
This section  describes a sim ple spatial resolution method of coherent signal sources 
on co llis io n  access to a central hub rece iver in a radio ALOHA [1,2,3] network. The extra 
hardware investm ent in th is approach a llow s an additional degree of freedom  in the 
random access protocol.
In a m ultip le access com m unication system , the main concern is to u tilise  a com m on 
com m un ica tion  resource efficiently. When there are more than one signal sources w ish ing  
to transfer d ig ital data packets to a sing le central hub receiver sim ultaneously, one can 
use one of a few  well known multip le access strateg ies such as TDMA, FDMA or DAM A 
[2] It is a lso not uncom m on for a com m unication  network to adopt ALOHA p rotoco l under
5
Figure 4. Phase Demodulator block d iagram3
certa in  m ultip le access cond itions [10,11,12]. ALOHA or RTDMA allows signal sources to 
transm it data packets at random time slots. In the event an access co llis ion  occurs, data 
packets sent w ill be lost and the sender sources w ill not receive acknow ledgem ent from  
the receiver. The sender sources w ill then retransm it the data packets at random ly 
se lected  time slo ts until a successfu l access is achieved. Under an overload situation, 
ALO HA access w ill eventually fail.
The purpose of th is section is to introduce an additional degree of freedom  in te rm s 
o f hardware im plem entation to resolve the direction of arrival of the co llis io n  transm itting  
sources. Thus, a number of alterative priority access strategies are then open to the 
network. A  poss ib le  hardware option is to use an additional beam form ing antenna [13].
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A multip le access remote term inal in a modern coherent com m unication network 
generally uses the recovered receive c lock to phase lock the transm it oscillator. The 
reason being that the remote term inals can assume higher frequency stab ility of the 
m aster c lock at the central hub as well as achieve a higher signal coherence. This 
technique perm its precise data packet capture w indow in the hub receiver. As a result, 
the accessing signal sources are generally correlated in phase with one another. 
Therefore, in a fixed site com m unication network, they can be arranged to be in phase at 
the hub if necessary. Diurnal path changes correction can be up-dated whenever an 
access is achieved. Under this assumption, a simple spatial signal resolution antenna 
system  can be realised for a PSK type network.
To sim plify the analysis, only a linear antenna array is considered.
Consider a linear antenna array with equally spaced iso trop ic elements as shown in 
Figure 1. The signals received by the n elements in the antenna array as a consequence 
of m -incom ing  PSK signals, ignoring the effect of mutual coupling between antenna 
elements, can be represented by a complex column vector X  such that,
X=[X0,X1,...Xn_1]
( 1)
With the com m on carrier frequency im plic itly  expressed, X can be expressed as,
m
X= l ej(4>t+B,ajS j+ N
¡=1 ( 2 )
where,
jOt- j(n 1
s=  [1,e ,...e T
(3)
• is the amplitude of the ith signal source.
• [.]T denotes transposition.
• 0 is the readjusted fixed phase shared among the signal sources w ith 
gaussian phase noise.
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• <J>t is the fixed tone PSK preamble with Tikhonov phase noise.
• a=2TTdsin8j/X.
• 0j represents the bearing of the ith signal source with respect to the array 
broadside.
• d is the in te r-e lem ent spacing of the antenna array.
• X- is the operating wavelength.
• N is the random white noise vector.
Consider the expected value of both sides of the Equation (2) and taking consideration  
of the assum ptions stated in Section 2,
m
< X > = c l  aiSi
¡=1
(4)
where c is a constant and can be normalised. < .> denotes the "Expected value of".
Now define Q matrix as,
<x0> <x‘> ..• < X n>
<x1 > <x0>
Q=
< X n > <x0>
(5)
where {.}* denotes conjugation.
To determ ine the number of signal sources m, the zero eigenvalue of the matrix Q 
needs be found and its m ultip licity is denoted as r. It is clear that the number of the 
signal sources is given by m=n-r. With m known, the principal m inor of Q with order m+1
is used.
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The new matrix is denoted by:
^m+1
< X n> <X*> ... <X*>0 1 m
<X^ <x0>
< X > • < X n>m 0
(6)
Now the unique e igenvector VQ corresponding to the zero eigenvalue of Qm+1 is 
com puted as,
v o=[ P o 'P i'~ P m]T; P c f 1
(7)
Thus,
< S ; > < S* > V Q=0; i= 1,2,...m
( 8 )
or equivalently,
< S i > V 0=0; i=1,2,...m
(9)
Expanding Equation (9) into components of V Q and St, the fo llow ing re lationsh ip is 
obtained,
?  (" ikaiLn
l pk® -°
k=0 ( 10)
-i«i
Clearly, the m roots of the polynom ial P(z) provide the so lution e , where
P(z)=I PkZ
k=0
m-k
( 1 1 )
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Thus, Up to n-1 angles of arrival of the incident signals can be identified. This 
form ulation  also a llow s the amplitude of each signal to be determined as well.
However, if the the arriving signals are not phase correlated then a signal covariance 
matrix needs be known. In this case, the hardware implementation is complicated, and the 
so lu tion  is well known [14].
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